Roughly put, explanatory circles - if any exist - would be propositions such that (i) each explains the next, and (ii) the last explains the first. In this paper, I give two arguments for the view that there are explanatory circles. The first argument appeals to general relativistic worlds in which time is circular. The second argument appeals to special science theories that describe feedback loops. In addition, I show that three standard arguments against explanatory circles are unsuccessful.

How should we evaluate Darwin and Wallace's arguments for common ancestry over separate ancestry? Elliott Sober defends a likelihood reconstruction of Darwin's reasoning that he dubs modus Darwin: similarity, therefore common ancestry. One assumption of Sober's approach is that separate ancestors have traits that are probabilistically independent. I motivate an objection to this assumption by appeal to 19th century naturalist alternatives such as those of Geoffroy and Owen. On Geoffroy and Owen's separate ancestry models, the ancestors can have traits that are probabilistically dependent. I then prove a generalization of Sober's approach that allows for similarity matching among traits to favour common ancestry over separate ancestry even when the traits of the separate ancestors are probabilistically dependent. I consider Helgeson's recent criticisms of Sober's approach and his alternative interpretation of Darwin's reasoning: more similar, hence, more recent common ancestry. I defend Sober's approach against Helgeson's objections.

Not all testing interventions that we might want to perform, or need to be performable in principle, fail to cause off-path variables. This is a problem for Woodward's Orthodox Interventionist Theory of causation, but not the 'Modified Interventionist Theory', which I proposed in a previous issue of this journal (Friend, 2021). As I explain here, this is because only the modified theory permits 'soft control'. I will survey three different kinds of case (beyond the case considered previously) in which soft control is necessary for a reasonable application of interventionism. These include cases where soft control makes intervention more practical, physically possible, and causally probative in the context of mechanisms. I'll also take the opportunity to remove some of the confusing aspects of my original formulation of the modified theory. The result, I believe, constitutes a strong case for it.

Brouwer's philosophy of mathematics is usually regarded as an intra-subjective, even solipsistic approach, an approach that also underlies his mathematical intuitionism, as he strived to create a mathematics that develops out of something inner and a-linguistic. Thus, points of connection between Brouwer's mathematical views and his views about and the social world seem improbable and are rarely mentioned in the literature. The current paper aims to challenge and change that. The paper employs a socially oriented prism to examine Brouwer's views on the construction, use, and practice of mathematics. It focuses on Brouwer's views on language, his social interactions, and the importance of group context as they appear in the significs dialogues. It does so by exploring the establishment and dissolution of the significs movement, focusing on Gerrit Mannoury's influence and relationship with Brouwer and analyzing several fragments from the significs dialogues while emphasizing the role Brouwer ascribed to groups in forming and sharing new ideas. The paper concludes by raising two questions that challenge common historical and philosophical readings of intuitionism.

Phenomena in gauge theory are often described in the physics literature via a specific choice of gauge. In foundational and philosophical discussions this is often criticized as introducing gauge dependence, and contrasted against (often aspirational) "gauge-invariant" descriptions of the physics. I argue, largely in the context of scalar electrodynamics, that this is misguided, and that descriptions of a physical process within a specific gauge are in fact gauge-invariant descriptions. However, most of them are non-local descriptions of that physics, and I suggest that this ought to be the real objection to such descriptions. I explore the unitary gauge as the exception to this nonlocality and consider its strengths and limitations, as well as (more briefly) its extension beyond scalar electrodynamics.

Cassirer's early philosophy of space and time, overshadowed by his later work on relativity, has been scarcely explored in the literature. This paper aims to bridge this gap. It argues that understanding Cassirer's point of view requires acknowledging the pivotal role he attributed to the work of Leonhard Euler in the philosophical 'coming of age' of modern science. Against the Leibniz-Berkeley philosophical plea for the relativity of all motion, Euler objected that if Newton's absolute space and time did not exist, the principle of inertia would be come meaningless and with it a scientific theory of motion. According to Cassirer, Kant took a step beyond Euler by shifting the focus from the existence of space and time as 'things' to their function as necessary 'conditions' of the possibility of mechanics. In the nineteenth century, it became clear that Newton's absolute space and time entail more structure than necessary. Nevertheless, according to Cassirer, the Euler-Kant insight still holds: a geometric structure serving as an inertial structure is the condicio sine qua non of a coherent theory of motion, including general relativity. This paper concludes that Cassirer came close to defending a sort of 'inertial functionalism' dressed in neo-Kantian garb.

This paper critically examines the validity of Freudian psychoanalysis within the framework of Moberger's characterisation of pseudoscience as bullshit with scientific pretensions. The central question addressed is whether Freudian psychoanalysis qualifies as "bullshit," following Moberger's guideline of looking for systematic fallacies. The analysis centres on two fundamental critiques against psychoanalysis: one posited by Popper, contending that psychoanalytic interpretation is excessively flexible, and another by Glymour, asserting that Freud's interpretative method baselessly posits associations as causes. This paper argues that both criticisms rest on misunderstandings and asserts that Freudian psychoanalysis does not commit the alleged fallacies. It also offers positive evidence that Freud was not a bullshitter. The conclusion drawn is that psychoanalysis should not be regarded as bullshit, and hence does not qualify as pseudoscience on Moberger's criteria. Consequently, the paper suggests that Freudian psychoanalysis deserves a fairer hearing then many have given it.

Gravitational redshift effects undoubtedly exist; moreover, the experimental setups which confirm the existence of these effects-the most famous of which being the Pound-Rebka experiment-are extremely well-known. Nonetheless-and perhaps surprisingly-there remains a great deal of confusion in the literature regarding what these experiments really establish. Our goal in the present article is to clarify these issues, in three concrete ways. First, although (i) Brown and Read (2016) are correct to point out that, given their sensitivity, the outcomes of experimental setups such as the original Pound-Rebka configuration can be accounted for using solely the machinery of accelerating frames in special relativity (barring some subtleties due to the Rindler spacetime necessary to model the effects rigorously), nevertheless (ii) an explanation of the results of more sensitive gravitational redshift outcomes does in fact require more. Second, although typically this 'more' is understood as the invocation of spacetime curvature within the framework of general relativity, in light of the so-called 'geometric trinity' of gravitational theories, in fact curvature is not necessary to explain even these results. Thus (a) one can often explain the results of these experiments using only the resources of special relativity, and (b) even when one cannot, one need not invoke spacetime curvature. And third: while one might think that the absence of gravitational redshift effects would imply that spacetime is flat (indeed, Minkowskian), this can be called into question given the possibility of the cancelling of gravitational redshift effects by charge in the context of the Reissner-Nordström metric. This argument is shown to be valid and both attractive forces as well as redshift effects can be effectively shielded (and even be repulsive or blueshifted, respectively) in the charged setting. Thus, it is not the case that the absence of gravitational effects implies a Minkowskian spacetime setting.

Neuroscientists routinely use reverse inference (RI) to draw conclusions about cognitive processes from neural activation data. However, despite its widespread use, the methodological status of RI is a matter of ongoing controversy, with some critics arguing that it should be rejected wholesale on the grounds that it instantiates a deductively invalid argument form. In response to these critiques, some have proposed to conceive of RI as a form of abduction or inference to the best explanation (IBE). We side with this response but at the same time argue that a defense of RI requires more than identifying it as a form of IBE. In this paper, we give an analysis of what determines the quality of an RI conceived as an IBE and on that basis argue that whether an RI is warranted needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Support for our argument will come from a detailed methodological discussion of RI in cognitive neuroscience in light of what the recent literature on IBE has identified as the main quality indicators for IBEs.

There has been a lot of discussion about Heisenberg's Umdeutung paper of 1925, which is universally credited as the first formulation of modern quantum mechanics. Much of this discussion has been characterized by puzzlement over the manner in which Heisenberg arrived at his formulation, supposedly through Bohr's atomic theory in conjunction with two philosophical principles, namely the Correspondence Principle and the Observability Principle. I provide textual, contextual, and philosophical evidence that the "prescriptive-dynamical framework" - recently advocated in the literature on independent grounds - is the perfect perspective from which to understand Heisenberg's work and the significance of the two principles he utilized to arrive at it.

This paper, in a nutshell, is a plea for community participation in research along with an adapted idea for how such participation should be shaped and understood. I will give varied examples of the ways in which scientists viewing a perceived problem solely from an external perspective has led to mistakes. If we do not properly take into account the knowledge and values of people with a condition, we are liable to pursue the wrong sorts of treatments. In particular, I provide examples of three ways (exemplified in the cases of "female hysteria", autism, and chronic fatigue syndrome) scientists are liable to pursue treatment of what they perceive to be at least partially mental illnesses that they/we shouldn't. I present the idea of deliberative research-the concept is based on that of deliberative democracy. The idea of deliberative democracy is that decisions should be made on the basis of reasons that would be acceptable to the target population. I similarly argue that research decisions should be made on the basis of reasons that would be acceptable to the target population, even if it requires other experts to determine how those reasons are best to be respected in the context of a particular project.

Evolution requires selection. Molecular/chemical/preDarwinian evolution is no exception. One molecule must be selected over another for molecular evolution to occur and advance. Evolution, however, has no goal. The laws of physics have no utilitarian desire, intent or proficiency. Laws and constraints are blind to "usefulness." How then were potential multi-step processes anticipated, valued and pursued by inanimate nature? Can orchestration of formal systems be physico-chemically spontaneous? The purely physico-dynamic self-ordering of Chaos Theory and irreversible non-equilibrium thermodynamic "engines of disequilibria conversion" achieve neither orchestration nor formal organization. Natural selection is a passive and after-the-fact-of-life selection. Darwinian selection reduces to the differential survival and reproduction of the fittest already-living organisms. In the case of abiogenesis, selection had to be 1) Active, 2) Pre-Function, and 3) Efficacious. Selection had to take place at the molecular level prior to the existence of non-trivial functional processes. It could not have been passive or secondary. What naturalistic mechanisms might have been at play?

In this paper, I will focus on the nature of theoretical concepts, i.e., the psychological entities related to theoretical terms in science. I will first argue that the standard picture of theoretical concepts in twentieth-century philosophy of science understood them as representation-oriented common taxonomic concepts. However, I will show how, in light of recent pragmatist approaches to scientific laws and theories, several important theoretical concepts in science do not seem to fit such picture. I will then argue that these theoretical concepts should be understood instead as goal-derived concepts, since their construction and use exhibit the typical characteristics that cognitive scientists assign to goal-derived concepts. I will furthermore argue that the existence of theoretical concepts that are goal-derived concepts represents yet another example of the central role that human goals play in science.

Although Mary Hesse remains an influential figure within the history of the philosophy of science her reflections on the role of the human imagination in science have, to date, been mostly neglected. In her first, and often overlooked monograph-Science and the Human Imagination-Hesse described the imagination as composed of four dimensions. Defined as the historical, the critical, the fertile and the creative imagination, these dimensions played, for Hesse, various roles in both the philosophy and practice of science. Suffice to say, Hesse's discussion of the role of the imagination in science challenges the idea that philosophy and science are logically determined forms of practice through an appeal, as will be argued, to Immanuel Kant's seminal reflections on the 'indispensable function' of the imagination. Accordingly, a detailed elucidation of Science and the Human Imagination not only situates Hesse's reflections within the long history of the philosophy of the imagination; it revitalises anew contemporary debates on the role of the imagination in the philosophy and practice of science.

The prevailing narrative in the history of science maintains that the ancient Greeks did not have a concept of a 'law of nature'. This paper overturns that narrative and shows that some ancient Greek philosophers did have an idea of laws of nature and, moreover, they referred to them as 'laws of nature'. This paper analyzes specific examples of laws of nature in texts by Plato, Aristotle, Philo of Alexandria, Nicomachus of Gerasa, and Galen. These examples emerged out of the closely intertwined Platonic and Pythagorean traditions, and these philosophers' texts make reference to laws of nature when describing arithmetical methods, arithmological doctrines, or medical theories. Nicomachus' laws of nature are especially noteworthy, because they have features that historians look for in the search for the origin of the modern concept of laws of nature. Nicomachus' laws of nature are mathematical, universal, and necessary. This paper raises the possibility that the ancient Platonic and Pythagorean traditions influenced the subsequent development of the idea of laws of nature in medieval and early modern Europe, including the conception of laws of nature deployed by Johannes Kepler and Isaac Newton.

The debate between the revisionist and received views of the relationship between Thomas Kuhn and logical empiricism has until now focused on the relationship between Kuhn and Rudolf Carnap. Here, I consider the relationship between Kuhn and two other members of the Vienna Circle's left-wing; Otto Neurath and Philipp Frank. It is argued that the attribution of the historical turn in philosophy of science to Kuhn obscures the historical awareness displayed in important works by members of the Vienna Circle, and thereby distorts its legacy. Both Frank and Neurath recognised the role for history in theorizing about science, and drawing upon these insights lead them to considerations of scientific theory-choice, rational disagreement, and the role of extra-scientific values in science, that anticipate those later made famous by Kuhn. It is also argued that the Left-Vienna Circle's programme for Unified Science, the replacement of traditional philosophy with a bipartite metatheory of science, provides a clearer and potentially more radical role for the history of science within the philosophy of science than Kuhn's. To reach this conclusion, it is demonstrated that some members of the Vienna Circle maintained a far less robust distinction between contexts of discovery and justification than has typically been attributed to them.

This article explores the emergence of molecular approaches in German genetic research during the 1958-1968 decade as a period of contingency and alternative possibilities. We introduce "Narratives of Contingency" as an analytical framework to examine how scientists construct a specific narrative - linking past experiences with expectations of future conditions - in order to outline and navigate pathway-decisions in the present. We apply this framework to Hans-Jörg Rheinberger's developmental model of molecular genetics and illustrate how the stages he identifies - the direction of the field, institutional developments, and epistemological demarcations - were already central themes in the comparative practices underlying narratives of contingency in this early period. Narratives of contingency can thus serve as a systematic framework for analyzing the processes through which new scientific fields, institutions, and epistemic horizons emerge, and possibly also for identifying historically plausible fork moments or alternative pathways not taken.

I examine a known case of undergeneralization in Euclid's Elements arising from Euclid's non-cognizance of the reflex angle. Sir Thomas Heath (1956) attributed the undergeneralization to Euclid's lack of awareness, an assessment that I dispute. Non-recognition of reflex angles also leads to Proclus' four-sided triangles which violate an essential property of triangles. I show that these issues are resolvable. However, the question as to why Euclid did not acknowledge the reflex angle remains. I claim that the best explanation is that Euclid was guided by reasons of rigor. I argue that the propositional role of diagrammata in Greek mathematics as expounded by Netz (1998,2003) and Euclid's view of the reliability of sense perception impose a crucial representational constraint that governs how diagrams could be used in the Elements. I show that the missing reflex angle, and the careful crafting of definitions in the Elements are evidence that the representation constraint was indeed meticulously followed, even at apparent cost. I argue that alternative explanations for the missing reflex angle are not tenable. In sum, Euclid was aware of the limitations of diagrams, and worked assiduously within their limitations to preserve rigor.

Aesthetic considerations played a substantial and positive role in the development and acceptance of plate tectonics, the modern theory of the earth's major geological features and the unifying framework of the earth sciences. Here I give an overview of how aesthetics influenced plate tectonics and take a detailed look at a handful of examples from this history where elegance and simplicity tipped the balance in favour of a given hypothesis. I discuss some implications of this case study for extant accounts of aesthetics in science and argue that the positive role aesthetics played can be explained by recent accounts that posit an indirect and contingent link between knowledge and psychological mechanisms underlying aesthetic appreciation.

Machine learning (ML) models recently led to major breakthroughs in predictive tasks in the natural sciences. Yet their benefits for the social sciences are less evident, as even high-profile studies on the prediction of life trajectories have shown to be largely unsuccessful - at least when measured in traditional criteria of scientific success. This paper tries to shed light on this remarkable performance gap. Comparing two social science case studies to a paradigm example from the natural sciences, we argue that, in addition to explanation, prediction is an important goal of social science - and we identify constraints that impede pure ML prediction from being successful in that field. As a remedy, we outline elements of an integrative modelling approach that combines explanatory models and predictive ML models.