Contemporary consciousness research has given rise to numerous theories in both the philosophical and neuroscientific domains (such as higher-order theory and global neuronal workspace), raising the question as to how well each is supported. This article develops a relatively novel method for determining this, which is to use evidence, not just from a theory's own domain, but also from its complementary domain (e.g., neuroscientific evidence is used to judge a philosophical theory, and vice versa). This approach works when a neuroscientific and a philosophical theory are conceptually linked, allowing evidence confirming or disconfirming one theory to do the same for the other. After developing this method, the article uses it to draw conclusions concerning some of our leading neuroscientific and philosophical theories of consciousness, including first- and second-order representationalism and theories emphasizing the prefrontal cortex's role in consciousness.

Research has revealed two major event-related potential (ERP) markers of visual awareness: the earlier Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN, around 150-250 ms after stimulus onset), and the following Late Positivity (LP, around 300-500 ms after stimulus onset). Understanding the neural sources that give rise to VAN and LP is important in order to understand what kind of neural processes underlie conscious visual perception. Although the ERPs afford high temporal resolution, their spatial resolution is limited because multiple separate neural sources sum up at the scalp level. In the present study, we sought to characterize the locations and time-courses of independent neural sources underlying the ERP correlates of visual awareness by means of Independent Component Analysis (ICA). ICA allows identifying and localizing the temporal dynamics of different neural sources that contribute to the ERP correlates of conscious perception. The present results show that the cortical sources of VAN are localized to posterior areas including occipital and temporal cortex, while LP reflects a combination of multiple sources distributed among frontal, parietal and occipito-temporal cortex. Our findings suggest that conscious vision correlates with dynamically changing neural sources, developing in part in "accumulative fashion": consciousness-related activity initially arises in few early sources and, subsequently, additional sources are engaged as a function of time. The results further suggest that even early latency neural sources that correlate with conscious perception may also associate with action-related processes.

A fundamental question in the domain of affect and conscious perception is whether the former can impact the latter. Traditionally, perception and affect were conceived as largely independent. Against this backdrop, it was recently argued that the affective valence of a stimulus can modulate the perceptual experience of its sensory features. An alternative hypothesis is that perceptual experiences have a valenced aspect over and above their sensory aspects, with these two aspects interacting and comprising integral perceptual dimensions. To test this, we carried out two experiments deploying Wendell Garner's speeded classification paradigm to decide whether visual brightness and affective valence are separable or integral dimensions.We found Garner interference, documenting that brightness and valence are integral dimensions. We did not observe effects of congruity - responses to bright positive stimuli were not faster than to bright negative stimuli - providing no support for affect induced changes in the perception of brightness.

Although life is lived forward, it can only be understood backward. From the perspective of life-history theory, we propose that mortality reminders may induce backward thinking from the endpoint of life and regulate intertemporal choice between smaller-and-sooner (SS) and large-and-later rewards (LL), thereby helping individuals with time management. Experiment 1 compared the effects of mortality (endpoint) imagination with the imagination of being at age 70 and found that only mortality imagination significantly reduced delay discounting, the extent to which a delayed reward is discounted. In Experiment 2, mortality reminders companied by retrospective episodic mental time travel significantly reduced delay discounting compared to prospective episodic processing. However, the effect disappeared when the end-of-life reminder was replaced with an old-age (70 years) reminder. Highlighting the inevitability of death, coupled with retrospective episodic thinking, promoted future-oriented preferences, suggesting that end-of-life meditation is likely to induce retrospective mental time travels.

The sense of agency (SoA) refers to the subjective experience of influencing the external world through actions. This study explores how action selection and simultaneous affective outcomes impact implicit and explicit SoA. In two experiments, participants performed free or instructed key presses followed by simultaneously presenting a reward picture (gain, loss) with an emotional sound (positive, neutral, negative). Experiment 1 showed enhanced implicit SoA for free (vs. instructed) actions and positive (vs. negative) sound. Experiment 2 revealed enhanced explicit SoA for reward gain (vs. loss) and positive (vs. negative) sound. Results suggest that SoA formation at different consciousness levels depends on various cues' absolute and relative strengths. Action selection only influenced implicit SoA, while affective outcomes showed differential effects: emotional sound impacted implicit SoA, and both reward and sound influenced explicit SoA, with motivation-related reward showing stronger effects. This research advances the understanding of cue integration mechanisms underlying SoA formation.

When we are presented with a coin rotated in depth, although we perceive its objective circular shape, the original perspectival shape is nonetheless represented in the visual system. Here we investigated the onset time and duration of such perspectival representation by systematically manipulating stimuli presentation time vs. post-stimuli retention time. Participants performed a speeded search task and had to find an oval target against a circle distractor that is either head-on (i.e., perspectivally dissimilar) or rotated leftward/rightward (i.e., perspectivally similar). We found that even when stimuli disappeared from view, participants still took more time in locating the oval target, suggesting robust and persistent perspectival interference (Experiment 1). This interference emerged as early as 100 ms (Experiment 2), and persisted for at least 1000 ms (Experiment 3). Together, these results suggest a 100 ms formation time and possibly 1000 ms or longer life span for perspectival representation.

Temporal attention is the ability to prioritize information based on timing. While conscious perception of temporally structured information is known to generate temporal attention, whether it occurs unconsciously remains uncertain. This study used a temporal cueing paradigm with masking techniques to explore the differences between conscious and unconscious temporal attention mechanisms. Experiment 1 found that both visible and invisible cues triggered temporal attention, with stronger effects for visible cues. Experiment 2, using electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings, showed that both visible and invisible cues evoked contingent negative variation (CNV) component, albeit smaller with invisible cues. The P300 component further supported this pattern. Hierarchical drift-diffusion modeling (HDDM) analysis demonstrated that both conscious and unconscious temporal attention effects involve non-perceptual decision-making processes. These findings both align and challenge the Global Workspace Theory, suggesting that while consciousness enhances conscious attention via global broadcasting, unconscious attention may rely on more localized neural networks.

Entrainment theories propose that attention inherently oscillates between moments of attentional enhancement and disengagement. Consequently, perceptual and response benefits have been reported in tasks with a rhythmic structure. In the present study, we report two preregistered auditory experiments attempting to replicate previous supporting behavioral evidence of entrainment theories. In addition, we incorporated eye-tracker measures. Both Experiment 1 (duration discrimination task) and Experiment 2 (pitch discrimination task) showed no phase-specific benefit of rhythmic sequences compared to arrhythmic ones. Importantly, a tonic larger pupil size for arrhythmic conditions was observed irrespective of target phase, suggesting higher processing demands or arousal state imposed by a sustained uncertain context. Overall, the present results call into question whether the perceptual benefits predicted by entrainment theories are generalizable across all experimental designs and paradigms. On the contrary, our findings join a large group of studies that have failed to replicate the foundational results of attentional entrainment.

Experiencing a sense of agency (SoA), the feeling of being in control over one's actions and their outcomes, typically requires intentional and voluntary actions. Prior research has compared the association of voluntary versus completely involuntary actions with the SoA. Here, we leveraged unique characteristics of oculomotor actions to partially manipulate the degree of action voluntariness. Participants performed either highly automatized prosaccades or highly controlled (voluntary) anti-saccades, triggering a gaze-contingent visual action effect. We assessed explicit SoA ratings and temporal action and effect binding as an implicit SoA measure. Anti-saccades were associated with stronger action binding compared to prosaccades, demonstrating a robust association between higher action voluntariness and a stronger implicit sense of action agency. We conclude that our manipulation of action voluntariness may have impacted the implicit phenomenological feeling of bodily agency, but it did not affect the SoA over effect outcomes or explicit agency perception.

Aphantasia, a spectrum of inabilities creating and perceiving mental images, is becoming more of a focus in continued research to better understand functions of sensory perception and imagination. Current research on aphantasia is still in an era of exploration to find its underlying neural mechanisms, comorbidities and comparing levels of visual imagery to other cognitive functions. Through a systematic review, this article explores the most influential developments in aphantasia research. The search included 3 databases-PsycINFO, PubMed, and Web of Science. After a rigorous selection process, 52 studies are included in this review. The findings include new research themes across different studies such as relationships between aphantasia and diminished episodic and autobiographical memory, comorbidities including autism, attention, emotions, and neurobiological differences. By integrating diverse perspectives, this review aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes underlying mental imagery and offers implications for further development in aphantasia research.

Personal relevance exerts a powerful influence on decisional processing, such that arbitrary stimuli associated with the self are classified more rapidly than identical material linked with other people. Notwithstanding numerous demonstrations of this facilitatory effect, it remains unclear whether self-prioritization is a temporally stable outcome of decision-making. Accordingly, using a shape-label matching task in combination with computational modeling, the current experiment investigated this matter. The results were informative. First, regardless of the target of comparison (i.e., friend or stranger), self-prioritization was a persistent product of decision-making across the testing session. Second, a variant of the standard drift diffusion model in which decisional boundaries collapsed gradually over the course of the task best fit the observed data. Third, whereas the efficiency of stimulus processing increased for other-related stimuli during the task, it decreased for self-related material. Collectively, these findings advance understanding of the temporal profile of self-prioritization.

Embodiment refers to the possibility of processing external objects as part of one's body. Similarly, absorption refers to the subjective experience of being absorbed in a narrative text and identifying with characters. Embodiment and absorption in literary texts have in common the idea of finding oneself in someone else's shoes. Recent studies have shown that embodiment is influenced by the perspective used to induce the illusion. The present study aimed to assess whether absorption in literary texts was modulated by perspective too. We first confirmed the reliability of the absorption measure (Story World Absorption Scale - SWAS) in Italian. Then, we used a Bayesian approach to assess the impact of the story perspective on the perceived absorption. Our results showed that, unlike embodiment, the level of absorption is not influenced by the narrative's perspective, suggesting that different processes underlie the two experiences of self-projection.

Contradictory findings suggest mental imagery may both exacerbate and protect against negative affect. We aimed to reconcile these contradictory findings by considering individual differences (N=989) in imagery vividness, attention control, resilience, emotion regulation strategy, and negative affect (depressive, anxious, and posttraumatic stress symptomology). We hypothesized that attention control would mediate relationships between imagery vividness and emotion regulation strategy use, and psychopathology symptomology. Results revealed that imagery vividness, as mediated by attention control, predicted greater levels of healthy reappraisal and deleterious rumination. Attention control also mediated negative relationships between imagery vividness and catastrophizing, self-blame, and psychopathology symptomology. An exploratory latent structural equation model revealed that imagery vividness and attention control aggregated positively with reappraisal and resilience scores. The present investigation suggests an adaptive function of imagery vividness via the indirect effects of attention control, facilitating adaptive emotion regulation and limiting maladaptive strategy use, thereby protecting against negative affect.

Our thought states change without intention. This study verified that the transition of thought states varies with fluctuations in autonomic nervous activity, and that this effect is modulated by interoceptive accuracy. The participants completed the heartbeat counting task (HCT) and vigilance task. We assessed the participants' interoceptive accuracy based on their performance on the HCT. The vigilance task is a simple attention task, and during this task, we asked the participants to report the content and contemplation of their thoughts. Consequently, participants with accurate interoception were more likely to remain in a highly contemplative thought state when parasympathetic activity was suppressed. In contrast, the dominance of parasympathetic activity facilitated transitions to different thought states or experiences of less contemplative thought states in them. The results suggest that even subtle changes in bodily responses at rest can affect thought transitions in people with accurate interoception.

Despite our feeling of control over decisions, our ability to consciously access choices before execution remains debated. Recent research reveals prospective access to intention to act, allowing potential vetoes of impending decisions. However, whether the content of impending decision can be accessed remain debated. Here we track neural signals during participants' early deliberation in free decisions. Participants chose freely between two options but sometimes had to reject their current decision just before execution. The initially preferred option, tracked in real time, significantly predicts the upcoming choice, but remain mostly outside of conscious awareness. Participants often display overconfidence in their access to this content. Instead, confidence is associated with a neural marker of self-initiated decision, indicating a qualitative confusion in the confidence evaluation process. Our results challenge the notion of complete agency over choices, suggesting inflated awareness of forthcoming decisions and providing insights into metacognitive processes in free decision-making.

The current study asked whether impoverished peripheral vision led to perception immune from word-based semantic influences. We leveraged a peripheral sound-induced flash illusion. In each trial, two or three Mandarin characters were flashed quickly in the periphery with number-congruent or -incongruent beeps. We first successfully replicated the original illusions, showing auditory dominance. For example, when three characters were presented together with two beeps, the observer reported perceiving only two characters. Similarly, an additional beep induced an illusory visual percept. Crucially, when the three characters formed a meaningful word, the lack of a concurrent beep suppressed the awareness to a greater extent. A separate experiment replicated the effect on participants who were unable to recognize the words. When the reading was disrupted by reversing the presentation order, the effect disappeared. These findings demonstrate the capacity of our visual system to extract peripheral linguistic information without conscious word recognition.

Arrows trigger reflexive shifts of attention and instantiate the prototypical example of automated symbolic orienting. We conducted four experiments to further test the boundary conditions of this phenomenon. Participants discriminated a peripheral target while spatially uninformative arrows, pointing leftwards or rightwards, appeared at fixation. In all experiments, arrow direction could either randomly vary (intermixed condition) or be kept constant within a block of trials (blocked condition). Moreover, in Experiments 3 and 4, a direction word presented at the beginning of the trial informed participants about the target location with 100% certainty. Overall, the results highlighted a significant arrow-driven orienting effect in both the blocked and the intermixed conditions. The present findings support the notion that automated symbolic orienting is resistant to suppression in that it endures even when the context should stress the uninformative nature of the arrows while also creating ideal conditions to boost participants' tendency to ignore them.

Does the likelihood of us experiencing inattentional blindness depend on whether the scenes are statistically regular (e.g., probable) or not? Previous studies have shown that observers find it harder to perceive real-world statistical irregularities, such as improbable (statistically irregular) scenes (e.g., scenes unlikely to take place in the real world) as opposed to probable (statistically regular) scenes. Moreover, high inattentional blindness rates have been observed for improbable stimuli (e.g., a gorilla on a college campus). However, no one has directly compared noticing rates for probable and improbable scenes. Here we ask if people are more likely to experience inattentional blindness for improbable than probable scenes. In two large-scale experiments in which one group of participants is presented, on the critical trial, with a probable scene and the other group with an improbable scene, we observed higher rates of inattention blindness for participants receiving improbable scenes than those receiving probable scenes.

Epistemological and ontological conceptions of information are contrasted. The former are based on acts of decoding of extrinsic inputs that result in a decoder becoming informed. The latter are based on intrinsic states or state changes of the system independent of any external factors such as inputs to the system. Ontological conceptions of information, such as those that underlie integrated information theory or any theory that allies itself with panpsychism, are not able to account for consciousness. In the only physical systems that are known to be conscious, namely, animal brains, acts of decoding extrinsic inputs are central to creating consciousness and its contents. Moreover, only a very specific subset of decodings should realize consciousness, because consciousness in animals evolved to create an evaluative experience of what is intrinsically true about the world and the body, which is then used in a perception-action cycle that affords choices among options for behaving in the world in order to accomplish goals.

Visual perspective taking (VPT) is an integral part of social interactions. While the mechanisms of VPT have been extensively explored in human-human interactions, only a handful of studies have investigated the mechanisms that enable humans to also take the perspective of robots. Previous work has proposed that human-like visual features trigger VPT (mere-appearance hypothesis). In this study, we investigate the boundary conditions of the mere-appearance hypothesis in four experiments in a dot-matching task. We show that not only human-like visual features trigger VPT but that a camera also triggers VPT. Non-human animal-like features, conversely, do not result in VPT. We thus suggest that not only human-like visual features but also an object that is associated with an implied social presence (a camera) can trigger VPT whereas this is not the case for non-human animal-like features. These findings further extend earlier work on the mere-appearance hypothesis and are informative for designing social robots.

Meditation is a self-regulatory process practiced primarily to reduce stress, manage emotions and mental health. The objective of this work is to study the information exchange between electrodes within and across the hemispheres during meditation using functional connectivity (FC) measures. We investigate the changes in the coherence between EEG electrode pairs during the meditation with open eyes practiced by long-term Brahmakumaris Rajyoga meditators and during listening to music by controls as the comparable task. FC derived from coherency, pairwise phase consistency (PPC) is used to study the changes in intra and interhemispheric coherence. Integrating connectivity (IC) derived from node degree strength has also been analyzed. Meditators show increased PPC in higher theta and alpha bands both within and across hemispheres. However, the control subjects with no knowledge of meditation show no change in theta band during the music session. Further, during baseline conditions, higher interhemispheric anterior to posterior IC is found in meditators in higher beta and slow gamma bands than controls. Distinct patterns of changes are observed with the PPC and IC measures in different frequency bands during meditation in the meditators and music-listening session in the control subjects indicating varied information processing between the right and left hemispheres. Increased IC is found between the frontal electrodes implying increased self-awareness in meditators. The PPC between the occipital electrodes in meditators is less than the controls in baseline condition indicating a possible modified visual information processing in Rajyoga meditators due to the long-term practice of meditation with open eyes. Overall, the changes in PPC and associated IC indicate increased functional integration during meditation supporting the hypothesis of communication through coherence and cortical integration theory during the non-ordinary state of consciousness induced by meditation.