This paper contributes to the question of how taxation of corporate profits and wages affects competition among firms for highly skilled human resources such as CEOs. Use of a theoretical model shows that wage taxes can have a substantial impact on the outcome of such a competition if marginal tax rates are different as in an international labor market. Further, the paper shows that increasing the wage tax rate unilaterally can have an ambiguous effect on observed gross compensation levels. However, in a local labor market for CEOs, observed gross fixed salaries should decline in the wage tax rate. Tax effects in a market for CEOs is a particularly interesting topic because recent developments with respect to compensation practices of top-level managers have opened a public debate about the use of instruments for regulating compensation of those managers. Furthermore, many countries around the world use tax incentives in order to facilitate immigration of highly skilled human resources. The investigation follows an analytical economics-based approach by extending an LEN model with elements of competition for scarce human resources and income taxation. It investigates the impact of differential taxation on the competition between two firms for the exclusive service of a unique, highly skilled CEO.

Accounting studies have analyzed rolling forecasts and similar dynamic approaches to planning as a way to improve the quality of planning. We complement this research by investigating an alternative (complementary) way to improve planning quality, i.e. the use of forecast accuracy indicators as a results control mechanism. Our study particularly explores the practical challenges that might emerge when firms use a performance measure for forecast accuracy. We examine such challenges by means of an in-depth case study of a manufacturing firm that started to monitor sales forecast accuracy. Drawing from interviews, meeting observations and written documentation, we highlight two possible concerns with the use of forecast accuracy: concerns related to the limited degree of controllability of the performance measure and concerns with its goal congruence. We illustrate how organizational actors experienced these challenges and how they adapted their approach to forecast accuracy in response to them. Our empirical observations do not only shed light on the possibilities and challenges pertaining to the use of forecast accuracy as a performance measure; they also improve our understanding of how specific qualities of performance measures apply to 'truth-inducing' indicators, and how the particular organizational and market context can shape the quality of performance measures more generally.