It may only be a handful of years before fully autonomous neurosurgical robots (ANRs) are pushed into widespread clinical adoption. Nevertheless, whether it is ethical to greenlight the development and adoption of ANRs is still up for debate. On the one hand, the widespread adoption of ANRs may lead to unprecedented therapeutic effects, increase sterility, improve pain profiles, increase precision, and reduce complications over the long term. On the other hand, ANRs may lead to human neurosurgical skill atrophy, increased legal uncertainty, increased burnout rates, and may produce no significant effect on pain profiles or complication rates, all of which may put patients at novel levels of risk. At this watershed, it is critical for stakeholders to preemptively deliberate about whether they would ultimately agree to these ethical trade-offs and decide to consciously support, thus help usher in the advent of autonomous neurosurgical technology.

A prominent critique of cognitive or athletic enhancement claims that certain performance-improving drugs or technologies may 'cheapen' resulting achievements. Considerably less attention has been paid to the impact of enhancement on the value of moral achievements. Would the use of moral enhancement (bio)technologies, rather than (solely) 'traditional' means of moral development like schooling and socialization, cheapen the 'achievement' of morally improving oneself? We argue that, to the extent that the 'cheapened achievement' objection succeeds in the domains of cognitive or athletic enhancement, it could plausibly also succeed in the domain of moral enhancement-but only regarding certain forms. Specifically, although the value of moral self-improvement may be diminished by some of the more speculative and impractical forms of moral enhancement proposed in the literature, this worry has less force when applied to more plausibly viable forms of moral enhancement: forms in which drugs or technologies play an adjunctive or facilitative, rather than a determinative, role in moral improvement. We illustrate this idea with three examples from recent literature: the possible use of psychedelic drugs in certain moral-learning contexts, 'Socratic Al' (a proposed Al-driven moral enhancer) and empathy enhancement through virtual reality (VR). We argue that if one assumes that these technologies work roughly as advertised, the 'cheapened achievement' objection loses much of its bite. The takeaway lesson is that moral enhancement in its most promising and practical forms ultimately evades a leading critique of cognitive and athletic enhancement. We end by reflecting on the potential upshot of our analysis for enhancement debates more widely.

From an ethical point of view, there is an important distinction between two types of prenatal screening. The first of these targets maternal or foetal conditions (e.g., infectious diseases, blood group sensitization) where early detection allows for interventions that improve the chances of a healthy pregnancy outcome. The second screens for foetal conditions such as Down syndrome, where a timely diagnosis in most cases only allows for a choice between preparation for a child with special needs or termination of the pregnancy. Whereas the former makes an easy fit with the prevention aim of most other population screening programmes, the latter does not. In order to steer clear from a possible eugenic reading of its aim, a wide international consensus has emerged for the view that prenatal screening of this type should have the atypical aim of helping women (couples) to make autonomous reproductive choices, rather than reducing the birth prevalence of the relevant disorders. However, keeping these types of prenatal screening apart may become increasingly difficult given the development of tests, such as the Non-Invasive Prenatal Test, which cannot only be used for both types of screening but may also lead to interconnected findings on both sides of the divide. This makes it an urgent question: What the aim or aims of this new hybrid screening should be? As neither 'prevention' nor 'autonomy' will do, we argue for a normative framework that gives both aims their due, while recognizing the tensions between them.

For years, the sexual and reproductive health of women with intellectual and developmental disability or disabilities has been insufficiently addressed by institutions and family members due to a lack of information, training, and, sometimes, religious issues. In this context, contraceptive digital pills can enhance the sexual and reproductive control of this population group. Digital pills could help to improve adherence to treatments aimed to prevent unwanted pregnancies, as well as allowing women and their caregivers to exert better drug intake control. However, there are some ethical risks to consider that may outweigh these benefits. This study sets out to explore the ethical considerations that should be taken into account in the case of a potential roll-out of contraceptive digital pills as a way of improving the sexual and reproductive health of these women.

The subject of this paper is a critique of the pronatalist metaphysics that underlies bioethics and shapes the thinking and discourse on reproductive rights. The point of reference is the philosophy of antinatalism presented by Marcus T. L. Teo. Seemingly arguing in favor of antinatalism, Teo mixes antinatalist concepts with pronatalist intuitions. The consequence of combining the impossible is the restoration of negative eugenics on the one hand, and a series of contradictions on the other. The article shows that philosophical antinatalism is a universal position that indicates that procreation always, everywhere and for everyone is wrong. The paper simultaneously exposes and criticizes the metaphysics of pronatalism underlying bioethical discourse. Weakening pronatalism in bioethics and turning more attention to antinatalism could bring good results for women, the environment, and bioethics itself in terms of its thematic preferences.

This paper explores the notion of loneliness as lack of solidarity in relations to Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Israel, and the diaspora. Loneliness as lack of solidarity is defined as lacking someone to identify with and/or lacking someone who is willing to assist while carrying a burden. We describe the mechanism of lack of identification using the concept of epistemic injustice. The paper suggests that art may serve as a way to mitigate this kind of loneliness, and focus on the Freedom Theater, which was operating in Jenin Refugee Camp until recently.

The growing demand for uterus transplantation (UTx) invites continued philosophical evaluation of the function of UTx (and what constitutes its 'success'), as well as the recipient eligibility for UTx. Currently, UTx caters to partnered, cisgender women of childbearing age looking to get pregnant and give birth to a biogenetically related child. The medical justification for this-the treatment of uterine infertility-explains the primacy of this practice. However, this dominant conceptualization of UTx does not necessarily capture the diverse needs for which both cis- and transgender women might take interest in UTx that are not strictly procreative, such as bodily integrity and gender identity reasons. In this paper, I argue that non-procreative motivations for uterus acquisition ought to be taken seriously as a matter of non-discrimination and consistency.

It is often said that it is important for patients to possess hope that their treatment will be successful. We agree, but a widely appealed to type of hope-hope based on conviction (religious or otherwise), renders this assertion problematic. If conviction-based hope influences patient decisions to undergo medical procedures, then questions are raised about the scope of patient autonomy. Libertarians permit patients to make decisions to undergo medical procedures on the basis of any considerations, including conviction-based hopes, on grounds of respect for freedom of choice. Rational interventionists want to restrict choices made on the basis of conviction-based hope on the grounds that choices based on hope incorporate irrationality of a sort incompatible with autonomous decision-making. In this article, we navigate a middle path between these extremes, arguing that patient decision-making based on conviction-based hope ought to be acceptable and permitted in health care when it conforms to norms of practical rationality. These norms allow patients some room to make decisions to consent to undergo medical procedures informed by conviction-based hope.

Can it be ethical to conduct xenotransplant research on a human brain-dead decedent (HB-DD) whose organs could otherwise be given to persons in need? The ethical consensus is that it is better to save existing persons via organ donation than to devote a HB-DD to research that will not directly benefit anyone. I argue otherwise. Given how rapidly xenotransplant research is progressing, and its clinical promise in the next couple of years or decades, I argue that it can be ethical to conduct xenotransplant research on a HB-DD whose organs could otherwise be given to individuals in need.

This study examines the ethical permissibility of biomedical moral enhancement (BME) for psychopaths, considering both coercive and voluntary approaches. To do so, I will first briefly explain what psychopaths are and some normative implications of these facts. I will then ethically examine three scenarios of BME for psychopaths: (1) coercive BME for non-criminal psychopaths, (2) coercive BME for psychopathic offenders, and (3) voluntary BME for psychopathic offenders. I will argue that coercive BME for non-criminal psychopaths is ethically problematic due to issues of cost, invasion of privacy, and stigmatic effects of compulsory diagnosis. Similarly, I will argue that coercive BME for criminals is impermissible due to violations of the rights to bodily and mental integrity. However, I will show that voluntary BME for offenders may be ethically permissible under certain conditions, challenging the critique that the consent of vulnerable prisoners cannot be considered fully voluntary. I argue that when an offender is provided with sufficient medical and legal information, incentives such as the possibility of parole review based on BME results do not preclude the voluntariness of consent. Ultimately, I aim to advance the debate on BME for psychopaths by delineating and defending conditions for the ethical permissibility of voluntary BME.

The ethical permissibility of the "slow code" sparks vigorous debate. However, definitions of the "slow code" that exist in the literature often leave room for interpretation. Thus, those assessing the ethical permissibility of the slow code may not be operating with shared definitions, and definitions may not align with clinicians' understanding and use of the term in clinical practice. To add clarity and nuance to discussions of the "slow code," this manuscript highlights the salient medical and moral components that distinguish resuscitative practices, resulting in a taxonomy that includes nine distinct entries: the Fake Code, Casual Code, Time-Limited Code, Family Code, Contained Code, a la Carte Code, Preventive Code, Passive Code, and Accepted Code. We argue that cogent analyses of the ethical implications of the "slow code" must begin with clear, shared understandings of the practices under debate.

Human activity is now having a defining influence on global systems. The Anthropocene epoch requires revisiting our ethical presuppositions to understand our relationship to the earth's life support systems. The Land Ethic of Aldo Leopold proposes an ethic that is diachronic, holistic, and biocentric, in contrast to the synchronic, individualist, and anthropocentric axioms of mainstream bioethics. I argue that these features of the Land Ethic make it more suitable to engage with the ethics of healthcare resource allocation in the Anthropocene; that understanding sustainability in a Land Ethical fashion requires that we view it as placing a side-constraint on all permissible healthcare resource use such that this use remains within planetary boundaries; and outline how this might re-shape debates around healthcare resource allocation.

It is not unusual for patients or families to disagree with healthcare professionals (HCPs) over best treatment options. Conversation typically results and mutually agreeable choices are implemented. Rarely, but increasingly, patients or families will request, even demand, interventions the treating team believes will be ineffective (they will not achieve the intended goal) or inappropriate (the medical or moral harms clearly outweigh any potential benefits). One's duty as an HCP requires one to refuse such interventions, but resulting patient or family conflict makes such refusals challenging, even traumatic, and HCPs often acquiesce. Some states have legal options that protect HCPs and their respective institutions when they make such unilateral choices, but the process is complex, time-consuming, and emotionally fraught. In this paper, We describe one especially difficult case, using it as a paradigmatic example of when, and why, a slow code is sometimes, if rarely, justified. We also discuss strategies HCPs can use to reduce the need for this, admittedly problematic, solution.

After briefly reviewing the historical development and ethical regulation of resuscitative technologies, this study probes why clinicians engage in the morally problematic practice of show and slow coding and why hospitals tolerate it? Studies conducted in 1995 and 2020 indicate that conscientious clinicians engage in these practices to protect their patients from abusive or futile resuscitation. And hospitals' clinical cultures tolerate these practices to protect conscientious clinicians from censure, dismissal, delicensing, or legal prosecution for withholding or withdrawing abusive or futile resuscitative technologies without prior patient or surrogate consent. Show and slow coding evolved in American clinical cultures in the second half of the 20th century when closed-chest cardiac massage, defibrillators, ventilators, and other resuscitative technologies raised seemingly novel ethical questions. To address these questions, bioethics commissions, healthcare societies, lawmakers, and a Roman Catholic Pope developed ethics standards requiring clinicians to obtain patient or surrogate consent before withholding or withdrawing resuscitative technologies. They thus conferred on patients an implicit right of resuscitation even if it was abusive and/or futile. Conscientious clinicians circumvented this implicit right by show and slow coding to protect patients from abusive resuscitation. Recognizing clinicians' benign intent, hospitals' clinical cultures tolerate show and slow coding as acts of conscience, akin to civil disobedience. Thus, rescinding ethics standards and laws requiring prior patient/surrogate consent for non-resuscitation or for cessation of resuscitative technologies decisions should end show/slow coding. Such a reform should also recognize clinicians' right of conscientious refusal to perform CPR.

Despite its prevalence today, the practice of purely performative resuscitation (PPR)-paradigmatically, the "slow code"-has attracted more critics in bioethics than defenders. The most common criticism of the slow code is that it's fundamentally deceptive or harmful, while the most common justification offered is that it may benefit the patient's loved ones, by symbolically honoring the patient or the care team's relationship with the family. I argue that critics and defenders of the slow code each have a point. Advocates of the slow code are right that not all PPR is wrongly deceptive or harmful to the patient or his family and that the symbolic aspect of medicine is itself morally significant. But the critics are also correct: slow codes are prima facie wrong. I argue that pursuing a slow code amounts to treating the patient as a tool for others' benefit-hence, treating him as an object-and that this instrumentalizing quality constitutes one core prima facie wrong of the practice. I also build a case for the idea that the slow code may not always be all-things-considered wrong, specifying certain limited conditions under which acts of PPR might ultimately be permissible. Thus, the symbolic dimension of medical treatment is indeed morally important, both in morally favorable and in morally problematic respects-namely, in its symbolic denial of the patient's humanity.

Since its launch in November 2022, ChatGPT has become a global phenomenon, sparking widespread public interest in chatbot artificial intelligences (AIs) generally. While not approved for medical use, it is capable of passing all three United States medical licensing exams and offers diagnostic accuracy comparable to a human doctor. It seems inevitable that it, and tools like it, are and will be used by the general public to provide medical diagnostic information or treatment plans. Before we are taken in by the promise of a golden age for chatbot medical AIs, it would be wise to consider the implications of using these tools as either supplements to, or substitutes for, human doctors. With the rise of publicly available chatbot AIs, there has been a keen focus on research into the diagnostic accuracy of these tools. This, however, has left a notable gap in our understanding of the implications for health outcomes of these tools. Diagnosis accuracy is only part of good health care. For example, crucial to positive health outcomes is the doctor-patient relationship. This paper challenges the recent focus on diagnostic accuracy by drawing attention to the causal relationship between doctor-patient relationships and health outcomes arguing that chatbot AIs may even hinder outcomes in numerous ways including subtracting the elements of perception and observation that are crucial to clinical consultations. The paper offers brief suggestions to improve chatbot medical AIs so as to positively impact health outcomes.