We explore the role of elites for development and the spread of industrialized dairying in Denmark in the 1880s. We demonstrate that the location of early proto-modern dairies, introduced by landowning elites from northern Germany in the eighteenth century, explains the location of industrialized dairying in 1890: an increase of one standard deviation in elite influence increases industrialized dairying by 56 percent of the mean exposure in one specification. We interpret this as evidence for a spread of ideas from the elites to the peasantry, which we capture through measures of specialization in dairying and demand for education and identify a causal relationship using an instrument based on distance to the influential first mover. Finally, we demonstrate that areas with cooperatives enjoyed greater wealth by the twentieth century, and that they are today associated with other Danish cultural attributes: a belief in democracy and individualism.

We document the historical roots and contemporary consequences of masculinity norms-beliefs about the proper conduct of men. We exploit a natural experiment in which convict transportation in the and centuries created a variegated spatial pattern of sex ratios across Australia. We show that in areas with heavily male-biased convict populations, relatively more men volunteered for World War I about a century later. Even at present these areas remain characterized by more violence, higher rates of male suicide and other forms of preventable male mortality, and more male-stereotypical occupational segregation. Moreover, in these historically male-biased areas, more Australians recently voted against same-sex marriage and boys-but not girls-are more likely to be bullied in school. We interpret these results as manifestations of masculinity norms that emerged due to intense local male-male competition. Once established, masculinity norms persisted over time through family socialization as well as peer socialization in schools.

Leveraging exogenous variation in time preferences, we measure the causal effects of culturally embodied long-term orientation traits on voluntary social distancing behavior, COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and mortality outcomes in 2020 in the United States. We establish that long-term orientation traits with bio-geographical origins causally reduce measures of COVID-19 cases, deaths and hospitalization, inpatient bed utilization, and age-specific excess deaths. Mobility indicators measuring voluntary decisions to socially distance, comprising measures of visitors/visits to recreational locations, and mobility proxy measuring duration of hours away from home show that a lower prevalence of long-term orientation traits explains persistent resistance to social distancing.

We examine the role of declining mortality in explaining the rise of retirement over the course of the 20th century. We construct a model in which individuals make labor/leisure choices over their lifetimes subject to uncertainty about their dates of death. In an environment with high mortality, an individual who saves for retirement faces a high risk of dying before he can enjoy his planned leisure. In this case, the optimal plan is for people to work until they die. As mortality falls, however, it becomes optimal to plan, and save for, retirement. We analyze our model using two mathematical formulations of the survival function as well as data on actual changes in the US life table over the last century, and show that this "uncertainty effect" of declining mortality would have more than outweighed the "horizon effect" by which rising life expectancy would have led to later retirement.

The early history of industrialization in the United States-famously known as "The American System of Manufactures"-exhibited four key features: the substitution of specialized intermediate inputs for skilled work in assembling final goods, the freedom with which knowledge has long been shared in the United States, a learning technology that leverages existing mechanical know-how in human capital accumulation, and increasing returns to intermediate inputs in processing final goods. Our endogenous growth model embodies these components and utilizes historical time series data on labor force "operatives" and the Census of Manufactures to calibrate the model's parameters. Our simulation closely matches the 1.88% average per capita product growth in the United States from 1860 to date. The simulation predicts that growth will peak in 1980 and ultimately converge to 1.31%-a growth slowdown rooted from the beginning in the economization of skilled labor inherent in the American System. By 2000, simulated per capita product is 2.21 times larger than a counterfactual in which the American System of manufactures never existed.

This paper proposes a model of statehood, defined as elite extraction of resources from a subject population. Different from most of the existing literature, the size of the subject population evolves endogenously in a Malthusian fashion, and the elite take into account the effects on future population levels when taxing the current population. The elite can spend extracted resources by investing in productive and extractive capacities. Productive capacity increases the size of the pie, while extractive capacity makes it easier for the elite to tax it. Together-but not each on its own-these two types of investment can give rise to multiple steady-state equilibria, such that one steady state has both a higher rate of extraction, and higher population density and output, than the other steady state. The model can also account for a positive empirical relationship between land productivity and state antiquity among countries with relatively late state development.

We construct the first consistent series on the long-term distribution of income in Poland by combining tax, household survey and national accounts data. We document a U-shaped evolution of inequalities from the end of the nineteenth century until today: (1) inequality was high before WWII; (2) abruptly fell after the introduction of communism in 1947 and stagnated at low levels during the whole communist period; (3) experienced a sharp rise with the return to capitalism in 1989. We find that official survey-based measures strongly under-estimate the rise in inequality since 1989. Our results highlight the prominent role of capital income in driving the U-shaped evolution of top income shares. The unique inequality history of Poland speaks to the central role of institutions and policies in shaping inequality in the long run.

We have constructed a comprehensive database that traces the publications of father-son pairs in the premodern academic realm and examined the contribution of inherited human capital versus nepotism to occupational persistence. We find that human capital was strongly transmitted from parents to children and that nepotism declined when the misallocation of talent across professions incurred greater social costs. Specifically, nepotism was less common in fields experiencing rapid changes in the knowledge frontier, such as the sciences and within Protestant institutions. Most notably, nepotism sharply declined during the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, when departures from meritocracy arguably became both increasingly inefficient and socially intolerable.