Attention must coordinate with memory to actively anticipate sensory input and guide action. Memory content may be biased away from veridical when it is functionally adaptive. So far, research has considered the biasing of still features in static displays. It is unknown whether the biasing of attentional templates can functionally adapt dynamic stimuli to facilitate search when targets and distractors compete within temporally extended contexts. Biasing of dynamic templates would require learning and modulatory mechanisms capable of abstracting over space and time to guide perception. Four experiments used a novel dynamic visual search task combined with a memory probe to test whether dynamic attentional templates can be biased. In Experiments 1-3, participants searched for a moving target among distractors that systematically moved either clockwise or counterclockwise relative to the target. On memory probe trials, participants recalled the target direction as biased away from the distractors. The distortion bias was adaptively changed (Experiment 2), grew over time (Experiment 2), and occurred even when motion direction was not the target-defining feature (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 manipulated the speed of targets and distractors to test the generalizability of the findings. Participants searched for a target of a given speed among faster or slower distractors. Memory probing revealed that participants remembered the target speed as biased away from that of distractors. Across different tasks, the magnitude of the biasing correlated positively with search performance. Our findings provide compelling evidence that dynamic stimulus attributes in attentional templates can become functionally biased when adaptive. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Masked priming paradigms are frequently used to shine light on the processes of nonconscious cognition. Introducing a new method to this field, Lähteenmäki et al. (2015) claimed that affective priming requires awareness. Specifically, they administered a subjective rating task after the priming task in each trial to directly assess awareness of the prime. Their main result was a lack of priming for subjectively unaware primes. In four experiments, we compared their method with the traditional paradigm, that is, a single-task priming phase followed by a direct test of prime recognition. We used faces with anger versus sadness expressions as primes and targets; emotion categorization was the task. In contrast to Lähteenmäki et al., primes and targets were drawn from different sets, such that priming effects can be unequivocally attributed to the processing of evaluative features. In Experiments 1a, b, we followed their approach of using different prime durations to produce variance in awareness ratings. With a duration of 40 ms, significant priming effects for subjectively unaware primes were found. This duration was also associated with priming effects in the traditional paradigm with near-zero objective prime categorization, suggesting that priming does not require awareness. In Experiment 2a, employing a constant 40-ms duration, we replicated the traditional effect. However, the parallel Experiment 2b with subjective awareness ratings produced a null result at a sharply increased response time level. We conclude that the claim that affective processing requires awareness is not justified. Subjective trial-by-trial visibility ratings can severely alter processing strategies in response priming paradigms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Traditional explanations for stereotypes assume that they result from deficits in humans (ingroup-favoring motives, cognitive biases) or their environments (majority advantages, real group differences). An alternative explanation recently proposed that stereotypes can emerge when exploration is costly. Even optimal decision makers in an ideal environment can inadvertently form incorrect impressions from arbitrary encounters. However, all these existing theories essentially describe shortcuts that fail to explain the multidimensionality of stereotypes. Stereotypes of social groups have a canonical multidimensional structure, organized along dimensions of warmth and competence. We show that these dimensions and the associated stereotypes can result from exploration: When individuals make self-interested decisions based on past experiences in an environment where exploring new options carries an implicit cost and when these options share similar attributes, they are more likely to separate groups along multiple dimensions. We formalize this theory via the contextual multiarmed bandit problem, use the resulting model to generate testable predictions, and evaluate those predictions against human behavior. We evaluate this process in incentivized decisions involving as many as 20 real jobs and successfully recover the classic dimensions of warmth and competence. Further experiments show that intervening on the cost of exploration effectively mitigates bias, further demonstrating that exploration cost per se is the operating variable. Future diversity interventions may consider how to reduce exploration cost, in ways that parallel our manipulations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Uncertainty presents a key challenge when learning how best to act to attain a desired outcome. People can report uncertainty in the form of confidence judgments, but how such judgments contribute to learning and subsequent decisions remains unclear. In a series of three experiments employing an operant learning task, we tested the hypothesis that confidence plays a central role in learning by regulating resource allocation to the seeking and processing of feedback. We predicted that, as participants' confidence in their task knowledge grew, they would discount feedback when it was provided and be correspondingly less willing to pay for it when it was costly. Consistent with these predictions, we found that higher confidence was associated with reduced electrophysiological markers of feedback processing and decreased updating of beliefs following feedback receipt. Bayesian modeling suggests that this decrease in processing was due to a drop in the expected informative value of novel information when participants were highly confident. Thus, when choosing whether to pay a fee to receive further feedback, participants' subjective confidence, rather than the objective accuracy of their decisions, guided their choices. Overall, our results suggest that confidence regulates learning and subsequent decision making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Many of the most interesting cognitive feats that humans perform require us to consider not just the things that but also . We often do this explicitly (e.g., when imagining precisely how a first date could have gone better), but other times we do it spontaneously and implicitly (e.g., when thinking, "I have to catch this bus," implying bad alternatives if the bus is not caught). A growing body of research has identified a core set of neural processes involved in explicit, episodic counterfactual thinking. Little is known, however, about the processes supporting the spontaneous, possibly implicit representation of alternatives. To make progress on this question, we induced participants to spontaneously generate counterfactual alternatives by asking them to judge whether agents were forced to make a particular choice or chose freely-a judgment that implicitly depends on their alternative options. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found 14 clusters that were preferentially engaged when participants were making force judgments (which elicit the spontaneous consideration of alternatives) compared to judgments of what actually occurred (which do not elicit alternatives). These clusters were widely distributed throughout the brain, including in the bilateral prefrontal cortex, bilateral inferior parietal lobule, bilateral middle and inferior temporal gyri, bilateral posterior cingulate, and bilateral caudate. In many of these regions, we additionally show that variability in the neural signal correlates with trial-by-trial variability in participants' force judgments. Our findings provide a first characterization of the neural substrates of the spontaneous representation of counterfactual alternatives. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

As social interactions increasingly move to digital platforms, communicators confront new factors that enhance or diminish virtual interactions. Texting abbreviations, for instance, are now pervasive in digital communication-but do they enhance or diminish interactions? The present study examines the influence of texting abbreviation usage on interpersonal perceptions. We explore how texting abbreviations affect perceived sender sincerity and the subsequent likelihood that recipients respond. Eight preregistered studies ( = 5,306) using mixed methods (e.g., surveys, field and lab experiments, and archival analysis of Tinder conversations) find that abbreviations make senders seem less sincere and recipients less likely to write back. These negative effects arise because abbreviations signal a lower level of effort from the sender. Communicator familiarity and text exchange length do not attenuate these effects, providing evidence for a robust phenomenon. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

In hybrid foraging, foragers search for multiple targets in multiple patches throughout the foraging session, mimicking a range of real-world scenarios. This research examines outcome uncertainty, the prevalence of different target types, and the reward value of targets in human hybrid foraging. Our empirical findings show a consistent tendency toward risk-averse behavior in hybrid foraging. That is, people display a preference for certainty and actively avoid taking risks. While altering the prevalence or reward value of the risky targets does influence people's aversion to risk, the overall effect of risk remains dominant. Additionally, simulation results suggest that the observed risk-averse strategy is suboptimal in the sense that it prevents foragers from maximizing their overall returns. These results underscore the crucial role of outcome uncertainty in shaping hybrid foraging behavior and shed light on potential theoretical developments bridging theories in decision making and hybrid foraging. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The standard method for addressing the consequences of misinformation is the provision of a correction in which the misinformation is directly refuted. However, the impact of misinformation may also be successfully addressed by introducing or bolstering alternative beliefs with opposite evaluative implications. Six preregistered experiments clarified important processes influencing the impact of bypassing versus correcting misinformation via negation. First, we find that, following exposure to misinformation, bypassing generally changes people's attitudes and intentions more than correction in the form of a simple negation. Second, this relative advantage is not a function of the depth at which information is processed but rather the degree to which people form attitudes or beliefs when they receive the misinformation. When people form attitudes when they first receive the misinformation, bypassing has no advantage over corrections, likely owing to anchoring. In contrast, when individuals focus on the accuracy of the statements and form beliefs, bypassing is significantly more successful at changing their attitudes because these attitudes are constructed based on expectancy-value principles, while misinformation continues to influence attitudes after correction. Broader implications of this work are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

What makes an object ? Complexity comes in many different forms. Some objects are complex but simple (e.g., a hairbrush). Other objects are the opposite; they look simple but work in a complex way (e.g., an iPhone). Is one kind of complexity more fundamental to how we represent, attend to, and remember objects? Although most existing psychological research on complexity focuses on visual complexity, we argue that mechanistic complexity may be more consequential: Across five preregistered experiments ( = 780 adults), we show that mechanistic complexity not only predicts explicit judgments but also drives visual attention and memory. Thus, representations of object complexity-and object representations more broadly-rely on more than just external appearance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

What are the diagnostic dimensions on which objects differ visually? We constructed a two-dimensional object space based on such attributes captured by a deep convolutional neural network. These attributes can be approximated as stubby/spiky and animate-/inanimate-looking. If object space contributes to human visual cognition, this should have a measurable effect on object discrimination abilities. We administered an object foraging task to a large, diverse sample ( = 511). We focused on the stubby animate-looking "face quadrant" of object space given known variations in face discrimination abilities. Stimuli were picked out of tens of thousands of images to either match or not match with the coordinates of faces in object space. Results show that individual differences in face perception can to a large part be explained by variability in general object perception abilities (o-factor). However, additional variability in face processing can be attributed to visual similarity with faces as captured by dimensions of object space; people who struggle with telling apart faces also have difficulties with discriminating other objects with the same object space attributes. This study is consistent with a contribution of object space to human visual cognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Social interactions can be uncomfortable. The current research focuses on a particularly uneasy interaction that individuals face with their friends and acquaintances: the need to request owed money back. Nine preregistered studies ( = 6,953) show that individuals' approach to resolving interpersonal debt varies based on their closeness with the requestee. Specifically, people prefer communication methods low in social richness (e.g., digital apps) when requesting money back from weak social connections such as distant acquaintances. However, they prefer communication methods high in social richness (e.g., in-person interactions) when requesting money back from strong social connections such as close friends. Process evidence reveals the psychological dynamics at play: (a) people anticipate discomfort when requesting money back from distant acquaintances in person, driving them away from in-person requests and toward digital apps, and (b) people are more averse to appearing impersonal with close friends, driving them away from digital apps and toward in-person requests. In sum, individuals adaptively approach uncomfortable financial interactions based on the relationship dynamics at hand. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Social media use is endemic among emerging adults, raising concerns that this trend may harm users. We tested whether reducing the quantity of social media use, relative to improving the way users engage with social media, benefits psychological well-being. Participants were 393 social media users (ages 17-29) in Canada, with elevated psychopathology symptoms, who perceived social media to negatively impact their life somewhat. They were randomized to either (a) assistance to engage with social media in a way to enhance connectedness (tutorial), (b) encouragement to abstain from social media (abstinence), or (c) no instructions to change behavior (control). Participants' social media behaviors were self-reported and tracked using phone screen time apps while well-being was self-reported, over four timepoints (6 weeks in total). Results suggested that the tutorial and abstinence groups, relative to control, reduced their quantity of social media use and the amount of social comparisons they made on social media, with abstinence being the most effective. Tutorial was the only condition to reduce participants' fear of missing out and loneliness, and abstinence was the only condition to reduce internalizing symptoms, relative to control. No condition differences emerged in eating pathology or the tendency to make social comparisons in an upward direction. Changes in social media behaviors mediated the effects of abstinence (but not of tutorial) on well-being outcomes. Participant engagement and perceptions of helpfulness were acceptable, but the abstinence group possibly perceived the content as less helpful. In conclusion, using social media differently and abstaining from social media may each benefit well-being. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Psychologists have long been intrigued by decision-induced changes in preferences where making a decision strengthens one's relative preference between more and less preferred options. This phenomenon has been explained through two prominent theories: a dissonance account, which suggests that it results from the decision maker's attempt to minimize an unpleasant emotional-motivational state of "dissonance," and an inference account, which posits that it reflects a process of inferring and updating one's "true" preferences. In the current research, we investigate whether, how, and why framing a decision as a choice or a rejection influences decision-induced preference modulation. Across 13 preregistered experiments, including seven ( = 6,248 participants from North America and Asia) reported in the main text, we find that reject-framed decisions between attractive options induce greater postdecision preference modulation (i.e., a larger preference gap between options) than choose-framed decisions, all else equal. Supporting the inference account, the effect is moderated by attribute similarity and choice set valence while being mediated consistently by perceived action diagnosticity. In contrast, purported moderators and process measures of the dissonance account received no support when tested. Additionally, we systematically address potential confounds associated with varying levels of "noise" in preference expression through decisions, an issue that had encumbered previous paradigms on preference modulation. Our findings suggest that changes in preference induced by ordinary day-to-day decisions primarily stem from an ongoing process of information inference and updating rather than dissonance reduction. This research also provides insights into the previously unforeseen consequences of framing interventions in policy and business. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The field of psychology has a long history of studying how diversity influences various outcomes such as identity development, social behaviors, perceptions, and decision making. However, considering the ways that diversity science research has expanded in recent years, the goal of this special issue is to provide space to highlight work that centers on identifying and testing new pathways from which we learn about diversity broadly defined. Specifically, this set of articles across the November and December 2024 issues stresses the need for us as a field to consider one's context, one's social identities or group memberships, and other various individual difference factors that all shape how we experience different forms of diversity across the lifespan (infancy through early adulthood). We also discuss areas of research not reflected through the submissions and push the field to fill those gaps in future work. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Simulating other people can shift one's self-concept, an effect known as simulation-induced malleability. How does imagining others shift the self? We propose that the activation of self-knowledge is the key factor by which simulation of others alters one's self-concept. We test this possibility across four studies that each manipulate self-knowledge activation indirectly during simulation and measure the impact on subsequent self-ratings. Results demonstrate that increasing activation of self-knowledge during simulation is associated with increased self-concept change. People experienced greater self-concept change when simulating similar others (Studies 1 and 2). People also generalized simulation-induced changes to aspects of the self-concept that were semantically similar to the simulated content (Study 3). Finally, people who are less likely to recruit self-knowledge (i.e., older adults) during simulation were less susceptible to self-concept change (Study 4). These studies highlight self-knowledge activation as an essential component of the effects of simulation on self-rated change. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

For contractualist accounts of morality, actions are moral if they correspond to what rational or reasonable agents would agree to do, were they to negotiate explicitly. This, in turn, often depends on each party's bargaining power, which varies with each party's stakes in the potential agreement and available alternatives in case of disagreement. If there is an asymmetry, with one party enjoying higher bargaining power than another, this party can usually get a better deal, as often happens in real negotiations. A strong test of contractualist accounts of morality, then, is whether moral judgments do take bargaining power into account. We explore this in five preregistered experiments ( = 3,025; U.S.-based Prolific participants). We construct scenarios depicting everyday social interactions between two parties in which one of them can perform a mutually beneficial but unpleasant action. We find that the same actions (asking the other to perform the unpleasant action or explicitly refusing to do it) are perceived as less morally appropriate when performed by the party with lower bargaining power, as compared to the party with higher bargaining power. In other words, participants tend to give more moral leeway to parties with better bargaining positions and to hold disadvantaged parties to stricter moral standards. This effect appears to depend only on the relative bargaining power of each party but not on the magnitude of the bargaining power asymmetry between them. We discuss implications for contractualist theories of moral cognition and the emergence and persistence of unfair norms and inequality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Language processing is incremental. As language signals-for example, words in a sentence-unfold, humans predict and activate likely upcoming input to facilitate comprehension. Prediction not only accelerates understanding but also prompts reassessment in the case of prediction error, fostering learning and refining comprehension skills. Therefore, it is paramount to understand what happens when linguistic predictions are violated-for example, when a sentence ends in an unpredicted word. One theory, which we test here, is that the originally predicted word is actively inhibited after semantic violations. Furthermore, we tested whether this purported lexical inhibition process is achieved by a domain-general mechanism-that is, one that also inhibits other processes (e.g., movement). We combined a semantic violation task, in which highly constrained sentences primed specific words but sometimes continued otherwise, with a motoric stop-signal task. Across two experiments, semantic violations significantly impaired simultaneous action-stopping. This implies that lexical and motor inhibition share the same process. In support of this view, multivariate decoding of electroencephalographic recordings showed early overlap in neural processing between action-stopping (motor inhibition) and semantic violations (lexical inhibition). Moreover, a known signature of motor inhibition (the stop-signal P3) was reduced after this initial overlap period, further suggesting the presence of a bottleneck due to shared processing. These findings show that semantic violations trigger inhibitory processing and suggest that this lexical inhibition recruits a domain-general inhibitory control mechanism. This provides a new perspective on long-standing debates in psycholinguistics, extends the range of a well-characterized cognitive control mechanism into the linguistic domain, and offers support for recent neurobiological models of domain-general inhibitory control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

People often need to learn complex information as part of their daily lives. One of the most effective strategies for understanding information is to explain it, for instance to a hypothetical other (Pilots 1 and 2). Yet, we find that learners prefer equally effortful but less effective learning strategies, even when incentivized to perform well (Study 1). Critically, we propose and find that learners' reluctance to explain is tied to their subjective knowledge of the material; learners who feel less knowledgeable about what they learned are most reluctant to explain it, despite the strategy being as effective for them (Study 2). An intervention that increased subjective knowledge (by having learners answer a few easy questions) increased learners' choice to explain, which was mediated by learners believing that explaining would be more pleasant and effective (Study 3). Directly manipulating beliefs about how fun and effective explaining is also boosted learners' willingness to explain (Study 4). Finally, because Studies 1-4 incentivized performance financially, we replicated key results in the classroom with students, finding improved scores on a class quiz (Study 5). The paradoxical implication of these findings is that those who need effective learning strategies the most are the ones least likely to use them. Put together, we find that subjective knowledge plays a key role in learning decisions and that boosting subjective knowledge is a simple intervention that can improve learning-related choices. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Loyalty is considered central to people's moral life, yet little is known about how people think about what it means to be loyal. We used a prototype approach to understand how loyalty is represented in Colombia and the United States and how these representations mediate attributions of loyalty and moral judgments of loyalty violations. Across seven studies ( = 1,984), we found cross-cultural similarities in the associative meaning of loyalty (Study 1) but found differences in the centrality of features associated with loyalty (Study 2) and the latent structure of loyalty representations (Study 3). Colombians represent loyalty in terms of more general moral characteristics, while U.S. participants represent loyalty in terms of interpersonal commitment, both in contrast with current approaches to loyalty. By comparing representations of loyalty and honesty, we establish that differences in loyalty conceptualizations reflect a different way of thinking about loyalty rather than morality more generally (Study 4). Further, Colombians attributed greater loyalty to individuals with general moral characteristics compared to participants from the U.S. sample (Study 5) and were more likely to classify nonloyal values as loyalty-related (Study 6). While the centrality of prototypical features predicts categorizing norm violations as loyalty-related, differences in prototypical structure account for differences in the severity of moral judgment for such violations (Study 7), which suggests that loyalty representations have similar functions, even though these representations differ in structural characteristics. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The factors that trigger lapses of attention (e.g., mind-wandering) during new learning remain unclear. The present study investigated whether the likelihood of experiencing an attentional lapse depends on (a) the importance of the material being studied and (b) the learner's age. In two experiments, younger and older adults completed a delayed free recall task in which to-be-remembered words were paired with point values. Thought probes were embedded into the encoding phase of each list to provide an index of one's ability to maintain attention on task and prevent recurrent lapses of attention (i.e., the consistency of attention). Experiment 1 revealed all individuals better remembered high-value information at the expense of low-value information, and older adults were more frequently focused on the task than younger adults. Participants were also less likely to remember an item at test if they experienced an attentional lapse while learning said item, and they were more consistently focused on the task when studying high-value information than when studying low-value information. Age did not moderate either of these effects. Experiment 2 replicated the findings from Experiment 1 and further revealed that the positive association between age and attentional consistency was explained by age-related differences in affect, motivation, personality, and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder symptomology. Once these factors were accounted for, older age was associated with increased attentional (less on-task focus). While future replication of this finding is needed, implications for education and theories of both mind-wandering and aging are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The way that societies assign people to racial categories has far-reaching social, economic, and political consequences. One framework for establishing racial boundaries is based on , which historically has been leveraged to create rigid racial categories, particularly with respect to being categorized as white. A second framework is based on , which can vary within families and across the lifespan, and is thus more likely to blur racial boundaries. The persistence of these distinct cultural beliefs about race requires that they be transmitted to each new generation, but there have been few cross-cultural studies on their development during childhood. Participants (5- to 12-year-old children, = 123) were from the United States, in which the ancestry model has been more prevalent, or from Brazil, in which the skin tone model has been more prevalent. In both countries, 5- to 7-year-olds endorsed the belief that skin tone determines race, for example, by assigning biological siblings with differing skin tones to different racial categories. However, racial concepts diverged among the 10- to 12-year-olds, with children from the United States shifting toward a classification based on ancestry and children in Brazil endorsing a classification based on skin tone even more strongly with age. These differing conceptions were especially evident with reference to white racial categorization: Older children from Brazil persisted in classifying lighter skinned people as white when they had African ancestry, unlike older children from the United States. These findings provide important insights into the developmental and cultural influences on racial classification systems. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).