In all Western countries, the vaccination campaign against COVID-19 encountered some resistance. To overcome vaccine inertia and hesitancy, governments have used a variety of strategies and policy instruments. These instruments can be placed on a 'ladder of intrusiveness', starting from voluntary tools based on simple information and persuasion, through material incentives and disincentives of varying nature and magnitude, to highly coercive tools, such as lockdown for the unvaccinated and the introduction of the vaccination mandate. Italy's experience during the vaccination campaign against Covid provides an ideal observational point for starting to investigate this issue: not only was Italy among the top countries with the highest percentage of people vaccinated at the beginning of 2022, but-at least compared to other European countries-it was also one of the countries that had gradually introduced the most intrusive measures to increase vaccination compliance. In the article the different steps of the 'intrusiveness ladder' are presented, providing examples from various countries, and then tested on the Italian Covid-19 vaccination campaign between 2021 and the first months of 2022. For each phase of the campaign, the instrument mixes adopted by the Italian government are described, as well as the contextual conditions that led to their adoption. In the final section, an assessment of the composition and evolution of the Italian vaccination strategy is provided, based on the following criteria: legitimacy, feasibility, effectiveness, internal consistency and strategic coherence. Conclusions highlight the pragmatic approach adopted by the Italian government and underline the effects-both positive and negative-of scaling up the intrusiveness ladder.

With Supreme and Constitutional courts or tribunals playing an increasingly significant role in shaping extractive policies in Latin America, scholars should turn their attention to the impacts of judicial decisions on policy processes. This phenomenon is of considerable interest to scholars of policy integration, as constitutional interpretations by the courts have the potential to reframe policy issues and address the effects of policy fragmentation. In this paper, we investigate the influence of high courts on the creation of integrative spaces that seek to convey a commitment to guaranteeing constitutional rights. Our study focuses on Colombia, Ecuador, and Guatemala where we analyze the role of high courts in initiating policy integration processes. First, it contributes to the processual approach to policy integration by highlighting the role of the courts in initiating policy integration processes. In doing so, we depart from the usual focus on integration as a design of governments, instead highlighting how governments and other actors react to integration mandates issued by the courts. Furthermore, we contribute to current debates on how high courts enhance the State's responses to social conflicts by protecting constitutional rights, identifying the conditions under which judicial decisions can produce effective policy integration. Our research is based on the analysis of court documents gray literature and semi-structured interviews conducted with key informants and country experts. The findings underscore the importance of goal compatibility between high courts and dominant actors within policy subsystems, in mobilizing the resources required to form and operate integrative spaces. Applicable enforcement mechanisms and conflict expansion by policy challengers complete the conditions that allow court decisions to produce effective policy integration. Finally, the strategic and contextual nature of actors' engagement in integration processes suggests that policy integration is no panacea for tackling complex issues and improving policy delivery.

Emergency policies are among the most challenging policies that policy makers have to deal with, because of their extreme seriousness, the lack of time, and the high uncertainties that are involved. Policy analyses have demonstrated that good structural and organizational strategies are important, but not sufficient, to systematically guarantee a high level of resiliency in response processes. Some scholars have therefore suggested the need to verify whether individual cognitive and relational mechanisms can contribute to explaining the different levels of resiliency that emerge in emergency response processes. From such a perspective, this article presents the findings of a research that was aimed at testing whether emotional mechanisms matter. The affect infusion model was used to provide the analytical framework that was considered to identify the evidence necessary for the empirical research, and the 'most similar system design' was applied to select and compare two couples of emergency response processes with similar contextual, structural and organizational features, but different levels of resiliency. The empirical research was conducted from April 2020 to February 2021, through periods of job shadowing and semi-structured interviews with personnel from the public and private organizations involved in the response processes. The research has substantially corroborated the hypothesis and has highlighted that, despite very similar contextual, structural and organizational conditions, a negative emotional mechanism, triggered by fear and anxiety, was pervasive among managers involved in the two lower-resiliency emergency response processes, while a positive emotional mechanism, triggered by pride, was dominant among managers involved in the two lower-resiliency processes.

Policy change frameworks are commonly used to understand policy development processes. However, few studies have attempted to apply these frameworks to the recent popular fee-free policy education at the high school level in Sub-Saharan Africa. Investigating fee-free policy development through policy change frameworks can assist both in identifying the genesis of past policies, including who the important actors are, how issues are framed and problematised, and how specific solutions are designed, as well as how to interpret unfolding policies. In this article, we review three prominent policy change frameworks: Baumgartner and Jones' "punctuated equilibrium framework," Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's "advocacy coalition framework," and Kingdon's "multiple streams framework." After reviewing the frameworks, we apply them to two fee-free policies in Ghana which are Progressive Free Senior High School and Free Senior High School policies to understand the drivers of fee-free policy change. From the socio-political background, three main concepts were derived from these policy change frameworks deducing from the basic assumptions of these theories. They are domestic politics, political and policy entrepreneurs, and socio-economic dynamics. The results show that fee-free policies are largely driven by domestic politics and political and policy entrepreneurs in political executive positions. Factors under socio-economic dynamics are only scope conditions that are not significant to trigger the adoption of a fee-free policy.

There is a rapidly developing literature on risks that threaten the whole of humanity, or a large part of it. Discussion is increasingly turning to how such risks can be governed. This paper arises from a study of those involved the governance of risks from emerging technologies, examining the perceptions of global catastrophic risk within the relevant global policymaking community. Those who took part were either civil servants working for the UK government, U.S. Congress, the United Nations, and the European Commission, or cognate members of civil society groups and the private sector. Analysis of interviews identified four major themes: Scepticism; Realism; Influence; and Governance outside of Government. These themes provide evidence for the value of conceptualising the governance of global catastrophic risk as a unified challenge. Furthermore, they highlight the range of agents involved in governance of emerging technology and give reason to value reforms carried out sub-nationally.

COVID-19 has caused 100s of millions of infections and millions of deaths worldwide, overwhelming health and economic capacities in many countries and at multiple scales. The immediacy and magnitude of this crisis has resulted in government officials, practitioners and applied scholars turning to reflexive learning exercises to generate insights for managing the reverberating effects of this disease as well as the next inevitable pandemic. We contribute to both tasks by assessing COVID-19 as a "super wicked" problem denoted by four features we originally formulated to describe the climate crisis: time is running out, no central authority, those causing the problem also want to solve it, and policies irrationally discount the future (Levin et al. in Playing it forward: path dependency, progressive incrementalism, and the "super wicked" problem of global climate change, 2007; Levin et al. in Playing it forward: Path dependency, progressive incrementalism, and the "super wicked" problem of global climate change, 2009; Levin et al. in Policy Sci 45(2):123-152, 2012). Doing so leads us to identify three overarching imperatives critical for pandemic management. First, similar to requirements to address the climate crisis, policy makers must establish and maintain policy objectives. Second, in contrast to climate, management responses must always allow for swift in policy settings and calibrations given rapid and evolving knowledge about a particular disease's epidemiology. Third, analogous to, but with swifter effects than climate, wide-ranging global efforts, if well designed, will dramatically reduce domestic costs and resource requirements by curbing the spread of the disease and/or fostering relevant knowledge for managing containment and eradication. Accomplishing these tasks requires building the analytic capacity for engaging in reflexive anticipatory policy design exercises aimed at maintaining, or building, life-saving thermostatic institutions at the global and domestic levels.

The European Union's 2030 climate and energy package introduced fundamental changes compared to its 2020 predecessor. These changes included a stronger focus on the internal market and an increased emphasis on technology-neutral decarbonization while simultaneously de-emphasizing the renewables target. This article investigates whether changes in domestic policy strategies of leading member states in European climate policy preceded the observed changes in EU policy. Disaggregating strategic change into changes in different elements (goals, objectives, instrumental logic), allows us to go beyond analyzing the relative prioritization of different goals, and to analyze how policy requirements for reaching those goals were dynamically redefined over time. To this end, we introduce a new method, which based on insights from social network analysis, enables us to systematically trace those strategic chances. We find that shifts in national strategies of the investigated member states preceded the shift in EU policy. In particular, countries reframed their understanding of supply security, and pushed for the internal electricity market also as a security measure to balance fluctuating renewables. Hence, the increasing focus on markets and market integration in the European 2030 package echoed the increasingly central role of the internal market for electricity supply security in national strategies. These findings also highlight that countries dynamically redefined their goals relative to the different phases of the energy transition.

As academic and political interest in citizen participation and democratic innovations is growing, the question of their impact on public policy remains essential to assess their genuine contribution to the normative project of democratization. Impact assessments of consultative participatory mechanisms are commonly conducted with a congruency approach-a desk-based research method which assesses impact based on the textual correspondence between a citizen-created idea and public policy documents. This method, however, lacks reliability and uniformity, and this paper therefore seeks to standardize its application and ways to improve the accuracy of its results by proposing two methodological add-ons. First, a sequential impact matrix that considers the preferences of decision-makers before a consultative participatory mechanism to see the extent to which decision-makers take up citizen ideas that align with or diverge from their own agenda. Second, a mixed method that combines a congruency approach with interviews of actors involved in the follow-up of the participatory process to balance their experiences with the congruency approach's main findings. The variants of the congruency approach are then applied to a deliberative minipublic-the citizen panel 'Brussels-Make Your Mobility'. This analysis shows how these methodological strategies alter the impact assessment's results, and its findings suggest that the use of a sequential impact matrix with a mixed method not only produces an accurate and reliable measurement but also generates valuable insights into the diffuse ways in which minipublics can exert substantial influences on the institutional structures and the political decision-making.

Much has been said theoretically about whether populism corrects the limitations of democracies, or instead damages their foundations. Yet we still know very little about how populist governments affect democratic policymaking in practice. Taking the classic policy cycle approach as a heuristic device, this article analyzes how populists influence agenda-setting, policy formulation and design, implementation, evaluation, and termination processes. Using a variety of sources, the article provides a qualitative in-depth analysis of the Mexican case during the first half of president Andrés-Manuel López-Obrador administration. The article shows that a populist government may fulfill some of its promises, but it ultimately materializes most of its perils, causing significant policy, institutional, and social damage. Populists introduce important distortions in each one of the policy stages and thus alter considerably the policymaking processes usually associated with democratic regimes. They employ a variety of strategies to limit the number of policy actors taking part in agenda-setting and evaluation exercises; formulate ineffective policy tools based on questionable design assumptions; develop personalistic implementation channels prone to patronage and clientelism; undermine the value of evidence-based analyses and discussions; and terminate institutions and programs on a discretionary basis. By exerting a rhetorical monopoly over the 'will of the people,' populists can follow policymaking patterns that significantly depart from the technical, rational, and pluralistic standards commonly associated with democratic policymaking. The article brings together debates on populism and policymaking, and studies a national case which has received limited scholarly attention, thus adding to both our theoretical and empirical contemporary understanding on this subject.

A country's preparedness to face crises is a multidimensional competence that depends on several attributes (economic factors, governance features, infrastructure and institutional endowments). This paper proposes a new approach to rank countries based on their degree of preparedness to deal with large-scale crises. The measured characteristics of countries have made it possible to compile an index of preparedness to face shocks and, therefore, predict their performance against the COVID-19 health crisis to verify the relevance of the proposed composite index. Fortunately, it appears that countries with a high degree of preparedness according to our aggregate index were able to respond adequately and effectively to this crisis. This is reflected in a lower mortality rate and more administered tests.

Environmental threats increasingly entail important risks from government responses. In considering the risks of a new vector-borne disease, for example, decision-makers must also grapple with potential risks from responses such as the aerial spraying of pesticides. In communicating about these complex risks, public officials often choose different "frames" that promote different conceptualizations of the issue. Yet prior research has paid limited attention to how public officials frame the risks of the environmental threat and the public response. This paper starts to fill that gap by conducting a content analysis of statements by public officials regarding risks from the threat of a local outbreak of the Zika virus in South Florida in 2016, as well as risks from the response of aerial pesticide spraying. Based on limited prior research, we hypothesize that public officials are likely to have adopted a "risk maximization" frame that stressed the high risks from exposure to Zika, but a "risk trade-off" frame when discussing aerial spraying. In actuality, we find that officials strongly favored a "reassurance" frame that downplayed both types of risks. Based on this analysis, we suggest framing strategies for disease outbreaks and other threats with potentially risky government responses may vary significantly depending on local contexts and that the South Florida experience was a missed opportunity to test the strategy of trade-off framing.

This article examines the potential contribution of the diaspora to development in Cameroon. It illuminates the role of institutional dynamics within the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA). Drawing on the concept of problem compatibility, this research demonstrates that problem recognition does not occur solely as a result of the work of policy entrepreneurs or problem brokers. It also depends on the institutional context within which the problem arises. Data demonstrate that the shock of the economic crisis and its repercussions in Cameroon required innovative sources of development financing, particularly capitalizing on resources from the diaspora, otherwise known as the diaspora option. This led in part to the modification of the "appreciative system" of its network on diaspora policy. Moreover, the heterogeneity of this network has reframed the view of the diaspora, long considered a threat to the stability and security of the country. This analysis, based on interviews with fifteen government officials, experts, and professionals, highlights the institutional processes that drive the problem stream.

Digital technologies can be important to policy-makers and public servants, as these technologies can increase infrastructure performance and reduce environmental impacts. For example, utilizing data from sensors in sewer systems can improve their management, which in turn may result in better surface water quality. Whether such from sensors is utilized is, however, not only a technical issue, but also depends on different types of social and institutional conditions. Our article identifies individual, organizational, and institutional barriers at the level of sub-states that hinder the evaluation of data from sewer systems. We employ fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to compare 23 Swiss sub-states and find that two barriers at different levels can each hinder data evaluation on their own. More specifically, either a lack of vision at the individual level or a lack of resources at the organizational level hinder the evaluation of data. Findings suggest that taking into account different levels is crucial for understanding digital transformation in public organizations.

Plastic pollution has reached a crisis point due to ineffective waste management, an over-reliance on single-use plastic items and a lack of suitable plastic alternatives. The COVID-19 Pandemic has seen a dramatic increase in the use of single-use plastics including 'COVID waste' in the form of items specifically intended to help stop the spread of disease. Many governments have utilised COVID-19 as a window of opportunity to reverse, postpone or remove plastic policies off agendas ostensibly in order to 'flatten the curve' of COVID-19 cases. In this paper, we use novel methods of social media analysis relating to three regions (USA, Mexico and Australia) to suggest that health and hygiene were not the only reasons governments utilised this window of opportunity to change plastic policies. Beyond the influence of social media on the plastics agenda, our results highlight the potential of social media as a tool to analyse public reactions to government decisions that can be influenced by industry pressure and a broader political agenda, while not necessarily following responses to consumer behaviour.

Trust in government is considered a prominent factor for enhancing public compliance with government policies and instructions. The Coronavirus pandemic demonstrates the crucial role public compliance with governmentally issued health guidelines has in mitigating the pandemic. However, the mechanism explaining the trust-compliance association, particularly in regard to health-behavior compliance, is unclear. This article develops a new theoretical model, the Mediated Trust Model (MTM), for explaining the relationship between trust in government and public compliance with health instructions. The model extends the classic Health Belief Model for predicting health behavior by claiming that the perceptions regarding the instructions' costs, benefits and one's ability to perform them are affected by trust in government and mediate the trust-compliance association. The MTM was tested in four cross-sectional studies performed during the first 20 months of the Coronavirus pandemic in Israel on 3732 participants, for various health instructions. Implications for public health literature, policy compliance theory and policy makers are discussed.

The proliferation of "wicked" policy problems in complex systems requires an experimental approach of problem-solving. Experimentalist governance offers a conducive framework through which to seek policy solutions amidst high levels of complexity in a multilevel governance structure. This study conceptualizes four distinctive experimental modalities based on varying levels of technical complexity and interest complexity, both of which represent salient constraints for policy reforms in a complex system, the health sector in particular. , , , and are all associated with distinct mechanisms of experimentation in a multilevel governance structure. Through four illustrative cases from China's massive experimental program of public hospital reform, this study demonstrates how experimentalist governance seeks policy solutions in the health sector. Should governance arrangements, policy capacity, pragmatism, and informational devices become aligned in a conducive way, experimentalist governance can play an instrumental role in seeking solutions for difficult problems in a complex policy system. A governance structure capable of policy learning and adaptive management is the key.

Researchers in public policy and public administration agree that policy integration is a process. Nevertheless, scholars have given limited attention to political aspects that facilitate or impede integration. This paper aims at filling that gap, by looking at how different theories of the policy process can help in explaining the process of policy integration as shaped by policy subsystems. By building on insights from theories of the policy process, we develop pathways regarding adoption and implementation in policy integration that account for the politicization and the role of actors and subsystems in the policy process. Our main argument is that policy integration is in permanent political tension with the sectoral logic of policymaking, which predominantly happens between actors in subsystems. Policy integration is, thus, not a single moment when those tensions are solved once and for all, but a political process that requires deliberate efforts to overcome the pull toward sector-specific problem definition, policymaking, implementation, and evaluation.

The overuse of fertilizers in agriculture and their entry into freshwater has many negative impacts on biodiversity and poses problems for drinking water resources in Germany. In response to exceeding levels of nitrate concentrations in groundwater in parts of the country, an intense public dispute evolved and a significant policy change in fertilizer regulation occurred in 2020. Based on the German case of agricultural water pollution, this study demonstrates in an innovative way how discourse network analysis is a fruitful method for the integrated study of actor coalitions and their use of narrative strategies in public debate. Theoretically, the study draws on the narrative policy framework (NPF) to explain how actor coalitions use narrative strategies to attempt to influence policymaking on water pollution by agricultural activities. The empirical analysis builds on newspaper articles and press releases disseminated between 2010 and 2020. The results demonstrate how two opposing actor coalitions with congruent policy beliefs formed in the struggle over fertilizer regulation. These not only diverged in their policy beliefs but also differed in their use of narrative strategies to try to expand or contain the policy issue. More precisely, the coalitions adapted their narratives over time in response to changes in the likelihood to win or lose. Furthermore, the results suggest the coalition in favor of stricter fertilizer regulation was more sophisticated in its effort to mobilize specific target groups. Overall, the article provides a valuable contribution to the literature on the NPF by combining research on coalition formation and policy narratives.

One of key goals of deliberative mini-publics is to counteract expert domination in policymaking. Mini-publics can be expected to democratize expertise by providing citizens with good opportunities for weighing expert information. Yet, there are concerns about undue influence of experts even within mini-publics. We test these expectations by analysing data from an online mini-public organized in Finland in March 2021. The topic of deliberation was measures taken to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. We examine whether experts' field of specialization and the order of expert hearings had an impact on how participants' views developed. We find that neither the field of expertise nor the order of hearings had systematic effects on participants' perceptions on containment measures. The results suggest that interactive modes of expert hearings in mini-publics seem not to be prone to domination by experts.

The design principles of institutions that visibly and significantly affect citizens' lives are likely to be politically salient. Popular support for these principles is in turn crucial for institutional viability and effectiveness. Transboundary pandemics are a case in point. Understanding citizens' preferences regarding the design of international alliances set up to mass-produce and distribute vaccines is likely to determine citizens' subsequent cooperation with vaccination campaigns. This study explores Germans' preferences for international COVID-19 vaccine alliance design principles. We conducted a conjoint experiment at a recurring cognitive moment in many pandemics' cycles, between the initial outbreak and a more devastating but still-unknown second wave, when infection rates were very low, yet no policy solutions had been developed. We analyzed preferences regarding four building blocks: (1) alliance composition (size; EU-centrism), (2) alliance distribution rules (joining cost; vaccine allocation), (3) vaccine nationalism (cost per German household; coverage in Germany) and (4) vaccine producer confidence (origin; type). Distribution rules, political ideology and personal perceptions of pandemic threat matter little. But a larger alliance size and dominant EU-country composition increase alliance support. And vaccine nationalism is key: support increases with both lower costs and larger coverage for own-nation citizens. Moreover, support goes down for Chinese and American producers and increases for Swiss and especially own-nation producers. In sum, a realist and technocratic outlook is warranted at the cognitive stage in pandemic cycles when no solutions have been found, yet the worst already seems to be over, as national self-interest reigns supreme in popular attitudes.

The "policy subsystem" has long been a key concept in our understanding of how policies on a given topic are produced. However, we know much less about policymaking in nascent policy subsystems. This article draws on the theories of agenda-setting and venue shopping to argue that the similarity and convergence of policy subsystems' agendas across different institutional venues and over time are features that distinguish more nascent policy subsystems from their more established, mature counterparts. In simple terms, policy venues' agendas converge when policy actors begin to discuss the same issues and instruments instead of talking past one another. The article illustrates this argument using textual data on Germany's emerging Artificial Intelligence (AI) policy: print media debates, parliamentary debates, and a government consultation from the period between November 2017 and November 2019. The insights from our analysis show that actors emphasize somewhat different policy issues and instruments related to AI in different venues. Nevertheless, the longitudinal analysis suggests that the debate does seem to converge across different venues, which indicates the formation of a subsystem-specific policy agenda regarding AI.