Academics influence not only knowledge production but also selection to the labour market and policy development. They have power. Despite the sociological attention paid to class in higher education, few studies have examined the way in which class interferes with the careers of those navigating from being students to becoming scholars. Building on Bourdieu's theory of social reproduction, this study examines how class influences different groups' experiences of becoming academics. Based on 60 interviews with Norwegian scholars in their early to mid-careers, the analysis identifies the kind of classed resources that are in play in the unequal access to academic positions. Beyond more classical resources, such as financial, cultural, and psychological certainty, the interviewees point to the significance of an early familiarity with the rules of the game and strategic navigation of the academic system. We use these findings to discuss and nuance Pierre Bourdieu's perspectives on the role of incorporated, practical consciousness and disinterestedness in class reproduction in the academic world. This theoretical contribution facilitates the combined analysis of the implicit and the explicit ways that dominant classes preserve their position in the hierarchy, which the study demonstrates as key to social reproduction in academic careers.

Changes in the social mobility of men in Scotland between the late-19th and the late-twentieth century are examined using new individual-level data from nineteenth-century censuses, linking records of men aged 0-19 in 1871 to their records in 1901, and then comparing their patterns with the social mobility of men aged 30-49 in 1974 and in 2001 as recorded in social surveys at these dates. The extent of social mobility in the nineteenth century was large. In particular, the social origins of people in the highest classes-the salariat-were very varied, indicating a society that was more open than is sometimes supposed. There was a slow growth in social mobility between then and 2001. In both periods, class inheritance-sons in the same social class as their father-was strongest in the economically declining sectors, which were agriculture and fisheries in 1901 and industry in 1974 and 2001. In the 1901 data, however, the transition to a non-agricultural economy induced strong outward mobility from agriculture.

How do sellers on online marketplaces determine agreeable prices? This question is a theoretical concern for sociologists but a professional one for secondhand clothing resellers. Thousands of resellers across the United States purchase items from physical secondhand clothing sources and then resell them for a profit on sites such as Depop, Etsy, and Poshmark. They confront two pricing challenges: secondhand clothing items are aesthetic items of non-standard, uncertain quality, and online marketplaces offer limited explicit institutional support to back pricing claims. I analyze interviews and fieldwork to theorize how resellers price items for sale on online marketplaces. Resellers gain knowledge of secondhand community values and online marketplace technologies via immersion into offline (local reselling networks and secondhand sources) and online spaces (social media and the marketplaces themselves). Resellers selectively draw on these sources of pricing knowledge to deploy similar but varied pricing practices. These situated valuation practices reveal how resellers rely on reselling community structures and reflexively invoke pricing displays on marketplace interfaces to price secondhand clothing. These practices increase confidence in exchange as resellers can suitably justify the prices of material goods to online marketplace participants with varying levels of knowledge and experience.

This article examines the erosion of political legitimacy in ex-mining towns in England. Political sociologists and political scientists have long taken an interest in the politics of coalmining areas, which were characterised by high strike rates and militant left values. More recently, the question of legitimacy in these areas has resurfaced, as now-deindustrialised pit towns register unusually high levels of political discontent and disengagement compared to areas with similar economic and demographic profiles. In interviews and group discussions with 93 residents of the former mining town of Mansfield, England, I find that many express ideas that profoundly challenge the system of representative democracy in its current form, with almost one in three participants understanding politics primarily through the frame of corruption. Drawing on an emergent literature which casts corruption talk as a moralised discourse of political in/exclusion, I argue that the corruption frame is best understood as the inversion of a now-defunct symbolic economy. As workers in pit towns no longer received the same tokens of care from their representatives, reflecting their reduced power, many came to understand the political system as corrupt and illegitimate.

This study uncovers Taiwanese dual-earner couples' monetary practices and explores how the marriage institution is conceived of in the context of East Asian familism and the sweeping trend of individualism. Ample cross-national research has investigated household finances and money management among couples over time, yielding mostly Western-oriented insights. It is nevertheless matched with little evidence from East Asian societies that share similar trends of individualization. Drawing from interviews with 22 couples and 3 married individuals (N = 47) in Taiwan, who are at least university-educated, middle-class, and on average in their mid-30s, this paper analyzes couples' monetary practices from a relationship constellation perspective that factors in resources from intergenerational transfer, as well as individual spouses' interpretation of their practices. Individualized management was found to be exceedingly prevalent among Taiwanese couples, unlike couples elsewhere that predominantly adopt pooling. Institutionalized individualization, on the one hand, posed higher hurdles for joint management and pooling. On the other, most interviewees showed an individualistic orientation in their practices, which can be seen as a strategy to anticipate and manage risks-marriage dissolution among others-in a highly uncertain world. Embedding monetary practices in the 'individualization without individualism' debate, this study unveils how the traditional marriage institution is implicitly challenged by not only increasing institutionalized individualization but also an ideational shift towards individualism, often assumed to not have taken root in East Asia. The empirical evidence from Taiwan sheds new light on both resource management in marriage and on how intimate relationships are constrained by institutional and socio-cultural contexts.

The conventional understanding of resilience often portrays it as a positive outcome emerging from adverse situations. This perspective frequently shapes interventions aimed at bolstering resilience among individuals considered to be in need. Drawing upon data from a European study, this paper contends that young people's apparent 'latent rejection' of favourable opportunities, or their deliberate choice to remain in precarious situations despite having some agency, should be recontextualised as unconventional but valid expressions of resilience. Instead of framing resilience solely as an aspirational concept, we propose a reframing that emphasises its role in coping with and surviving challenging circumstances. Furthermore, we advocate for the adoption of Mason's 'safe-uncertainty' model to foster a more practical form of resilience. This approach towards a more sustainable resilience could be valuable in other fields dealing with those populations labelled as 'vulnerable', 'problematic' or 'disadvantaged', and it can, we argue, enhance decision-making skills, and promote the development of robust support networks.

Decades of field experiments show that White Americans are more likely to discriminate against Black Americans when the situation provides a nonracist rationalization for withholding help from a Black target - for instance, when the cost of helping looks unreasonable. However, work on racial discrimination in helping is scarcer outside of the US context. The present experiment extends this line of research to Europe and studies differences in helping asiatique (Asian), blanc (White) and noir (Black) men and women in France. In addition, it assesses to what extent racial discrimination in the probability to provide assistance is moderated by the perceived cost of help. The study rests on a sample of over 4500 independent observations collected through a factorial design that combines 12 testers (equally apportioned in race and gender groups), two social class conditions and four observation sites. Testers asked for directions to pedestrians in front of the traffic lights of a busy road, and pedestrians could provide different forms of help that varied in perceived cost. The analysis indicates that overall asiatique and noir testers receive help less often than their blanc counterparts. It also shows that racial discrimination is stronger when the perceived cost of helping is higher.

This study employs latent class analysis (LCA) as a novel methodology to investigate the multidimensional nature of meritocratic beliefs, addressing the limitations of traditional unidimensional approaches. Using data from the International Social Survey Program 2009 for the United States, Finland, and China, this study demonstrates several advantages of this multidimensional approach. First, LCA effectively identifies dual consciousness, where individuals simultaneously endorse meritocratic and structuralist explanations of social stratification. The analysis reveals three distinct narratives explaining social stratification: purely meritocratic beliefs, predominantly meritocratic beliefs, and dual consciousness. While all three subtypes consider merits highly important, they differ in their perceived importance of structural factors. Second, LCA facilitates cross-national comparisons, unveiling qualitative typological variations in meritocratic beliefs across countries. Unique country-specific subtypes or patterns emerge: Finland exhibits purely meritocratic beliefs, the United States shows predominantly meritocratic beliefs, and China demonstrates a dominance of dual consciousness. Although dual consciousness exists in all three countries, its prevalence varies significantly-dominant in China, moderate in the United States, and least in Finland. Third, this study reveals that the effect of education on meritocratic beliefs varies across the three countries. Education strengthens individual meritocratic beliefs in the United States, weakens them in Finland, and shows no significant effect in China. These findings highlight both within-country and across-country heterogeneity of meritocratic beliefs, underscoring the importance of a multidimensional approach.

In sociology, the question of what it means to explain social phenomena and how this relates to the purpose of the social sciences is important but nowadays rarely asked. This article elaborates on this question and provides an answer by outlining the program of "explanatory sociology" as a branch of the modern social science approach. It is shown that, in this framework, to explain means to uncover cause-effect relationships based on models of individuals who are assumed the central force in social life. This idea is taken further to uncover specific challenges that individuals face in social life and how and why they establish and manage (or do not) social forms that help to organize the world from the viewpoint of their abilities and needs. Such action-oriented explanations have been presented and developed in sociology since its very beginning. Two main forms or logics to construct action-based explanations are outlined and developed due to the form and function of the used action theory or model. The article contributes to the discussion about the form and task of sociological theorizing by presenting action-based explanations as a form of sociological theorizing that defines a clear task in exploring challenges in social life and assessing possible forms of coping with them from the perspective of individuals. By doing so, two main ways of broadening explanations are considered and compared in light of what the purpose of sociology might be.

In this paper, we complement a previous study of the UK natural science elite, as represented by Fellows of the Royal Society, with a comparable study of the humanities and social sciences elites, as represented by Fellows of the British Academy. We seek to establish how far similarities and differences exist in the social composition of these three academic elites and in the routes that their members have followed into elite positions. We are also concerned with the consequences of the humanities and social sciences elites being brought together in the British Academy, in contrast with the situation in most other countries where elite natural and social scientists are located in the same academy. We pursue these issues in the context of C. P. Snow's discussion of the social underlay of the cultural disjunction that he saw between the natural sciences and the humanities, while also considering how the social sciences fit in. We find that there is support for Snow's position at the time of his writing. However, a notable development in more recent years is that the growing social sciences elite is moving in its social composition away from the humanities elite and closer to the natural science elite. This is primarily due to changes in the social origins and education of Fellows in those sections of the British Academy that are on the borderline between the social and the natural sciences. A widening difference thus arises with Fellows in the humanities sections most representative of Snow's 'traditional culture'.

Current literature often links contentious protests with media hostility, showing that news outlets typically portray protests involving disruption or violence in a negative light. Contesting this literature, this work introduces an intersectional approach-focusing on geopolitics, protest goals and actions-to theorize divergences in the media framing of protests that entail violence. To illustrate these divergences, we use mixed methods-network analysis and content analysis-to examine an original dataset on U.S. media coverage of three large movements in different countries. These movements share similarities in their anti-status quo goals and contentious actions but differ in geopolitical locations: one taking place in the U.S., the second in a U.S. ally country, and the third in a non-ally country. As the first to apply network analysis in movement-media studies, this comparative study contributes to a systematic examination of media framing variations both within and across social movements. This work also complicates our understanding of violence and media representation by introducing a theoretically-informed approach that considers multiple factors simultaneously.

Drawing on fieldwork data among Syrian refugee women marrying Egyptian men amid forced migration, I explore how displacement reshapes the meaning and purpose of marriage. Many such unions, often customary or polygamous, provoke comparisons to forced marriage and gender-based violence. Bypassing the reductive exploitation and static narratives, I ask: How does displacement alter refugee women's perceptions of marriage's purpose? And can marriage serve as a strategic tool for (self)resettlement? This investigation urges us to reevaluate the existing range of resettlement options and criteria, offering fresh perspectives on marital strategies post-displacement. Rather, similar marriages often stem from both affective and practical considerations, challenging colonial dichotomies (e.g., agent/victim) and reinstating the role of factors such as social capital in the trajectories of the uprooted. This study expands understanding of gendered and Othered refugee experiences, highlighting marriage's transformative role in forced displacement and resettlement. It contributes to ongoing discussions on marriage, displacement, and resettlement, urging a nuanced approach that acknowledges the complexities of refugee agency and adaptation.

Informal affective bonding through which social resources are deployed, known as guanxi, is significant in social, political, and economic relationships in present-day China. Guanxi is sociologically understood as a form of social network and also as a type of social exchange. In addition, guanxi is regarded as a kind of or derived from ritual practices. Ritual aspects of guanxi are critically examined. The concept of ritual is distinguished from Confucian li, with which guanxi is often associated. Rituals held to be supportive of guanxi are examined, three distinct conceptualisations of ritual are identified, and ritual is differentiated from social practice, ceremony, and rite. Finally, emotions in guanxi ritual are briefly discussed, comparing Collins' approach with an account from the early Chinese theorist Xunzi.

Cruel Optimism' (Berlant, 2011) sustains neoliberalism by promising freedom and autonomy through adherence to and performance of competitive behaviours. As Brown (2003) observes, neoliberalism is a discourse which operates, not through repression or restriction, but through promising self-fulfilment and happiness. The role of emotion-management in poverty governance has been widely acknowledged. However, this has focused on cultivation of population-level punitive, negative emotions (such as shame, stigma, or resentment). It is widely acknowledged that welfare provision has been specifically targeted by neoliberal discourse, justifying intensifying interventions aimed at reshaping the subjectivities and aspirations of poor and marginalised individuals and households to serve the needs of deregulated markets. However, little attention has been paid to the importance of positive, hopeful emotion management in legitimising and effecting co-operation. Drawing on interviews with 54 workers in the Welsh homelessness system, I argue that workers systematically create and sustain optimism in their clients as a mechanism to enable them to survive within an increasingly hostile housing system, as part of a deliberate, if reluctant, strategy to cultivate empowered, 'ethical' welfare selfhood against a backdrop of citizen abandonment. A three-stage approach deployed by workers includes (1) destabilisation of expectations of state help (2) re-orientation, through cultivation of belief in neoliberal promise (3) development of maintenance strategies. Improving applicant capacity to perform neoliberal welfare citizenship was perceived as an urgent, moral and pragmatic necessity, and justified by care logics. I demonstrate how this extends not only our understanding of welfare implementation, but also shows how positive emotion-management generally, and Berlant's Cruel Optimism specifically, can be used to understand the practicalities of welfare governance.

The term "charisma" is recognized as sociology's most successful export to common speech. While sociologists habitually dismiss popular uses of the word, we address its vernacularity head on as a worthy object of study and as a potential resource for conceptual development. Using machine learning, we locate "charisma" within the wider discursive field out of which it arises (and continues to arise) across four corpora; namely: Weber's major writings; social scientific research (123,531 JSTOR articles); and social media ("X") posts containing of "charisma" (n=77,161) and its 2023 variant, "rizz" (n=85,869). By capturing meaning structures that discursively suspend "charisma" across multiple dimensions, we discern three spectra that help to distinguish charisma's sociological and non-sociological uses. Spectrum one differentiates perspectives which see charisma as having either a structural or individual-level range of efficacy. Spectrum two differentiates indifferent/analytical perspectives on charisma from perspectives which see it as desirable but also morally conservative. Spectrum three differentiates between relational and individualized ontologies for charisma. We find that, rather than hewing closely to the Weberian formulation, social scientific uses exist in an intermediate position vis-à-vis these three spectra. Thus, scholars participate in what they otherwise criticize as charisma's vulgarization. The article concludes with recommendations for how to constructively interact with 'popular charisma.'

This study explores how gender and age interact in shaping beliefs about fair pay through a factorial survey experiment conducted with German employees. Respondents evaluated hypothetical worker descriptions varying in age, gender, and earnings. While no gender gap in fair earnings was found for the youngest hypothetical workers, a significant gap favoring men emerged with increasing age. This suggests that male workers receive a higher age premium on fair earnings than female workers. The findings highlight the need to understand how gender interacts with other characteristics to legitimize workplace inequalities.

This short article represents a contribution to the debate on the motion "Social science is explanation, or it is nothing." While in the format of parliamentary debating the contribution would fall on the side of the opposition, I will not be arguing against explanation as such. The work of explaining is in no way oppositional to or mutually exclusive with critique. Instead, my contribution will revolve around two arguments: one is that both critique and explanation exhibit characteristics we commonly attribute to science; the other is that reserving the label of science for explanation draws a boundary around social sciences in ways that exclude many of the interesting things it does. Some of the examples include the sociological analysis of governmental approaches to the COVID-19 pandemic, or critical analysis of concepts such as "cancel culture" or "terrorism." The conclusion is that explanation and critique are mutually supporting elements of science, and that combined they give us insights we cannot glean from either alone.

The article focuses on the work of working-class women (WCW) amid turbulent times. Its timespan is just prior to and during the Covid-19 pandemic in the UK. The women's work, and the key skills involved, are fundamental to everyday lives, but both have been under-valued and under-rewarded. The pandemic shone a fresh light on the societal importance of this work and highlighted how its under-valuation and the women's systemic low pay and inferior working conditions have serious ramifications not only for individual workers and their families but for the provision of key services. The article centres WCW, at the intersection of classed and gendered disadvantage, to ask about inequalities in work experiences. Analysing nationally representative samples of thousands of workers in the UK prior to and as Covid-19 rolled out, we compare WCW with other workers. We show that the women faced both persistent and new inequalities at work: enduring low earnings, pandemic-led risks to jobs and paid hours, little opportunity to work from home or flexibly, and stressful key working roles. We reveal the heavily classed nature of some of these findings, show that others were more strongly gendered, while still others were classed and gendered outcomes that require intersectional analyses of the women's working lives.

This essay introduces contributions to a special section, which documents and extends a debate on the proposition "Social Science is Explanation or it is Nothing" held at the London School of Economics on October 13, 2022. It discusses the history of the "Group for Theoretical Debates in Anthropology" led by Tim Ingold, Peter Wade and Soumhya Venkatesan, which has handed down a list of credible candidates for issues that had a chance of engaging every anthropologist, including students and those with interdisciplinary interests. It raises questions about the specific affordances of debates as forms of academic engagements. It argues that the chosen proposition concerning explanation invites a discussion about the contributions of the social sciences at a time when impulses from science and technology studies as well as fruitful exchanges across the boundary between "theory" and "method" have helped us moved beyond the older question as to whether or not sociology is "a science".

For Black, Indigenous, and other colonised peoples, decolonisation and racial justice are urgent imperatives, but their demands are often dismissed as utopian, impossible, or otherwise out-of-time. This article therefore introduces the coloniality of age as a theoretical framework that aims to open up possibilities for otherwise worlds. Departing from established accounts of the coloniality of time, the coloniality of age grounds the analysis of racialised time in the chronopolitical formations of tempus nullius and the paternalistic paradigm. Alongside the doctrine of terra nullius or 'uninhabited land', the doctrine of tempus nullius or 'uninhabited time' works to deny Black peoples the ability to make and remake history on their own terms. Supplementing theories of the barbarian other, the paternalistic paradigm identifies patriarchal father/child relations as a conceptual and historical precedent to race. The coloniality of age directs the analysis to the temporal limits of coloniality. I argue that the temporal limits of coloniality are constituted by Black childhood; the coloniality of age figures Black childhood as an age with no future. This framework is then applied to analyse young Black peoples' counter-narratives of Black childhood. The counter-narratives of being 'stuck', 'growing up', the 'pace' of racism, and 'regressing' centre the temporal agency of Black children as they navigate the chronopolitics of Black childhood. Each of these counter-narratives unsettles the coloniality of age. Read together, the counter-narratives tell a larger story of Black children confronting the temporal limits of coloniality, refusing the terms of White futurity, and instead opting to grow otherwise. The article concludes that Black childhood might be reframed as an age with otherwise futures beyond the temporal limits of coloniality.

This article builds on data and field work notes from two ethnographic studies conducted in two cities: Istanbul and Trabzon, Turkey. It examines the socio-political dynamics behind the prevalence and impact of conspiratorial narratives. We explore the emergence, circulation, and effects of these narratives and how they shape political orientations and mobilisation. We raise methodological questions about these narratives and propose researchers closely scrutinise them rather than dismissing them as illogical or incoherent. Our research reveals three novel relational and methodological insights derived from conspiratorial narratives. First, these narratives serve as sense-making tools during times of uncertainty. They provide accessible explanations for abrupt changes, and they rely and draw upon 'cultural repertoires'. Second, by challenging the mainstream narratives, they shape subjectivities; empowering narrators to act as agents. Third, how conspiratorial narratives circulate has implications for the dynamics of state-public relationships, often following the neoliberal logic, they portray political leaders as central figures in navigating complex decision-making processes. Our case studies demonstrate that actors, even in less powerful positions, may not necessarily antagonise the state. We underscore the methodological significance of these narratives for researchers, to examine actors' agency, group dynamics, and responses to everyday injustices.