Gambles that involve a large but unlikely gain coupled with a small but likely loss-like a lottery ticket-are known as positively-skewed. There is evidence that people tend to prefer these positively skewed choices, leading to what is called a positive-skew bias. In this study, we attempt to better understand under what conditions people are more drawn toward positively skewed, relative to symmetric, gambles. Based on the animal literature, there is reason to believe that preference for skewed gambles is dependent on the strength of the skew, with a greater preference for more strongly skewed options. In two online studies (Study 1: N = 209; Study 2: N = 210), healthy participants across the lifespan (ages 22-85) made a series of choices between a positively skewed risky gamble and either a certain outcome (Study 1) or risky symmetric gamble (Study 2). Logistic regression analyses revealed that people were more likely to choose moderately- and strongly skewed gambles over certain outcomes, with the exception of when there were large potential losses (Study 1). However, a stronger skewness did not increase preference for positively skewed gambles over symmetric gambles, findings which also may depend on the valence of the expected outcome (Study 2). Taken together, these results suggest that there may be a greater preference for more strongly positively skewed gambles but it 1) is dependent on what other gamble is presented and 2) is most prevalent for positive expected values. Additionally, contrary to previous findings, we did not find strong evidence of an age-related increase in positive skew bias in either study. However, exploratory analyses revealed that decision making strategy and cognitive abilities may play a role.

Although previous studies have demonstrated an association between vaccine attitudes and cognitive biases, often resulting in vaccination hesitancy, the exact contribution of rationality has not been fully clarified. We tested two hypotheses regarding the impact of rationality on vaccine attitudes stemming from bounded and expressive rationality. We focused on parental vaccine attitudes operationalized by the affective, behavioral, and cognitive attitude components and investigated how these are influenced by disillusionment toward authorities and ability to engage in rational thinking operationalized using cognitive reflection and heuristics and biases tasks. The study was of a cross-sectional correlational design with a non-probabilistic sample of 823 volunteer participants surveyed online in April and May 2018 in Croatia. The results identified disillusionment toward authorities as a predictor of all components. Furthermore, performance on heuristics and biases tasks also predicted the affective and cognitive, but not the behavioral component, whereas cognitive reflection had no impact on vaccine attitudes. Next, a moderation effect of disillusionment toward authorities on the association between the omission bias task and all attitude components was identified. Parents with low disillusionment demonstrated positive vaccine attitudes regardless of their rationality, whereas for parents with high disillusionment a significant positive correlation between performance on the omission bias task as assessed with a vaccination vignette and attitudes was identified. This suggests that the ability to resist vaccine specific omission bias, that is, higher rationality, can decrease the negative effects of disillusionment, which supports the bounded rationality hypothesis.

Two studies examined whether episodic future thinking (EFT; pre-experiencing future events) reduces discounting of future rewards (DD). No studies have investigated whether process simulations (i.e., simulating the process of executing a future event) amplify EFT's reduction of DD. Study 1 examined the effect of incorporating process simulations into EFT ( = 42, = 43.27; 91% female, family income = $75,976) using a 2 × 2 factorial design with type of episodic thinking (process, nonprocess/general) and temporal perspective (EFT, episodic recent thinking) as between-subjects factors. Study 2 replicated Study 1 in a sample of adults living in poverty ( = 36; = 38.44, 88% female; family income = $25,625). The results of both studies showed EFT reduced DD, but process-oriented EFT did not amplify the effect of EFT. Our findings suggest the key ingredient in EFT's effect on DD is self-projection into the future. This was also the first study to show EFT improves DD in a sample living in poverty.

Psychologists have convincingly demonstrated that preferences are not always stable and, instead, are often "constructed" based on information available in the judgment or decision context. In 4 studies with experts (accountants and actuaries in Studies 1 and 2, respectively) and a diverse lay population (Studies 3 and 4), the evidence was consistent with the highly numerate being more likely than the less numerate to construct their preferences by rating a numerically inferior bet as superior (i.e., the bets effect). Thus, the effect generalizes beyond a college student sample, and preference construction differs by numeracy. Contrary to prior thinking about preference construction, however, high expertise and high ability (rather than low) consistently related to the paradoxical phenomenon. Results across studies including Study 3's experimental modifications of the task supported the hypothesized number comparison process (and not a lack of expertise with monetary outcomes and probabilities or numeracy-related differences in attention to numbers) as the effect's underlying cause. The bets effect was not attenuated by Study 4's instructions to think about what would be purchased with bet winnings. Task results combined with free-response coding supported the notion that highly numerate participants have a systematic and persistent inclination for doing simple and complex number operations that drive their judgments (even after controlling for nonnumeric intelligence). Implications for 3 types of dual-process theories are discussed. The results were inconsistent with default-interventionist theories, consistent or unclear with respect to fuzzy trace theory, and consistent with interactive theories.

We sometimes decide to take an offered option that results in apparent loss (e.g., unpaid overtime). Mainstream decision theory does not predict or explain this as a choice we want to make, whereas such a choice has long been described and highly regarded by the traditional Chinese dogma "" (suffering a loss is good fortune). To explore what makes the dogma work, we developed a celebrity anecdote-based scale to measure "Chikui" (suffering a loss) likelihood and found that:(i) people with higher scores on the Chikui Likelihood Scale (CLS) were more likely to report higher scores on subjective well-being and the Socioeconomic Index for the present and (ii) the current Socioeconomic Index could be positively predicted not only by current CLS scores but also by retrospective CLS scores recalled for the past, and the predictive effect was enhanced with increasing time intervals. Our findings suggest that "suffering a loss is good fortune" is not a myth but a certain reality.

Research on decision-making styles has shown that stylistic differences matter for real-life outcomes, but less research has explored how styles relate to other differences between individuals. Heeding a call for a more systematic and theoretically sound understanding of decision-making styles, we investigated the relation between decision-making styles and specific aspects of social orientation and approach to time in two samples (students, n = 118, and police investigators, n = 90). The results of regression analyses showed that decision-making styles are related to specific differences in social orientation and time approach. Furthermore, results of structural equation model analyses suggested possible adjustments to the proposed two-factor model for decision-making styles (Dewberry, Juanchich, & Narendran, 2013a).

Decision-making competence is the ability to follow normative principles when making decisions. In a longitudinal analysis, we examine the robustness of decision-making competence over time, as measured by two batteries of paper-and-pencil tasks. Participants completed the youth version (Y-DMC) at age 19 and/or the adult version (A-DMC) eleven years later at age 30, as part of a larger longitudinal study. Both measures are comprised of tasks adapted from ones used in experimental studies of decision-making skills. Results supported the robustness of these measures and the usefulness of the construct. Response patterns for Y-DMC were similar to those observed with a smaller initial sample drawn from the same population. Response patterns for A-DMC were similar to those observed with an earlier community sample. Y-DMC and A-DMC were significantly correlated, for participants who completed both measures, 11 years apart, even after controlling for measures of cognitive ability. Nomological validity was observed in correlations of scores on both tests with measures of cognitive ability, cognitive style, and environmental factors with predicted relationships to decision-making competence, including household SES, neighborhood disadvantage, and paternal substance abuse. Higher Y-DMC and A-DMC scores were also associated with lower rates of potentially risky and antisocial behaviors, including adolescent delinquency, cannabis use, and early sexual behavior. Thus, the Y-DMC and A-DMC measures appear to capture a relatively stable, measurable construct that increases with supportive environmental factors and is associated with constructive behaviors.

Adults differ in the extent to which they find spending money to be distressing; "tightwads" find spending money painful and "spendthrifts" do not find spending painful enough. This affective dimension has been reliably measured in adults, and predicts a variety of important financial behaviors and outcomes (e.g., saving behavior, credit scores). Although children's financial behavior has also received attention, feelings about spending have not been studied in children, as they have in adults. We measured the spendthrift-tightwad (ST-TW) construct in children for the first time, with a sample of 5-to-10-year-old children ( = 225). Children across the entire age range were able to reliably report on their affective responses to spending and saving, and children's ST-TW scores were related to parent reports of children's temperament and financial behavior. Further, children's ST-TW scores were predictive of whether they chose to save or spend money in the lab, even after controlling for age and how much they liked the offered items. Our novel findings - that children's feelings about spending and saving can be measured from an early age and relate to their behavior with money - are discussed with regard to theoretical and practical implications.

People often neglect opportunity costs: They do not fully take into account forgone alternatives outside of a particular choice set. Several scholars have suggested that poor people should be more likely to spontaneously consider opportunity costs, because budget constraints should lead to an increased focus on trade-offs. We did not find support for this hypothesis in five high-powered experiments (total N = 2325). The experiments used different products (both material and experiential) with both high and low prices (from $8.50 to $249.99) and different methods of reminding participants of opportunity costs. High-income and low-income participants showed an equally strong decrease in willingness to buy when reminded of opportunity costs, implying that both the rich and the poor neglect opportunity costs.

After more then 50 years of probabilistic choice modeling in Economics, Marketing, Political Science, Psychology, and related disciplines, theoretical and computational advances give scholars access to a sophisticated array of modeling and inference resources. We review some important, but perhaps often overlooked, properties of major classes of probabilistic choice models. For within-respondent applications, we discuss which models require repeated choices by an individual to be independent and response probabilities to be stationary. We show how some model classes, but not others, are invariant over variable preferences, variable utilities, or variable choice probabilities. These models, but not others, accommodate pooling of responses or averaging of choice proportions within participant when underlying parameters vary across observations. These, but not others, permit pooling/averaging across respondents in the presence of individual differences. We also review the role of independence and stationarity in statistical inference, including for probabilistic choice models that, themselves, do not require those properties.

Many behavioral paradigms used to study individuals' decision making tendencies do not capture the decision components that contribute to behavioral outcomes, such as differentiating decisions driven toward a reward from decisions driven away from a cost. This study tested a novel decision making task in a sample of 403 children (age 9 years) enrolled in an ongoing longitudinal study. The task consisted of 3 blocks representing distinct cost domains (delay, probability, effort) wherein children were presented with a deck of cards, each of which consisted of a reward and a cost. Children elected whether to accept or skip the card at each trial. Reward-cost pairs were selected using an adaptive algorithm to strategically sample the decision space in the fewest number of trials. Using person-specific regression models, decision preferences were quantified for each cost domain with respect to general tolerance (intercept), as well as parameters estimating the effect of incremental increases in reward or cost on the probability of accepting a card. Results support the relative independence of decision making tendencies across cost domains, with moderate correlations observed between tolerance for delay and effort. Specific decision parameters showed unique associations with cognitive and behavioral measures including executive function, academic motivation, anxiety, and hyperactivity. Evidence indicates that sensitivity to reward is an important factor in incentivizing decisions to work harder or wait longer. Dissociating the relative contributions of reward and cost sensitivity in multiple domains may facilitate the identification of heterogeneity in sub-optimal decision making.

The attraction effect shows that adding a third alternative to a choice set can alter preference between the original two options. For over 30 years, this simple demonstration of context dependence has been taken as strong evidence against a class of parsimonious value-maximising models that evaluate alternatives independently from one another. Significantly, however, in previous demonstrations of the attraction effect alternatives are approximately equally valuable, so there was little consequence to the decision maker irrespective of which alternative was selected. Here we vary the difference in expected value between alternatives and provide the first demonstration that, although extinguished with large differences, this theoretically important effect persists when choice between alternatives has a consequence. We use this result to clarify the implications of the attraction effect, arguing that although it robustly violates the assumptions of value-maximising models, it does not eliminate the possibility that human decision making is optimal.

Research on gambling near-misses has shown that objectively equivalent outcomes can yield divergent emotional and motivational responses. The subjective processing of gambling outcomes is affected substantially by close but non-obtained outcomes (i.e. counterfactuals). In the current paper, we investigate how different types of near-misses influence self-perceived luck and subsequent betting behavior in a wheel-of-fortune task. We investigate the counterfactual mechanism of these effects by testing the relationship with a second task measuring regret/relief processing. Across two experiments (Experiment 1,  = 51; Experiment 2,  = 104), we demonstrate that near-wins (neutral outcomes that are close to a jackpot) decreased self-perceived luck, whereas near-losses (neutral outcomes that are close to a major penalty) increased luck ratings. The effects of near-misses varied by near-miss (i.e. whether the spinner stopped just short of, or passed through, the counterfactual outcome), consistent with established distinctions between upward versus downward, and additive versus subtractive, counterfactual thinking. In Experiment 1, individuals who showed stronger counterfactual processing on the regret/relief task were more responsive to near-wins and near-losses on the wheel-of-fortune task. The effect of near-miss position was attenuated when the anticipatory phase (i.e. the spin and deceleration) was removed in Experiment 2. Further differences were observed within the objective gains and losses, between "clear" and "narrow" outcomes. Taken together, these results help substantiate the counterfactual mechanism of near-misses.

Dual-system models propose that cognitive processing can occur either intuitively or deliberately. Unlike deliberate decision strategies, intuitive ones are assumed to have an emotional component attached to the decision process. We tested if intuitive decisions are indeed accompanied by an emotional response while deliberate decisions are not. Specifically, we conducted a psychophysiological study in which participants were instructed to decide either intuitively or deliberately if three simultaneously presented words were semantically coherent or incoherent (triad task). The degree of emotionality of these two decision strategies (intuitive vs. deliberate) was compared using changes in electrodermal activity (EDA) and the reaction time (RT) effect of an affective priming paradigm as primary measurements. Based on a valence-arousal model, our results revealed that intuitive and deliberate judgments do not differ as to their emotional but that they do differ in emotional . Most notably, sympathetic activation during intuitive judgments was significantly lower compared to sympathetic activation during deliberate judgments. Our results reflect that a relaxed state of mind-manifested in low sympathetic activity-could underlie the holistic processing that is assumed to facilitate the proliferation of semantic associations during coherence judgments. This suggests that coherence judgments made under an (instructed) intuitive decision mode have a specific psychophysiological signature and that arousal is the differentiating component between intuitive and deliberate decision strategies.

Delay of gratification captures elements of temptation and self-denial that characterize real-life problems with money and other problem behaviors such as unhealthy risk taking. According to fuzzy-trace theory, decision makers mentally represent social values such as delay of gratification in a coarse but meaningful form of memory called "gist." Applying this theory, we developed a gist measure of delay of gratification that does not involve quantitative trade-offs (as delay discounting does) and hypothesize that this construct explains unique variance beyond sensation seeking and inhibition in accounting for problem behaviors. Across four studies, we examine this Delay-of-gratification Gist Scale by using principal components analyses and evaluating convergent and divergent validity with other potentially related scales such as Future Orientation, Propensity to Plan, Time Perspectives Inventory, Spendthrift-Tightwad, Sensation Seeking, Cognitive Reflection, Barratt Impulsiveness, and the Monetary Choice Questionnaire (delay discounting). The new 12-item measure captured a single dimension of delay of gratification, correlated as predicted with other scales, but accounted for unique variance in predicting such outcomes as overdrawing bank accounts, substance abuse, and overall subjective well-being. Results support a theoretical distinction between reward-related approach motivation, including sensation seeking, and inhibitory faculties, including cognitive reflection. However, individuals' agreement with the qualitative gist of delay of gratification, as expressed in many cultural traditions, could not be reduced to such dualist distinctions nor to quantitative conceptions of delay discounting, shedding light on mechanisms of self-control and risk taking.

The Brunswik lens model typically represents a judge's accuracy using parameters derived from linear regression. This is not optimal if the judgment or the ecological criterion is dichotomous. Alternative approaches, modeling dichotomies using logistic regression, or linearizing judgments with confidence ratings, have not been compared with the same data.

Suicide rates are highest in adults of middle and older age. Research with psychiatric patients has shown that proneness to feel regret about past decisions can grow so intense that suicide becomes a tempting escape. Here, we examine the additional role of individual differences in maximizing, or the tendency to strive for the best decision, rather than one that is good enough. We provided individual-differences measures of maximizing, regret proneness, and negative life decision outcomes (as reported on the Decision Outcome Inventory or DOI) to a non-psychiatric control group, as well as three groups of psychiatric patients in treatment for suicide attempts, suicidal ideation, or non-suicidal depression. We found that scores on the three individual-differences measures were worse for psychiatric patients than for non-psychiatric controls, and were correlated to clinical assessments of depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation. More importantly, maximizing was associated with these clinical assessments, even after taking into account maximizers' worse life decision outcomes. Regret proneness significantly mediated those relationships, suggesting that maximizers could be at risk for clinical depression because of their proneness to regret. We discuss the theoretical relevance of our findings and their promise for clinical practice. Ultimately, late-life depression and suicidal ideation may be treated with interventions that promote better decision making and regret regulation.

Decision-making is rarely context-free, and often both social information and non-social information are weighed into one's decisions. Incorporating information into a decision can be influenced by previous experiences. Ostracism has extensive effects, including taxing cognitive resources and increasing social monitoring. In decision-making situations, individuals are often faced with both objective and social information and must choose which information to include or filter out. How will ostracism affect the reliance on objective and social information during decision-making? Participants (=245) in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized in a standardized, group task. They then performed a dynamic decision-making task that involved the presentation of either non-social (i.e. biased reward feedback) or social (i.e., poor advice from a previous participant) misleading information. In Experiment 2, participants (=105) completed either the ostracism non-social condition or social misleading information condition with explicit instructions stating that the advice given was from an individual who did not partake in the group task. Ostracized individuals relied more on non-social misleading information and performed worse than included individuals. However, ostracized individuals discounted misleading social information and outperformed included individuals. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Across two experiments, ostracized individuals were more critical of advice from others, both individuals who may have ostracized them and unrelated individuals. In other words, compared to included individuals, ostracized individuals underweighted advice from another individual, but overweighted non-social information during decision-making. We conclude that when deceptive objective information is present, ostracism results in disadvantageous decision-making.

The unfavorable comparison between the obtained and expected outcomes of our choices may elicit disappointment. When the comparison is made with the outcome of alternative actions, emotions like regret can serve as a learning signal. Previous work showed that both anticipated disappointment and regret influence decisions. In addition, experienced regret is associated with higher emotional responses than disappointment. Yet it is not clear whether this amplification is due to additive effects of disappointment and regret when the outcomes of alternative actions are available, or whether it reflects the learning feature of regret signals. In this perspective, we used eye-tracking to measure the visual pattern of information acquisition in a probabilistic lottery task. In the partial feedback condition, only the outcome of the chosen lottery was revealed, while in the complete feedback condition, participants could compare their outcome with that of the non-chosen lottery, giving them the opportunity to experience regret. During the decision phase, visual patterns of information acquisition were consistent with the assessment of anticipated regret, in addition to a clear assessment of lotteries' expected values. During the feedback phase, subjective ratings and eye-tracking results confirmed that participants compared their outcome with the outcome of the non-chosen lottery in the complete feedback condition, particularly after a loss, and ignored the non-realized outcome of the chosen option. Moreover, participants who made more visual saccades consistent with counterfactual comparisons during the feedback period anticipated regret more in their decisions. These results are consistent with the proposed adaptive function of regret.

In risky and other multiattribute choices, the process of choosing is well described by random walk or drift diffusion models in which evidence is accumulated over time to threshold. In strategic choices, level- and cognitive hierarchy models have been offered as accounts of the choice process, in which people simulate the choice processes of their opponents or partners. We recorded the eye movements in 2 × 2 symmetric games including dominance-solvable games like prisoner's dilemma and asymmetric coordination games like stag hunt and hawk-dove. The evidence was most consistent with the accumulation of payoff differences over time: we found longer duration choices with more fixations when payoffs differences were more finely balanced, an emerging bias to gaze more at the payoffs for the action ultimately chosen, and that a simple count of transitions between payoffs-whether or not the comparison is strategically informative-was strongly associated with the final choice. The accumulator models do account for these strategic choice process measures, but the level- and cognitive hierarchy models do not. © 2015 The Authors. published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

We asked participants to make simple risky choices while we recorded their eye movements. We built a complete statistical model of the eye movements and found very little systematic variation in eye movements over the time course of a choice or across the different choices. The only exceptions were finding more (of the same) eye movements when choice options were similar, and an emerging gaze bias in which people looked more at the gamble they ultimately chose. These findings are inconsistent with prospect theory, the priority heuristic, or decision field theory. However, the eye movements made during a choice have a large relationship with the final choice, and this is mostly independent from the contribution of the actual attribute values in the choice options. That is, eye movements tell us not just about the processing of attribute values but also are independently associated with choice. The pattern is simple-people choose the gamble they look at more often, independently of the actual numbers they see-and this pattern is simpler than predicted by decision field theory, decision by sampling, and the parallel constraint satisfaction model. © 2015 The Authors. published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.