Preexisting political institutions influence governments' responses to public health crises in different ways, creating national variations. This article investigates how state capacity, a country's fundamental ability to organize bureaucracy and allocate societal resources, affects the timing and configuration of governments' COVID-19 policy responses. Through comparative case study analysis of five of China's neighboring countries early in the COVID-19 crisis, the paper shows that more-capable states (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) initiated crisis response faster, mobilized national resources more extensively, and utilized diverse policy tools when the virus risk level was still low. In contrast, low-capacity states (Thailand and Indonesia) were more reactive in handling the crisis, limited their focus to border-related measures, and were more constrained in the types of tools they could employ. The paper points to the importance of studying the COVID-19 response process rather than the outcome (i.e., confirmed cases/deaths) when unpacking the impacts of political institutions in public health crises.

Public officials use blame avoidance strategies when communicating performance information. While such strategies typically involve shifting blame to political opponents or other governments, we examine how they might direct blame to ethnic groups. We focus on the COVID-19 pandemic, where the Trump administration sought to shift blame by scapegoating (using the term "Chinese virus") and mitigate blame by positively framing performance information on COVID-19 testing. Using a novel experimental design that leverages machine learning techniques, we find scapegoating outgroups backfired, leading to greater blame of political leadership for the poor administrative response, especially among conservatives. Backlash was strongest for negatively framed performance data, demonstrating that performance framing shapes blame avoidance outcomes. We discuss how divisive blame avoidance strategies may alienate even supporters.

While information campaigns have been widely recognized as a pillar of public health crisis management and heightened by the current COVID-19 pandemic, an insufficient number of studies have investigated the impact of information disclosure on influencing citizen cooperation crucial for emergency management. Focusing on generic information disclosure practices during the recovery period from January 19, 2020, to February 29, 2020, in China and by employing a difference-in-difference method, this study finds that information disclosure significantly enhanced citizen coproduction as measured by aggregated search queries of COVID-19-related information, and earlier disclosure yielded greater effect more quickly. Moreover, government capacity and citizens' trust in government at the local level significantly moderate the positive impact of information disclosure. This study uncovers the novel relationship between information disclosure and citizen coproduction during emergencies in the Chinese context.

This article asks to what extent and under which conditions interest groups are congruent with public opinion. We argue that interest groups can be caught in a balancing act between engaging with their constituency on the one hand and aligning their position with the broader public on the other hand. We contribute to previous studies by arguing that the effect of interest group type on congruence is moderated by the degree to which constituencies are involved in advocacy processes and the salience of policy issues. We test these expectations by analyzing 314 media claims made by Belgian interest groups regarding 58 policy issues. The results demonstrate that citizen groups with formal members are more prone to share the position of the broader public compared to concentrated interest groups such as business associations, especially if they involve their members in advocacy activities and when issues are salient in the media.

Organizational-reputation literature has advanced our understanding about the U.S. regulatory state and its agencies. However, we lack contributions on what a reputational account can add to our knowledge about the European regulatory state, the strategic behavior of supranational agencies, and their endeavors to legitimize themselves in a multilevel political system. We know little of how reputation-management strategies vary across EU agencies and why. The study offers the very first mapping of organizational-reputation-management patterns across all EU agencies, as well as the first empirical assessment on how reputational considerations guide supranational agencies' legitimation strategies. The results indicate that EU agencies facing higher reputational threats revert to their avowed raison d'être (i.e., technical conduct). We find that regulatory agencies utilize a more diverse set of reputational strategies by emphasizing the technical, procedural, and moral reputations more than nonregulatory agencies, whereas social-policy agencies foster their technical reputation more than economic-policy agencies.

The past decades have been characterized by a growing number of nonstate actors (NSAs) involved in global governance. However, despite this growth, only a small number of NSAs have been able to maintain a prolonged global presence over a substantial period of time. To explain why some NSAs are more active, we rely on resource dependence theory. We demonstrate that sustained advocacy over time can be explained by a density dependence mechanism, namely the more NSAs mobilize, the lower the chance that individual NSAs will prolong their global advocacy efforts. Analysis of data stemming from a unique data set of 5,627 NSAs active at the global climate conferences demonstrates that much advocacy in this field is indeed of an incidental nature, namely a large number of groups attend once and never return.

The Westphalian idea of sovereignty in international relations has undergone recent transformation. "Shared sovereignty" through multilevel governance describes the responsibility of the European Union (EU) and its Member States in tobacco control policy. We examine how this has occurred on the EU level through directives and recommendations, accession rules for new members, tobacco control campaigns, and financial support for antitobacco nongovernmental organizations. In particular, the negotiation and ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the participation in the FCTC Conference of the Parties illustrates shared sovereignty. The EU Commission was the lead negotiator for Member States on issues over which it had jurisdiction, while individual Member States, through the EU presidency, could negotiate on issues on which authority was divided or remained with them. Shared sovereignty through multilevel governance has become the norm in the tobacco control policy area for EU members, including having one international organization negotiate within the context of another.