We examine fossil-fuel power plant employment impacts of new nitrogen oxides (NOx) provisions under Title I of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAAs). These provisions required installation of reasonably available control technology (RACT) for NOx emissions for major stationary sources in the Ozone Transport Region and in more stringently classified ozone nonattainment areas. Standard approaches using nonattainment designation to identify regulatory impacts abstract from important implementation aspects such as when regulatory changes occur, where regulations are in effect, and which specific regulations apply. Omitting these factors can introduce bias by contaminating the control group, leading to underestimation of historical employment impacts and overestimation of projected impacts from tightening regulations. Our results indicate that the new NOx RACT requirements negatively impacted power plant employment. We find no significant impacts on generation, suggesting that installation of pollution controls may have contributed to labor-saving technical change at affected units.

The requisite scope of analysis to adequately estimate the social cost of environmental regulations has been subject to much discussion. The literature has demonstrated that engineering or partial equilibrium cost estimates likely underestimate the social cost of large-scale environmental regulations and environmental taxes. However, the conditions under which general equilibrium (GE) analysis adds value to welfare analysis for single-sector technology or performance standards, the predominant policy intervention in practice, remains an open question. Using a numerical computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, we investigate the GE effects of regulations across different sectors, abatement technologies, and regulatory designs. Our results show that even for small regulations GE effects are significant, and engineering estimates of compliance costs can substantially underestimate the social cost of single-sector environmental regulations. We find the downward bias from using engineering costs to approximate social costs depends on the input composition of abatement technologies and the regulated sector.