[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1080/01442872.2019.1577375.].

Tax authorities utilize a wide range of instruments to motivate honest taxpaying ranging from strict audits to fair procedures or personalized support, differing from country to country. However, little is known about how these different instruments and taxpayers' trust influence the generation of interaction climates between tax authorities and taxpayers, motivations to comply, and particularly, tax compliance. The present research examines the extended slippery slope framework (eSSF), which distinguishes tax authorities' instruments into different qualities of power of authority (coercive and legitimate) and trust in authorities (reason-based and implicit), to shed light on the effect of differences between power and trust. We test eSSF assumptions with survey data from taxpayers from three culturally different countries ( = 700) who also vary concerning their perceptions of power, trust, interaction climates, and tax motivations. Results support assumptions of the eSSF. Across all countries, the relation of coercive power and tax compliance was mediated by implicit trust. The connection from legitimate power to tax compliance is partially mediated by reason-based trust. The relationship between implicit trust and tax compliance is mediated by a confidence climate and committed cooperation. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Since the scandal, governments are increasingly concerned about the way in which citizens' personal data are collected, processed and used during election campaigns To develop the appropriate tools for monitoring and controlling this new mode of "data-driven campaigning" (DDC) regulators require a clear understanding of the practices involved. This paper provides a first step toward that goal by proposing a new organizational and process-centred operational definition of DDC from which we derive a set of empirical indicators. The indicators are applied to the policy environment of a leading government in this domain - the European Union (EU) - to generate a descriptive "heat map" of current regulatory activity toward DDC. Based on the results of this exercise, we argue that regulation is likely to intensify on existing practices and extend to cover current "cold spots". Drawing on models of internet governance, we argue that this expansion is likely to occur in one of two ways. A "kaleidoscopic" approach, in which current legislation extends to absorb DDC practices and a more "designed" approach that involves more active intervention by elites, and ultimately the generation of a new regulatory regime.