Disinformation has transformed into a global issue and while it is seen as a growing concern to democracy today, autocrats have long used it as a part of their propaganda repertoire. Yet, no study has tested the effect of disinformation on regime stability and breakdown beyond country-specific studies. Drawing on novel measures from the Digital Society Project (DSP) estimating the levels of disinformation disseminated by governments across 148 countries between 2000-2022 and from the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset, we provide the first global comparative study of disinformation and survival of democratic and authoritarian regimes, respectively. The results show that in authoritarian regimes, disinformation helps rulers to stay in power as regimes with higher levels of disinformation are less likely to experience democratization episodes. In democracies, on the other hand, disinformation increases the probability of autocratization onsets. As such, this study is the first to provide comparative evidence on the negative effects of disinformation on democracy as well as on the prospects of democratization.

A great amount of research has noted the existence of a gap between election winners and losers in relation to perceptions of electoral fairness and satisfaction with democracy. One aspect of the winner-loser gap that has been overlooked is the impact of citizens' expectations about election outcomes on these attitudes. More precisely, how do citizens react to unexpected defeats and victories? Are individuals on the losing side less critical of the electoral process or dissatisfied with democracy when they recognize beforehand that their favourite party or candidate was likely to be defeated? Does experiencing a surprise victory lead to a boost in perceived electoral integrity or democratic satisfaction? To answer these questions, I use data from the 1996, 2000, 2004, 2012, 2016 and 2020 ANES. While there is little evidence that expectations exert a major influence on post-election attitudes, outcome unexpectedness seems to have decreased confidence in the vote counting process among losers, independents and even winners in the 2020 election. The results show the considerable influence that fraud claims and conspiracy theories can have on public opinion when elected officials and candidates push a consistent story line of electoral malfeasance and corruption in an effort to denigrate political opponents.

Governments routinely offer deals to companies accused of white-collar crimes, allowing them to escape criminal charges in exchange for fines or penalties. This lets prosecutors avoid costly litigation and protects companies' right to bid on lucrative public contracts, which can reduce the likelihood of bankruptcies or layoffs. Striking deals with white-collar criminals can be risky for governments because it could affect the perceived legitimacy of the legal system. This article explores the conditions under which the general public supports leniency agreements. Building on theoretical intuitions from the literature, we identify three characteristics that could affect mass attitudes: home bias, economic incentives, and retribution. We conduct a survey experiment in the United States and find moderate support for leniency agreements. Whether the crime occurs on US soil or abroad does not affect public opinion, and the number of jobs that would be jeopardized by criminal prosecution only has a small effect. Instead, survey respondents become much more supportive of a deal when it includes criminal charges for the corporate managers who were personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing. In the court of public opinion, punishing a handful of individuals appears to matter more than saving thousands of jobs.

Interest groups seek to influence parliamentarians' actions by establishing exchange relationships. We scrutinize the role of exchange by investigating how interest groups impact parliamentarians' use of individual parliamentary instruments such as questions, motions, and bills. We utilize a new longitudinal dataset (2000-2015) with 524 Swiss parliamentarians, their 6342 formal ties to interest groups (i.e., board seats), and a variety of 23,750 parliamentary instruments across 15 policy areas. This enables us to show that interest groups systematically relate to parliamentarians' use of parliamentary instruments in the respective policy areas in which they operate-even when parliamentarians' time-invariant (fixed effects) and time-variant personal affinities (occupation, committee membership) to the policy area are accounted for. Personal affinities heavily moderate interest groups' impact on their board members' parliamentary activities. Moreover, once formal ties end, the impact of interest groups also wanes. These findings have implications for our understanding of how interest groups foster representation in legislatures.

Prior research suggests social ties with undocumented immigrants among Latinxs may increase political engagement despite constraints undocumented social networks may introduce. We build on prior research and find across six surveys of Latinxs that social ties with undocumented immigrants are reliably associated with collective, identity expressive activities such as protesting, but not activities where immigration may not be immediately relevant, such as voting. Moreover, we assess a series of mechanisms to resolve the puzzle of heightened participation despite constraints. Consistent with prior research at the intersection of anti-immigrant threat and Social Identity Theory, we find Latinxs with strong ethnic identification are more likely to engage in political protest in the presence of social ties with undocumented immigrants, whereas weak identifiers disengage. We rule out alternative mechanisms that could link undocumented social ties with participation including political efficacy, a sense of injustice, linked fate, acculturation, outgroup perceptions of immigration status, partisan identity, conducive opportunity structures, and prosociality. Our contribution suggests the reason social ties with undocumented immigrants are not necessarily a hindrance to political engagement among Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics is because they can draw from identitarian resources to overcome participatory constraints.

The COVID-19 pandemic was a key policy issue during the 2020 election in the United States. As such, it is important to analyze how voters evaluated government responses to the pandemic. To this end, in this article, we examine factors that influenced Americans' evaluations of state-level COVID-19 policy responses. We find that during the pandemic onset period, Americans typically rated their state governments' responses more favorably if their governor was a co-partisan. In contrast, during the re-opening period, we find that Democrats relied on both partisanship and policy to evaluate their state-level responses, while Republicans continued to rely solely on partisanship. We contend that given the complex policy environment surrounding COVID-19, Americans may have not been fully aware of the policies their state governments adopted, so they relied on partisan cues to help them evaluate their state-level policy responses. But by the re-opening period, Americans likely had enough time to better understand state-level policy responses; this allowed Democrats to also evaluate their state-level responses based on policy. These findings shed light on how Americans evaluated COVID-19 responses just prior to the 2020 election.

Do incumbents dominate non-partisan elections because of an especially large personal vote? This question has important implications for understanding the causes of incumbent success and the benefits or drawbacks of non-partisan elections. This paper uses a natural experiment, combined with three original datasets, to estimate the size, persistence, and consequences of the personal vote in a large non-partisan city election. We first use individual-level survey data to show that individuals assigned quasi-randomly to a new incumbent are substantially less likely to support the incumbent. We use a second survey, one year later, to demonstrate the persistence of this effect. Finally, we use historical election results to simulate the electoral consequences of the personal vote; we find that the personal vote is sufficiently large to affect one in four incumbent races. We conclude that the personal vote, while large and important, is not sufficient to explain incumbent dominance in non-partisan contests.

Although the majority of studies on political knowledge document lingering gender-based differences in advanced industrial democracies, most contributors have drawn such conclusions from a single or a handful of countries, using limited batteries of political information items. Exploiting a pooled data set of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems encompassing 106 post-election surveys in forty-seven countries between 1996 and 2011, this article demonstrates that survey instrument-related factors, such as question format and content, as well as the overall difficulty of questions, are more consequential in shaping the size of gender gaps in political knowledge than institutional factors, such as electoral rules or opportunity structures. The research design of this article draws from almost three hundred different items measuring factual political knowledge using the broadest country coverage and most comprehensive approach to measurement to date.

Scholarship in the area of group identity has expanded our understanding of how group consciousness and linked fate operate among racial and ethnic minority populations in the United States. What is yet to be tested is whether the measures employed adequately capture the multi-dimensional theoretical constructs associated with group consciousness across racial and ethnic populations. To address this question we make use of the 2004 National Political Study (n=3,339) and apply principle components analysis and exploratory factor analysis to assess whether measures used for both group consciousness and linked fate are interchangeable, as well as whether these measures are directly comparable across racial and ethnic populations. We find that the multidimensional approach to measuring group consciousness is a sound strategy when applied to African Americans, as the dimensions fit the African American experience more powerfully than is the case for Non-Hispanic Whites, Hispanics, and Asian populations. Our analysis suggests that scholars interesting in exploring group identity among the African-African population have fewer analytical concerns in this regard than those working with other populations where the underlying components associated with group consciousness appear to be operating differently.

We argue that research on political behavior, including political participation, public opinion, policy responsiveness, and political inequality will be strengthened by studying the role of health. We then provide evidence that health matters for voter turnout and partisanship. Using the General Social Survey (GSS) and The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), we find that people who report poor health are less likely to vote and identify with the Republican Party. Moreover, the effects of health on voter turnout and partisanship appear to have both developmental and contemporaneous components. Taken together, our findings suggest that may have significant .