Informed by the public health policymaking literature, this study's objective is to identify scientific, political, social, economic, and external factors related to U.S. governors' decisions to issue stay-at-home orders (SAHOs) in response to the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Public health experts advocate for social distancing to slow the spread of infectious diseases, but government mandates to social distance can impose substantial social and economic costs. This study uses event history analysis to investigate the issuance of COVID-19-related gubernatorial SAHOs during a 41-day period in the 50 U.S. states. The findings indicate that scientific, political, and economic factors were associated with the issuance of SAHOs, but that external considerations played the largest role, particularly those related to the timing of other governors' decisions. This study offers evidence about how some U.S. political leaders balance public health concerns against other considerations and, more broadly, how state governments address crisis-level issues.

Due to the slow rate of COVID-19 vaccine uptake and the spread of the highly contagious Omicron variant, governments are considering mandating COVID-19 vaccination for specific professions and demographic groups. This study evaluates popular attitudes toward such policies. We fielded a survey of 535 registered voters in South Dakota to examine popular attitudes towards vaccine mandates for five groups-children 12 and older, K-12 teachers, medical staff, nursing homes staff, and police personnel. We estimated a series of logistic regression models and presented predicted probabilities to find the primary determinants of these attitudes. Results revealed that political partisanship and trust in government are strong predictors of support for vaccine mandates across all models. Should government and public health officials wish to increase the proportion of people vaccinated for COVID-19, they must recognize the limitations of current public health campaigns, and reshape their efforts in congruence with scientific findings.

Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, the decision to reopen schools for in-person instruction has become a pressing policy issue. This study examines what overall factors drive public support for schools re-opening in person and whether members of the public are willing to comply with school re-opening decisions based on their own preferences and/or the level of government from which the order comes. Through two rounds of national surveys with an embedded experiment, I find consistent evidence that 1) trust in information from elites - not contact with COVID - best explain preferences for reopening, 2) political ideology and racial and class identification help explain preferences as well, and 3) the President of the United States is best positioned to generate compliance with a school reopening mandate. This study suggests that politics - not public health - drives public support for schools reopening and compliance with government orders to reopen.

The emergence of COVID-19 spurred the fastest development of a vaccine in history. Yet, a large proportion of Americans remain hesitant to receive it. Our paper investigates how the social networks we inhabit might explain persistent vaccine hesitancy. We argue that the COVID-19 vaccination status of respondents' closest associates inhibits or motivates their decision to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. To test our argument, we conduct an original survey asking respondents a battery of questions about the people with whom individuals most frequently discuss vaccines and COVID-19. Our survey reports that individuals' discussion networks are polarized by vaccination status. Concurrently, there is a strong association between the social network's vaccination status and the respondent's vaccination status. This association is so robust that partisanship does not moderate the association between discussants' vaccination status and respondents' vaccination status. Together, our results imply that unvaccinated individuals remain hesitant because they face reinforcing social pressure from their closest associates. The unique timing of our survey, during an unprecedented vaccination campaign against a novel disease, offers a snapshot of how relationships may affect attitudes.

Conspiracy theories and misinformation (CTM) became a salient feature of the Trump era. However, traditional explanations of political attitudes and behaviors inadequately account for beliefs in CTM or the deleterious behaviors they are associated with. Here, we integrate disparate literatures to explain beliefs in CTM regarding COVID-19, QAnon, and voter fraud. We aim to provide a more holistic accounting, and to determine which political, psychological, and social factors are most associated with such beliefs. Using a unique national survey, we find that anti-social personality traits, anti-establishment orientations, and support for Donald Trump are more strongly related to beliefs in CTM than traditional left-right orientations or other frequently posited factors, such as education, science literacy, and social media use. Our findings encourage researchers to move beyond the traditional correlates of political behavior when examining beliefs that express anti-social tendencies or a deep skepticism of social and political institutions.

About one third of American voters cast a vote more "against" than "for" a candidate in the 2020 Presidential election. This pattern, designated by negative voting, has been initially understood by rational choice scholarship as a product of cognitive dissonance and/or retrospective evaluations. This article revisits this concept through the affective polarization framework in the light of the rise of political sectarianism in American society. Based on an original CAWI survey fielded after the 2020 election, our regression analysis demonstrates that the predicted probability of casting a negative vote significantly increases among individuals for whom out-candidate hate outweighs in-candidate love. Negative voting is less prevalent among partisans as their higher levels of in-group affection can offset out-group contempt. By asserting the enduring relevance of negative voting in American presidential elections, we aim at stimulating further research and discussion of its implications for democratic representation.

Utilizing a nationally representative survey of Americans from December 2020, we consider the degree to which COVID-19 risk perceptions are related to political factors. We examine the likelihood that one believes they will be infected with COVID-19, the likelihood that a peer will be infected, and the difference between the individual and peer perceived risks, known as optimism bias, and compare these perceptions across partisan characteristics. Results show that Trump voting category is the most important contributor to perceived COVID-19 risks. We find similar partisan differences as prior research, note that these differences persisted through the end of 2020, despite the post-Thanksgiving surge with high and growing rates of COVID in all regions of the United States. Contrary to prior expectations, partisanship does not strongly predict the level of optimism bias, as both assessed personal and general health risks track closely with one another by both political party and ideology.