One of the latest methods being trialled across the development sector to help advance progress towards achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is 'twinning'. In this equation, twinning is rendered as a broadly replicable methodology for improving development outcomes, with a particular emphasis on building up human resources and technical capacity within governments and national bureaucracies. It is time-bound, target driven and depoliticised. However, the relationship between twinning and development has not always looked this way. Our paper uses a genealogical approach to unpack and illuminate the historical circumstances and politico-economic conditions under which these discourses have previously converged. It documents the gradual historical trajectory of the phenomenon of twinning from an overt political act to a largely apolitical tool of development practitioners. In so doing, it denaturalises the status quo and prompts reflection on alternative pathways, politics and practices of development.

This article argues that the concept of state capture helps to structure our understanding of patterns of grand corruption seen around the world in varied contexts, and increasingly even in countries once regarded as secure democracies. This article seeks to lay the groundwork for future empirical research into state capture in three areas. First, it situates the concept within a wider literature on corruption and describes how it relates to other similar terms, including regulatory capture and kleptocracy. Second, it elaborates on three pillars of activity that are subject to capture, and a variety of mechanisms through which state capture occurs. This provides a structure for the gathering of evidence on how capture plays out in different cases, and raises questions about the interactions among mechanisms and variation in sequencing. Third, the paper considers the impact of state capture on economic and social development, by outlining the ways in which it skews the distribution of power and potential long-term consequences for the allocation of rights and resources.

For two decades scholars have used insights from constructivist approaches and principal-agent (P-A) theory to understand the relationship between states and international organisations (IOs). Together, these works identify the conditions under which IOs can operate independently of states, although they have yet to explain when and why IO bureaucrats are likely to do so. Nor do they articulate a clear and consistent definition of autonomy. In this article, we seek to fill these gaps. We advance a narrow understanding of autonomy that distinguishes unintended behaviour from the intended independence of IO bureaucrats, before developing a three-stage, integrative explanation for the conditions under which IO bureaucrats act autonomously. First, we borrow from constructivist approaches a focus on staffing rules and the identity of IO bureaucrats to explain the sources of these agents' preferences. Second, we add insights from work on exogenous pressures for change-crises and critical junctures-to explain when and why IO bureaucrats will advance their preferences. Third, we incorporate P-A theory's attention to an IO's institutional design, along with insights from literature on domestic institutions, to explain when bureaucrats can implement their preferences. Case studies of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) illustrate our argument.

Voicing criticism seems to be a difficult task for employees in international organisations (IOs), as numerous anecdotes in the literature suggest. This observation is alarming, since internal criticism is an indispensable resource for organisational learning processes. So why are IOs apparently not using this resource to its full potential? The present article is the first to provide a comprehensive answer to this question by combining insights from organisation theory with an empirical case study of the UN Secretariat. My general argument is that 'criticism from within' is ambivalent. It can be a resource for, but also a threat to IOs: internal criticism can endanger an IO's external reputation as well as destabilise the organisation from within. Based on this theoretical understanding, I identify and empirically examine three specific reasons for the UN Secretariat's weak criticism culture: (1) Criticism is suppressed due to a widespread fear of leaks resulting from external pressures. (2) Criticism is avoided as a strategy of self-protection in the face of (inevitable) failures. (3) Constructive criticism is difficult to express in settings where organisational hypocrisy is necessary.

This article examines the institutional rationale of China's Belt and Road Initiative for Sino-Latin American interregionalism and global multilateralism. Applying Pedersen's ideational-institutional realism approach and research on interregionalism, we provide a more nuanced analysis than mainstream realist theorising dominating research on China's foreign policies. We argue that China's interregional relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) entail a cooperative strategy to counter US hegemony in its own 'backyard'. At a cognitive level, we show that the worldviews of Chinese foreign policy elites are informed by the tenets of realism. At an institutional level, interregionalism serves as a soft balancing device. In the power dimension, China uses cooperative relations with LAC to create soft power, enhancing access to raw materials, and promoting Chinese values, worldviews, and policies to the region. Hence, China-LAC interregionalism qualifies as 'diminished multilateralism', a pragmatic variant of multilateralism that favours particularistic interests while hampering collective problem solving.

By drawing from the engagement with the empirical case of (Arabic: steadfastness) in Palestine, this article focuses on the social and political implications of everyday life in conflict settings. Proposing an alternative perspective on conflicts, this article argues that it is important also to focus on normalcy of everyday life in conflict settings and how this transforms conflict dynamics. Hence, contrary to the assumption that there is an opposition between the normalcy of everyday life and violent conflicts, this article argues that everyday life is not disrupted but that it goes on also in the face of conflicts, it only has to adapt to it. Building on Stephen Lubkemann's concept of 'culturally scripted life projects', this article will show how the attempt to pursue a regular life unfolds in an everyday setting in order to escape the predominant conflict/resistance frame. In addition to as an individual practice this article highlights the broader social and political role this concept assumes in the context of Palestinian nationalism. In order to illustrate this argument, this article presents as a spatial quotidian practice which is primarily aimed at realising culturally scripted life project in the face of the Israeli occupation.

In this paper, we examine Brazil's international activism and ascent to the status of rising state during the presidencies of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and his chosen successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014). We focus on the dissemination of social policies under an innovative model of development that reflected the political and economic context of a developing country. We argue that this activism was framed in terms of Brazil's socio-economic and cultural peculiarities, whereby these were treated not as obstacles but as positive contributions to developing states' attempts to reform global governance structures. We argue that this reflects an alternative form of foreign policy politicisation in which the social dilemmas, particularities and contradictions of the Brazilian experience are incorporated in the foreign policy agenda to leverage its international stature as a rising state. We explain how Brazil's international cooperation through transferring its public policies and development models (policies for fighting hunger and poverty, agrarian development and income generation) to its Southern partners has been discursively articulated as representing Brazil's normative potential to contribute to political and institutional solutions, and rebuild norms and standards that affect the distribution of international power and wealth.

This symposium is a follow-up to the 2019 CEEISA/ISA conference 'International Relations in the Age of Anxiety' held at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, Serbia, in June 2019. The central piece in the symposium is the keynote address by Bahar Rumelili on the untapped potential of existentialism in IR followed by highly engaged responses by Felix Berenskötter, Karl Gustafsson, Brent Steele and Andreja Zevnik. In this introduction we first describe the context in which we organised the conference and our motivations to choose the topic of the age of anxiety. We also reflect on how the global pandemic, which erupted in January 2020, made our topic more relevant than ever before. We then briefly introduce each piece and discuss what we see as the key questions they raise.

While the United Nations (UN) and other international organisations have celebrated the 20th anniversary of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, critical scholars claim that the agenda has rarely been able to foster resilience. They show how programmes have only slowly and partially achieved gender balancing and parity in war-affected countries. The limitation we identify in the debate between policy and critique is that resilience has often been reduced to an egalitarian project-where mechanical policies and schemes are deployed to ameliorate the conditions of women, enhance their participation in decision-making and pursue the equality between women and men-to advance in sustaining peace. In this article we complement the existing critiques by engaging with the feminist writings of Elizabeth Grosz, as well as with indigenous feminist practices in Liberia. We nurture a feminism that affirms the agency and inventiveness of women to begin to reimagine resilience as difference: a resilience that thrives outside governance structures and the confines of neoliberal policymaking.

Most scholarship on major oil-producing countries (OPCs) focuses on their illiberal characteristics, but scant research explores how these regimes react to periodic oil price collapses, particularly neo-patrimonial OPCs with relatively low state capacity, herein termed gatekeeper OPCs. These OPCs should be extremely vulnerable to regime change during economic crises. However, since the most recent collapse in international oil markets in 2014, almost all neo-patrimonial OPCs have managed to weather the ensuing fallout, thereby begging the question of how these seemingly vulnerable regimes manage to survive extended periods of economic crises. We hypothesise that the likelihood of regime survival in neo-patrimonial OPCs depends on a strategic calibration of domestic neo-patrimonial policies, such as clientelism and executive aggrandisement, and the skilled navigation of global geopolitics. We find evidence that incumbent governments leverage international geopolitical tensions during economic crises to secure valuable foreign aid from key allies, which allows them to maintain the domestic neo-patrimonial strategies required to safeguard their power. We reached the above finding through a nested mixed-methods research design combining quantitative analysis of 35 major OPCs from 2011 to 2018 using Cox proportional hazards models with the qualitative comparison of two gatekeeper OPCs-Chad and Venezuela.

The Liberal International Order (LIO) is under pressure from various angles. To account for this phenomenon, a recent trend is to focus on endogenous sources of contestation-institutional properties of the order that create negative feedback effects. In this article, we seize on and extend an endogenous explanation centring on the LIO's political structure and institutional design. While existing research stipulates a connection between the rising authority of liberal international organisations (IOs) and their increasing politicisation, we still lack a clear understanding of the reasons behind the growing rejection of the order at the level of mass publics. We argue that the LIO's institutional setup contains a widening 'democracy gap' denoting a disconnect between the participatory legitimation requirements for the exercise of political authority and the technocratic legitimation rationale characterising IOs. By creating a , the democracy gap incites growing political dissatisfaction and, by implying a , it turns policy contestation into outright polity contestation. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical argument in case studies of the EU and the international regimes on trade and human rights, and subsequently discuss the analytical and normative implications of our argument.

Although international actors operating under the United Nations umbrella put much faith in the possibility of bridging science and policy through various institutional arrangements, research in the Science and Technology Studies (STS) tradition suggests that different revolve around environmental degradation issues. , which imply peculiar understandings of knowledge across cultures, are not easily bridged. This paper contends that conflicting (civic) epistemologies inevitably emerge in epistemic debates at the intergovernmental level, with strong implications for how science and knowledge are dealt with and understood in environmental negotiations. Drawing on the experience of global soil and land governance and building on the idiom of , the concept of is introduced as an analytical tool to capture the diverging ways of appreciating and validating knowledge in intergovernmental settings. Placing state actors and their perspectives center stage, account for the tensions, contestations and politicisation processes of international institutional settings dealing with environmental issues. The paper concludes discussing the consequences of for the study of global environmental governance: it cautions about overreliance on approaches based on learning and all-encompassing discourses, emphasizing the value of using STS-derived concepts to investigate the complexity of international environmental negotiations.

Resilience has become an oft-invoked concept in development and security policy circles and the subject of much debate in the literature. Yet, one aspect that needs to be further theorised is the complex relationship between resilience, conflict and gender. This introduction identifies the gradual congruence between the programmatic agendas of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and resilience-building approaches in peacebuilding and argues that this convergence needs to be further scrutinised. Our main argument is that it is time for the scholarship to go beyond the simple categorisation of resilience as being either the new paradigmatic solution to international interventions, conflicts and crises or a meaningless and useless governmental buzzword. Instead, the contributions found in this Special Issue see resilience in terms of multiplicity. Resilience, understood in terms of multiplicity and in a multidimensional way, appears a valuable analytical concept to study both the systemic nature of gendered power relations and their prevalence and adaptation over time, as well as the responses of individuals, communities and institutions to the gendered effects of conflict. To add empirical richness to the Special Issue, these conceptual connections are analysed in multiple geographical case studies, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Iraq, Liberia, Palestine and Rwanda.

Since 2018, US foreign policy elites have portrayed China as the gravest threat to their country. Why was China predominantly cast as an ideological threat, even though other discursive formulations, such as a geopolitical threat, were plausible and available? Existing major IR theories on threat perpcetions struggle to address these questions. In this article, we draw from rhetoric and public legitimation scholarship to argue that the mobilization of adjacent policy debates was key to mainstream the representation of China as an ideological threat. By mobilizing debates on Russia and the soft power and sharp power concepts, a minority view in US foreign policy with a longstanding ambition to get tough on China established a seemingly natural link between liberal internationalism and an ideologically threatening China. Liberal foreign policy elites who originally opposed a view of China could now subsume a geopolitical threat into an ideological one reminiscent of US-Soviet Cold War rivalry. This constituted a necessary catalyst to align most foreign policy elites to understand China as the gravest threat to the United States, at a time when China's capabilities and behaviour, coupled with a deep sense of insecurity regarding America's place in the world, provided the necessary backdrop.

This paper inquires theoretically into how leaders act and react to the state role of rising power through the case study of India. It brings together role theory and leadership trait analysis, and contends that there is a puzzling interplay between rising status and leaders' characteristics. We project that leaders' traits and styles condition how they enact roles. India and its leaders offer a suitable case for investigating this issue. Since the economically unstable early 1990s, India has gone through a relatively successful era of global emergence. Thus, we examine the relationship between India's roles and the leadership profiles of Prime Ministers Atal Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Narenda Modi, specifically their belief in the ability to control events and the need for power. We find especially in Vajpayee and Singh that their traits can help explain India's foreign policy roles and in Modi (first term only) a leader vulnerable to contextual winds. We argue that the interplay of leaders' traits and roles, as expressions of both material and social dimensions, helps assess how they make sense of their country's rising within both the regional and international systems.

The ongoing covid-19 pandemic has prompted discussions, both politically and analytically, that frame its security problematic as an infrastructural dilemma that unfolds between the public health-related need for interrupting the movement of people and calls to keep economic processes of production, distribution and consumption going. Moving beyond this diagnosis, we argue that infrastructural responses to the crisis in the European Union have resulted in the creation and invocation of economic and socio-material assemblages that are expected to steer societies through the crisis, which we term 'safe assemblages'. In empirical terms, we discuss the cases of the creation of economic emergency funds which we view as economic assemblages that guarantee payment connectivity for struggling businesses, and of the invocation of the 'home' as an assemblage that minimises contagion risks while maintaining social connectivity through digital means. In theoretical terms, we suggest expanding current theorisations of the role of circulation in security infrastructures, referring to Foucault, by a consideration of assemblages as a third component that mediates the relationship between circulation and its interruption.

Resilience and gender have become new buzzwords for expressing renewal in peacebuilding. This article unpacks the gender-resilience nexus in theory and analyses global trends and variation in peacebuilding policy and practice. It advances an analytical framework based on three central pillars of peacebuilding: process, outcome, and expertise. A comprehensive analysis of 49 international peacebuilding handbooks, produced by leading international organisations for policymakers and practitioners in the field, is conducted. The results show how the integration of the gender-resilience nexus signals new ways of understanding conflict dynamics and peacebuilding. Yet, gender peace expertise is 'thin' with regard to policies and practices of resilient conflict transformation. By way of conclusion, we suggest three directions to be taken in research to advance and refine the gender-resilience nexus. First, the politics and contestation of peacebuilding need to be problematised and explored further. Second, the understanding of resilience in peacebuilding needs to shift emphasis from conflict management to conflict transformation. Third, the positionality of peacebuilding actors and local contexts need to be probed further.

This article appraises Professor Rumelili's important central focus on anxiety by broadening the scope of the challenges the age of anxiety poses. With reference to recent events, such as the covid-19 pandemic and authoritarian politics, it argues that practices and strategies once thought to alleviate anxiety are now resources for it. The article concludes by calling for scholars to consider the possibility of anxiety as a structural feature of global politics, and organising our theoretical interventions, analyses, and politics around that constitutive feature. Ontological security, therefore, proves more elusive than ever before.

Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) claims that poverty reduction is one of its objectives, some studies show that IMF borrower countries experience higher rates of poverty. This paper investigates the effects of IMF loan conditions on poverty. Using a sample of 81 developing countries from 1986 to 2016, we find that IMF loan arrangements containing structural reforms contribute to more people getting trapped in the poverty cycle, as the reforms involve deep and comprehensive changes that tend to raise unemployment, lower government revenue, increase costs of basic services, and restructure tax collection, pensions, and social security programmes. Conversely, we observe that loan arrangements promoting stabilisation reforms have less impact on the poor because borrower states hold more discretion over their macroeconomic targets. Further, we disaggregate structural reforms to identify the particular policies that increase poverty. Our findings are robust to different specifications and indicate how IMF loan arrangements affect poverty in the developing world.

Neoliberalism has been allegedly challenged in East Central Europe. The neoliberal rollback by both nationalist forces and their economic nationalism in Hungary and Poland is commonly used to confirm this regional generalisation. In this generalisation, economic nationalism promotes anti-neoliberal state strategies because it challenges the economic globalism which was formerly privileged by the neoliberal globalist forces in these strategies. This paper challenges such a generalisation. Focusing on Czechia, it counterargues against this rollback thesis by stating that neoliberalism has overcome the global economic crisis and the political crisis of its austerity management. The transnational class approach is then offered as an alternative to the rollback scholarship: contrary to the rollback thesis, Czechia illustrates how economic nationalism can also promote neoliberalism. Moreover, Czech neoliberalism remains resilient because a pragmatic coalition of two neoliberal-nationalist and globalist-forces retains an enduring influence on the country's economic strategies. These findings cultivate the regional generalisation but contribute subsequently to the broader debate on the worldwide rollback of neoliberal globalisation due to the political rise of economic nationalism.

Telling a story can explain how an event came about. It can thereby also change how we grasp temporality. In this article, I will discuss Paul Ricœur's notion of 'narrative time' in the context of International Relations. Viewed from this perspective, narratives not only explain, but also mediate two ways of understanding time, phenomenological and cosmological, by weaving experienced time and natural time together. How they do so will be shown considering three tools: calendar, succession of generations, and trace. The calendar and the succession of generations interlink, through narratives, physical and biological elements with experience. This includes the creation of 'temporal watersheds' by extraordinary events, periodisations, traditions, and the recasting of preceding academic generations. The trace gestures at the temporal implications of the sources on which IR builds by referring to their time bridging function.