We define and study the notion of quantum polarity, which is a kind of geometric Fourier transform between sets of positions and sets of momenta. Extending previous work of ours, we show that the orthogonal projections of the covariance ellipsoid of a quantum state on the configuration and momentum spaces form what we call a dual quantum pair. We thereafter show that quantum polarity allows solving the Pauli reconstruction problem for Gaussian wavefunctions. The notion of quantum polarity exhibits a strong interplay between the uncertainty principle and symplectic and convex geometry and our approach could therefore pave the way for a geometric and topological version of quantum indeterminacy. We relate our results to the Blaschke-Santaló inequality and to the Mahler conjecture. We also discuss the Hardy uncertainty principle and the less-known Donoho-Stark principle from the point of view of quantum polarity.

The present essay provides a new metaphysical interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) in terms of mereological bundle theory. The essential idea is to claim that a physical system in RQM can be defined as a mereological fusion of properties whose values may vary for different observers. Abandoning the Aristotelian tradition centered on the notion of substance, I claim that RQM embraces an ontology of properties that finds its roots in the heritage of David Hume. To this regard, defining what kind of concrete physical objects populate the world according to RQM, I argue that this theoretical framework can be made compatible with (i) a property-oriented ontology, in which the notion of object can be easily defined, and (ii) moderate structural realism, a philosophical position where relations and relata are both fundamental. Finally, I conclude that under this reading relational quantum mechanics should be included among the full-fledged realist interpretations of quantum theory.

What, if anything, would be wrong with replacing the light postulate in Einstein's 1905 formulation of special relativity with a 'sound postulate', stating that the speed of sound is independent of the speed of the source? After reviewing the historical reasons underlying the particular focus on light in the special theory, we consider the circumstances under which such a theory of 'sonic relativity' would be justified on empirical grounds. We then consider the philosophical upshots of 'sonic relativity' for four contemporary areas of investigation in the philosophy of spacetime: (i) global versus subsystem symmetries, (ii) dynamical versus geometrical approaches to spacetime, (iii) the possibility of a preferred frame in theories of quantum gravity, and (iv) spacetime functionalism.

According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function is considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this interpretative framework, is defined as a computational device encoding observers' information; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave function. This perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal result excluding that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying reality described by some ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not affected by the conclusions of PBR's argument; consequently, the alleged inconsistency can be dissolved. To do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens' categorization of ontological models, showing that their implicit assumptions about the nature of the ontic state are incompatible with the main tenets of RQM. Then, we will ask whether it is possible to derive a PBR-type result, answering in the negative. This conclusion shows some limitations of this theorem not yet discussed in the literature.

In the absence of new physics around GeV, the electroweak vacuum is at best metastable. This represents a major challenge for high scale inflationary models as, during the early rapid expansion of the universe, it seems difficult to understand how the Higgs vacuum would not decay to the true lower vacuum of the theory with catastrophic consequences if inflation took place at a scale above GeV. In this paper we show that the non-minimal coupling of the Higgs boson to curvature could solve this problem by generating a direct coupling of the Higgs boson to the inflationary potential thereby stabilizing the electroweak vacuum. For specific values of the Higgs field initial condition and of its non-minimal coupling, inflation can drive the Higgs field to the electroweak vacuum quickly during inflation.

Of the many ways of getting at the core of the weirdnesses in quantum mechanics, there's one which traces back to Schrödinger's seminal 1935 paper, and has to do with the apparent nature of the reality described by the formalism through the wavefunction . This issue, which I will be calling the , is distinct from the standard measurement problem of quantum mechanics, despite Schrödinger himself ends up conflating the two. I will argue that the is an exquisitely philosophical problem, for as it is standard when facing any phenomenon which appears to have indeterminate or fuzzy characteristics, the solutions available are to either blame the deficiencies of our language, or our lack of knowledge, or to blame the world itself. These three attitudes can already be found in the literature on quantum mechanics, either explicitly or implicitly, and they appear to motivate three very distinct research programs: , , and .

Discussions on indeterminism in physics focus on the possibility of an open future, i.e. the possibility of having potential alternative future events, the realisation of one of which is not fully determined by the present state of affairs. Yet, can indeterminism affect also the past, making it open as well? We show that by upholding principles of finiteness of information one can entail such a possibility. We provide a toy model that shows how the past could be fundamentally indeterminate, while also explaining the intuitive (and observed) asymmetry between the past-which can be remembered, at least partially-and the future-which is impossible to fully predict.

A fundamental postulate of statistical mechanics is that all microstates in an isolated system are equally probable. This postulate, which goes back to Boltzmann, has often been criticized for not having a clear physical foundation. In this note, we provide a derivation of the canonical (Boltzmann) distribution that avoids this postulate. In its place, we impose two axioms with physical interpretations. The first axiom (thermal equilibrium) ensures that, as our system of interest comes into contact with different heat baths, the ranking of states of the system by probability is unchanged. Physically, this axiom is a statement that in thermal equilibrium, population inversions do not arise. The second axiom (energy exchange) requires that, for any heat bath and any probability distribution on states, there is a universe consisting of a system and heat bath that can achieve this distribution. Physically, this axiom is a statement that energy flows between system and heat bath are unrestricted. We show that our two axioms identify the Boltzmann distribution.

We use the notion of polar duality from convex geometry and the theory of Lagrangian planes from symplectic geometry to construct a fiber bundle over ellipsoids that can be viewed as a quantum-mechanical substitute for the classical symplectic phase space. The total space of this fiber bundle consists of geometric quantum states, products of convex bodies carried by Lagrangian planes by their polar duals with respect to a second transversal Lagrangian plane. Using the theory of the John ellipsoid we relate these geometric quantum states to the notion of "quantum blobs" introduced in previous work; quantum blobs are the smallest symplectic invariant regions of the phase space compatible with the uncertainty principle. We show that the set of equivalence classes of unitarily related geometric quantum states is in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of all Gaussian wavepackets. We emphasize that the uncertainty principle appears in this paper as geometric property of the states we define, and is not expressed in terms of variances and covariances, the use of which was criticized by Hilgevoord and Uffink.

It is now well-known that Newton-Cartan theory is the correct geometrical setting for modelling the quantum Hall effect. In addition, in recent years edge modes for the Newton-Cartan quantum Hall effect have been derived. However, the existence of these edge modes has, as of yet, been derived using only orthodox methodologies involving the breaking of gauge-invariance; it would be preferable to derive the existence of such edge modes in a gauge-invariant manner. In this article, we employ recent work by Donnelly and Freidel in order to accomplish exactly this task. Our results agree with known physics, but afford greater conceptual insight into the existence of these edge modes: in particular, they connect them to subtle aspects of Newton-Cartan geometry and pave the way for further applications of Newton-Cartan theory in condensed matter physics.

In quantum foundations, there is growing interest in the program of reconstructing the quantum formalism from clear physical principles. These reconstructions are formulated in an operational framework, deriving the formalism from information-theoretic principles. It has been recognized that this project is in tension with standard interpretations. This paper presupposes that the quantum reconstruction program (QRP) (i) is a worthwhile project and (ii) puts pressure on interpretations. Where does this leave us? Prima facie, it seems that interpretations perfectly fit the spirit of information-based reconstructions. However, interpretations, understood as saying that the wave functions represents one's about a physical system, recently have been challenged on technical and conceptual grounds. More importantly, for some researchers working on reconstructions, the lesson of successful reconstructions is that the wave function does represent objective facts about the world. Since knowledge is a factive concept, this speaks against epistemic interpretations. In this paper, I discuss whether interpretations constitute a reasonable alternative. My thesis is that if we want to engage QRP with interpretations, then we should aim at a reconstruction that is spelled out in non-factive experiential terms.

If an asymmetry in time does not arise from the fundamental dynamical laws of physics, it may be found in special boundary conditions. The argument normally goes that since thermodynamic entropy in the past is lower than in the future according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, then tracing this back to the time around the Big Bang means the universe must have started off in a state of very low thermodynamic entropy: the . In this paper, we consider another boundary condition that plays a similar role, but for the decoherent arrow of time, i.e. the subsystems of the universe are more mixed in the future than in the past. According to what we call the , the initial quantum state of the universe had very low entanglement entropy. We clarify the content of the Entanglement Past Hypothesis, compare it with the Thermodynamic Past Hypothesis, and identify some challenges and open questions for future research.

There is solid consensus among physicists and philosophers that, in gauge field theory, for a quantity to be physically meaningful or real, it must be gauge-invariant. Yet, every "elementary" field in the Standard Model of particle physics is actually gauge-variant. This has led a number of researchers to insist that new manifestly gauge-invariant approaches must be established. Indeed, in the foundational literature, dissatisfaction with standard methods for reducing gauge symmetries has been expressed: Spontaneous symmetry breaking is deemed conceptually dubious, while gauge fixing suffers the same limitations and is subject to the same criticisms as coordinate choices in General Relativity. An alternative gauge-invariant proposal was recently introduced in the literature, the so-called "dressing field method" (DFM). It is a mathematically subtle tool, and unfortunately prone to be confused with simple gauge transformations, hence with standard gauge fixings. As a matter of fact, in the physics literature the two are often conflated, and in the philosophy community some doubts have been raised about whether there is any substantial difference between them. Clarifying this issue is of special significance for anyone interested in both the foundational issues of gauge theories and their invariant formulation. It is thus our objective to establish as precisely as possible the technical and conceptual distinctions between the DFM and gauge fixing.

Harrigan and Spekkens (Found Phys 40:125-157, 2010) provided a categorization of quantum ontological models classifying them as -ontic or -epistemic if the quantum state describes respectively either a physical reality or mere observers' knowledge. Moreover, they claimed that Einstein-who was a supporter of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics-endorsed an epistemic view of In this essay we critically assess such a classification and some of its consequences by proposing a twofold argumentation. Firstly, we show that Harrigan and Spekkens' categorization implicitly assumes that a complete description of a quantum system (its ontic state, ) only concerns , systems instantiating , properties. Secondly, we argue that such assumptions conflict with some current interpretations of quantum mechanics, which employ different ontic states as a complete description of quantum systems. In particular, we will show that, since in the statistical interpretation ontic states describe ensembles rather than individuals, such a view cannot be considered -epistemic. As a consequence, the authors misinterpreted Einstein's view concerning the nature of the quantum state. Next, we will focus on and , which in virtue of their relational and perspectival metaphysics employ ontic states dealing with relational properties. We conclude that Harrigan and Spekkens' categorization is too narrow and entails an inadequate classification of the mentioned interpretations of quantum theory. Hence, any satisfactory classification of quantum ontological models ought to take into account the variations of across different interpretations of quantum mechanics.

Two views on the direction of time can be distinguished-primitivism and non-primitivism. According to the former, time's direction is an in-built, fundamental property of the physical world. According to the latter, time's direction is a derivative property of a fundamentally directionless reality. In the literature, non-primitivism has been widely supported since most (if not all) our fundamental dynamical laws are time-reversal invariant. In this paper, I offer a way out to the primitivist. I argue that we do have good grounds to support a primitive direction of time in the quantum realm. The rationale depends on exploiting the metaphysical and dynamical underdetermination of quantum theories to make a case in favor of primitivism. In particular, primitivism can be grounded in spontaneous collapse theories (e.g., GRW and CSL). The specific sense in which these theories capture a primitive direction of time is that, when the ontology of the theory is seriously taken into account, it does not remain invariant under time reversal. In taking GRW with a matter-density field (GRWm), I will argue that primitivism about the direction of time can be defended in the quantum case.

The causal closure of physics is usually discussed in a context free way. Here I discuss it in the context of engineering systems and biology, where strong emergence takes place due to a combination of upwards emergence and downwards causation (Ellis, Emergence in Solid State Physics and Biology, 2020, arXiv:2004.13591). Firstly, I show that causal closure is strictly limited in terms of spatial interactions because these are cases that are of necessity strongly interacting with the environment. Effective Spatial Closure holds ceteris parabus, and can be violated by Black Swan Events. Secondly, I show that causal closure in the hierarchy of emergence is a strictly interlevel affair, and in the cases of engineering and biology encompasses all levels from the social level to the particle physics level. However Effective Causal Closure can usefully be defined for a restricted set of levels, and one can experimentally determine Effective Theories that hold at each level. This does not however imply those effective theories are causally complete by themselves. In particular, the particle physics level is not causally complete by itself in the contexts of solid state physics (because of interlevel wave-particle duality), digital computers (where algorithms determine outcomes), or biology (because of time dependent constraints). Furthermore Inextricably Intertwined Levels occur in all these contexts.

In recent works, Časlav Brukner and Jacques Pienaar have raised interesting objections to the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. We answer these objections in detail and show that, far from questioning the viability of the interpretation, they sharpen and clarify it.

We investigate the connection between interference and computational power within the operationally defined framework of generalised probabilistic theories. To compare the computational abilities of different theories within this framework we show that any theory satisfying four natural physical principles possess a well-defined oracle model. Indeed, we prove a subroutine theorem for oracles in such theories which is a necessary condition for the oracle model to be well-defined. The four principles are: causality (roughly, no signalling from the future), purification (each mixed state arises as the marginal of a pure state of a larger system), strong symmetry (existence of a rich set of nontrivial reversible transformations), and informationally consistent composition (roughly: the information capacity of a composite system is the sum of the capacities of its constituent subsystems). Sorkin has defined a hierarchy of conceivable interference behaviours, where the order in the hierarchy corresponds to the number of paths that have an irreducible interaction in a multi-slit experiment. Given our oracle model, we show that if a classical computer requires at least queries to solve a learning problem, because fewer queries provide no information about the solution, then the corresponding "no-information" lower bound in theories lying at the th level of Sorkin's hierarchy is . This lower bound leaves open the possibility that quantum oracles are less powerful than general probabilistic oracles, although it is not known whether the lower bound is achievable in general. Hence searches for higher-order interference are not only foundationally motivated, but constitute a search for a computational resource that might have power beyond that offered by quantum computation.

The Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) argument against noncontextual local hidden variables is recast in quantum logical terms of fundamental propositions, states and probabilities. Unlike Kochen-Specker- and Hardy-like configurations, this operator based argument proceeds within four nonintertwining contexts. The nonclassical performance of the GHZ argument is due to the choice or filtering of observables with respect to a particular state. We study the varieties of GHZ games one could play in these four contexts, depending on the chosen state of the GHZ basis.

A Gedanken experiment is presented where an excited and a ground-state atom are positioned such that, within the former's half-life time, they exchange a photon with 50% probability. A measurement of their energy state will therefore indicate in 50% of the cases that no photon was exchanged. Yet other measurements would reveal that, by the mere possibility of exchange, the two atoms have become entangled. Consequently, the "no exchange" result, apparently precluding entanglement, is non-locally established between the atoms by this very entanglement. This quantum-mechanical version of the ancient Liar Paradox can be realized with already existing transmission schemes, with the addition of Bell's theorem applied to the no-exchange cases. Under appropriate probabilities, the initially-excited atom, still excited, can be entangled with additional atoms time and again, or alternatively, exert multipartite nonlocal correlations in an interaction free manner. When densely repeated several times, this result also gives rise to the Quantum Zeno effect, again exerted between distant atoms without photon exchange. We discuss these experiments as variants of interaction-free-measurement, now generalized for both spatial and temporal uncertainties. We next employ weak measurements for elucidating the paradox. Interpretational issues are discussed in the conclusion, and a resolution is offered within the Two-State Vector Formalism and its new Heisenberg framework.

Arguments by Sorkin (Impossible measurements on quantum fields. In: Directions in general relativity: proceedings of the 1993 International Symposium, Maryland, vol 2, pp 293-305, 1993) and Borsten et al. (Phys Rev D 104(2), 2021. 10.1103/PhysRevD.104.025012) establish that a natural extension of quantum measurement theory from non-relativistic quantum mechanics to relativistic quantum theory leads to the unacceptable consequence that expectation values in one region depend on which unitary operation is performed in a spacelike separated region. Sorkin [1] labels such scenarios 'impossible measurements'. We explicitly present these arguments as a no-go result with the logical form of a reductio argument and investigate the consequences for measurement in quantum field theory (QFT). Sorkin-type impossible measurement scenarios clearly illustrate the moral that Microcausality is not by itself sufficient to rule out superluminal signalling in relativistic quantum theories that use Lüders' rule. We review three different approaches to formulating an account of measurement for QFT and analyze their responses to the 'impossible measurements' problem. Two of the approaches are: a measurement theory based on detector models proposed in Polo-Gómez et al. (Phys Rev D, 2022. 10.1103/physrevd.105.065003) and a measurement framework for algebraic QFT proposed in Fewster and Verch (Commun Math Phys 378(2):851-889, 2020). Of particular interest for foundations of QFT is that they share common features that may hold general morals about how to represent measurement in QFT. These morals are about the role that dynamics plays in eliminating 'impossible measurements', the abandonment of the operational interpretation of local algebras as representing possible operations carried out in region , and the interpretation of state update rules. Finally, we examine the form that the 'impossible measurements' problem takes in histories-based approaches and we discuss the remaining challenges.