This Article examines how the rapid deregulation and rampant possession of firearms is likely going to impact policing, and the constitutional law that governs it. For the longest time, lawful gun carry, concealed or open, was exceedingly rare. For a police officer to see a gun was both to see danger, and a crime in progress. This link among guns, danger, and unlawful possession has shaped much of the law of policing. But now, this understanding of the world is in its last stages of unraveling. In nearly all states, guns are no longer unlawful to own and carry by default. In many, they are barely regulated. Recent Supreme Court Second Amendment decisions like New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen serve only to hasten where state laws already were headed. For police, however, the harm guns can do exists irrespective of what the law has to say about the legality of carrying them. As a result, the nation's gun laws are on a collision course with the practice and law of policing. This Article explores how the constitutional law governing policing is changing and will change in the face of gun legalization. Part I of this Article explains the ubiquitous role guns play in the life of a police officer, and what actions guns lead police to take. Part II is about the legal doctrine of policing, both before and after firearm legalization. It details how the law shaped what police could do in order to protect themselves and others, and how that law is changing to accommodate legalization. Police now must operate in a terrain that increasingly is uncertain as to their lawful authority, and that in many instances may put them or others in jeopardy. Part III examines how the shifting laws of guns and policing might impact police behavior, likely resulting in ad hoc carve-outs for police authority that-if history is any guide-overwhelmingly will be imposed on Black and Brown communities.

The thought of a large biotech company holding an exclusive right to research and manipulate human genetic material provokes many reactions--from moral revulsion to enthusiasm about the possibilities for therapeutic advancement. While most agree that such a right must exist, debate continues over the appropriate extent of its entitlements and preclusive effects. In this Article, Professor Donna Gitter addresses this multidimensional problem of patents on human deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequences in the United States and the European Union. Professor Gitter chronicles not only the development of the law in this area, but also the array of policy and moral arguments that proponents and detractors of such patents raise. She emphasizes the specific issue of patents on DNA sequences whose function has not fully been identified, and the chilling effect these patents may have on beneficial research. From this discussion emerges a troubling realization: While the legal framework governing "life patents" may be similar in the United States and the European Union, the public perceptions and attitudes toward them are not. Professor Gitter thus proposes a dual reform: a compulsory licensing regime requiring holders of DNA sequence patents to license them to commercial researchers, in return for a royalty keyed to the financial success of the product that the licensee develops; and an experimental-use exemption from this regime for government and nonprofit researchers.