Who supports high taxes on the rich? Existing accounts of public attitudes focus on egalitarian values and material interests, but make little mention of the ideas people hold about how the economy works descriptively. Drawing on the distinction between positive- and zero-sum beliefs about the economy, and original survey data from five countries, I show that there are systematic differences in tax progressivity preferences across groups within the public who think differently about the economy. Positive-sum thinking is associated with less progressive preferences. However, despite theoretical attention, there is no evidence of systematic zero-sum thinking among the public. On the other hand, some descriptions focus on conflict between rich and poor, and these do predict support for greater progressivity. Further analysis is required to differentiate alternative causal explanations of the patterns observed, but different modes of descriptive economic thinking are an important feature of the mass politics of progressivity.

The crisis of the euro area has severely tested the political authority of the European Union (EU). The crisis raises questions of normative legitimacy both because the EU is a normative order and because the construction of economic and monetary union (EMU) rested upon a theory that stressed the normative value of the depoliticization of money. However, this theory neglected the normative logic of the two-level game implicit in EMU. It also neglected the need for an impartial and publically acceptable constitutional order to acknowledge reasonable disagreements. By contrast, we contend that any reconstruction of the EU's economic constitution has to pay attention to reconciling a European monetary order with the legitimacy of member state governance. The EU requires a two-level contract to meet this standard. Member states must treat each other as equals and be representative of and accountable to their citizens on an equitable basis. These criteria entail that the EU's political legitimacy requires a form of cracy that we call 'republican intergovernmentalism'. Only rules that could be acceptable as the product of a political constitution among the peoples of Europe can ultimately meet the required standards of political legitimacy. Such a political constitution could be brought about through empowering national parliaments in EU decision-making.

This article examines whether the empowerment of the European Union's (EU) supranational institutions has had an impact on the development of EU asylum. By systematically investigating EU asylum law before and after 'communitarization', it argues that its 'policy core' has maintained a high degree of continuity. An advocacy coalition under the leadership of the interior ministers managed to co-opt pivotal actors in the newly empowered European Commission and European Parliament. By contenting themselves with changes of secondary order, these EU institutions accepted and institutionalized the restrictive and weakly integrated core of EU asylum set by the Council in the first negotiation round. Their role and decisions were driven not only by the negotiation dynamics and political expediency, but also by new inter- and intra-institutional norms fostering consensual practices.

In 2006, the European Commission released its Global Europe Communication, in which it announced a shift from a multilateral to a bilateral trade strategy. One of the key pillars of this new strategy was to strengthen the bilateral trade relations with key Asian countries. In contrast to existing analyses that focus on European Union (EU) decision makers' agency, we propose an explanation for this notable shift in the EU's trade policy that stresses the political role of import-dependent firms. In light of the increasing integration of such firms into global value chains, the article argues that a plausible case can be made, both theoretically and empirically, that import-dependent firms had a clear stake in the signing of preferential trade agreements between the EU and Asian countries and that their lobbying efforts significantly affected the EU's decision to start negotiations with South Korea, India and Vietnam.

Although there are considerably more men than women in most parliaments around the world, we know little about whether male-dominated legislatures neglect women's policy preferences. Our article addresses this gap by analysing the congruence of policy preferences between women, men and their elected representatives. We endeavour to answer two questions. Are women's policy preferences underrepresented in modern democracies? If so, which factors explain the size of the gender gaps in policy preference congruence? Comparing 21 European countries, we show that women's preferences actually tend to be more accurately represented in parliaments than those of men. Moreover, our analyses reveal that this unanticipated finding is not driven by the share of female office-holders, but rather by levels of women's turnout, which leads us to conclude that who votes is more important than who represents for policy preference congruence.

Previous studies have applied theories of European integration to interpret crisis-led policymaking processes and integration outcomes in the EU. However, there has been little attempt to appraise the analytical leverage offered by major integration theories as a function of different crisis pressures. We theorize that diverse combinations of crisis pressures generate four decision-making scenarios in the EU, each of which can be ascribed to different combinations of analytical insights from neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, postfunctionalism, and federalism. We illustrate the value of our framework in relation to four EU crises concerning the euro area, refugees, Brexit and Covid-19. Overall, the paper makes a theoretical contribution to advance the debate on crisis-led integration in the EU.

The EU is still fragile after its long decade of crises since 2008, and its durability remains an open question. New capacities were created during this time. But it is not clear how robust they are and whether developing them further will encounter insurmountable obstacles, including resentment by citizens. Over time, tensions and disagreements unleashed three foundational conflicts: conflicts over sovereignty (who decides), solidarity (who gets what when and why) and identity (who we are). The crisis politics that was deployed to deal with such tensions has often constrained policy responses in scope and effectiveness. Against the odds, however, the destructive spiral stopped short of driving the Union into self-destruction: a circumstance that calls for an explanation. We summarize empirical research that shows three ways in which this unexpected resilience can be explained: public rhetorical action, externalization strategies, and the paradoxical strengths of a weak centre in achieving polity maintenance.

The liberal international order has recently come under increasing nationalist pressure, evidenced by a rise in nationalist demands to withdraw from international institutions. A growing literature examines the domestic economic, social, and political origins of this nationalist backlash against international institutions. However, less is known about the extent to which precedents of withdrawals of one country affect nationalist pressures for future withdrawals elsewhere. In this paper, we argue that initial withdrawal episodes provide new information about the feasibility and desirability of withdrawals to nationalist elites in other countries. Hence, we expect nationalists abroad to be either encouraged or deterred to follow a similar path - depending on the success of these precedents. We explore this argument in the context of the British withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit), which arguably marks the most significant withdrawal from an international institution to date. Based on a quantitative analyses of media reports in ten European countries, we show we show that nationalist parties in Europe increased or moderated the aggressiveness about their EU-related rhetoric as the ups and downs of the Brexit-drama unfolded. Our results suggest that precedents of nationalist withdrawals shape domestic politics well beyond the concerned countries themselves.

The management of the COVID-19 crisis and, in particular, the Next Generation EU fund have shown that European leaders can find integrationist policy solutions despite increasing politicisation at home where democratic constraints may lead to a feared 'multilevel politics trap'. Therefore, we ask whether and how national governments can manage such constraints and thus spring or avoid the trap. Theoretically, we argue that the agency of governments is a crucial factor for understanding the varying dynamics of politicisation in regional integration, as governments can raise or lower domestic audience costs by strategically interacting with their parliament or media. Empirically, we probe the plausibility of our theoretical propositions by examining constraint management and position-taking in Austria and the Netherlands in the context of European fiscal solidarity. Our results show that there is no inevitably self-reinforcing multilevel politics trap but that the effects of domestic constraint are, to a considerable extent, contingent on the agency of national governments.

Policy agendas are often cast in semantic constructions that portray them as universally desirable outcomes. These semantic constructions protect and reinforce the power of dominant coalitions and make it hard to pursue alternatives. The semantic space is entirely occupied by the dominant concepts. At the same time, within the dominant coalition, ideational conflict is muted by decontesting concepts. Drawing on political theory, I show the presence of this double act of reducing the semantic space and decontesting concepts with the case of 'better regulation'. Then I briefly extend the argument to other terms such as policy coherence, agile governance, smart cities and social value judgements. The critical discussion of the implications of dominant language brings in transparency, allows other coalitions to articulate their vision in a discursive level-playing-field, and offers citizens the possibility to discuss what is really 'better' and 'for whom'.

How does the politicisation of trade policy affect the lobbying strategies chosen by interest groups? Several studies have shown that business associations tend to focus more on inside lobbying and citizen groups more on outside lobbying. We argue that politicisation makes this difference in lobbying strategy even more pronounced. Facing an issue that is contested and publicly salient, we should see business actors move even more toward inside lobbying and citizen groups move even more toward outside lobbying. We test this argument using a unique combination of evidence from a survey with 691 interest groups and an analysis of Twitter usage with respect to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) by 993 interest groups. The empirical evidence largely supports our argument. By making and testing this argument, we contribute to the literatures on the politicisation of trade policy and interest group strategies.

In the Fordist era, trade unions promoted welfare state expansion and coverage against risks for the broader workforce. With the shift to the post-industrial economy, however, new economic groups have been left without representation. This is particularly evident for women: despite a rapid increase in female employment since the 1980s, unions' membership base remains anchored in the male, old and industrial working class. Without the crucial pressure of labour, welfare systems have failed to enhance the reconciliation of work and family life. Under which conditions do unions support the expansion of work-family policies? Marshalling evidence from 20 OECD countries in the 1980-2010 period, this paper investigates the role of political actors in family policy reform. Findings suggest that unions promote the expansion of work-family packages when they are gender-inclusive and have institutional access to policy-making.

Existing studies suggest that right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) appeal to people in communities that have fallen behind in material terms. However, it remains open which benchmark communities apply as they become politically discontented. We argue that the structure of territorial inequalities influences the benchmarks used by people in regions falling behind. Panel data regressions using subnational election results in EU states from 1990 to 2018 reveal a sharp contrast between the economic geographies of right-wing populism in core and peripheral EU member states. We find a strong association between falling behind the richest region of the country and RWPP support within core EU countries, while in peripheral EU states falling behind the EU core is associated with regional support for RWPPs. This suggests that RWPP voters in peripheral countries cue on how they are faring relative to the EU core, while RWPP supporters in core countries cue on how they are faring relative to dynamic regions of their own country. Our analysis also shows that increased manufacturing employment reinforces the effect of falling behind the richest region in core EU member states, while we find no strong evidence that regional economic stagnation is important to the electoral performance of RWPPs.

When the member states imposed unilateral restrictions on the cross-border movement of persons and goods in their initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU appeared to relapse into the 'politics trap' of earlier integration crises. However, our analysis of entry restrictions for persons in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland from the end of 2019 to the summer of 2022 shows no systematic relationship between domestic politicisation and national border closures. Rather, border closures followed the course of the pandemic as well as EU recommendations. Our findings suggest that the EU was able to escape the 'politics trap' thanks to the exogenous and symmetrical nature of the crisis and effective EU-level policy coordination.

Ernst Haas initially formulated neofunctionalism as a theory of incremental regional polity formation, treating crises as anomalies. Subsequent revisions of the theory incorporated crises as recurring phenomena. This paper introduces a novel conceptualisation and analysis of recent European Union crises, framing them as effects of and challenges to its regulatory polity. It distinguishes between 'failures' and 'attacks', aligning them with the capacity and community-building dimensions of polity formation. Failures, rooted in capacity deficits, prompt capacity development to sustain common policies, varying with international interdependence among member states. In contrast, attacks arise from contestations of constitutive values, necessitating community demarcation through enhanced unity among defenders and exclusion of attackers. The speed and scope of demarcation depend on the attacker's membership position. Through a comparative analysis of the euro, migration, Covid, Brexit, rule of law, and Russia crises, the study illustrates and substantiates its theoretical argument.

While Ernst B. Haas is recognized among European integration scholars as a founding figure of neo-functionalism, his later writing on nationalism is less known to European integration scholars. I contribute to this special issue by discussing Haas' later work on liberal nationalism and by reflecting on its insights for the study of collective identities in the European Union today. In a nutshell, Haas expected that (1) national and supranational identities are inherently rational and the expression of a deliberate choice, (2) citizens shift their identities from the national to the European level due to utilitarian considerations, (3) nationalism is not per se destructive, but it comes in many moulds and can be the basis for the international community. I argue that Haas' emphasis on rational and deliberate identity choice clashes with our current understanding of identity as implicit and subliminal. Moreover, his optimism is challenged by the rise of radical-right-wing parties who have successfully mobilized exclusive nationalist identities against European integration. On the other hand, Haas' emphasis on the double-edged nature of collective identity is an important reminder that also European identity, while striving to overcome exclusive nationalism, can reify its exclusiveness at the supranational level.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has pushed the EU into a new phase where both the political elites and the public start to rethink its foreign and security policies. This paper uses a unique survey in seven European countries in the wake of the war to examine European public opinion on how the EU's foreign and security policies should be made and how autonomous they should be. We find that Europeans not only favour increasing military capacity at the national or NATO level but also prefer increasing military capacity at the EU level, though to a lesser degree. We also show that perceptions of both short-term and long-term threats, European identification and mainstream left-wing ideology lead Europeans to favour a more militarily powerful, unified and autonomous EU.

The implications of the dilemma attributed to Mair between the responsiveness of political actors and their responsibility is considered from the perspective of citizens. The article analyses citizens' understandings of political actors' responsiveness and responsibility in their discourses on the SEGEU. We provide an in-depth abductive secondary analysis of three qualitative datasets collected in Belgium and France between 2005 and 2019. Most participants frame responsibility and responsiveness in terms that are close to Mair's definitions. However, some challenge the principle of responsibility and elaborate an alternative understanding directed towards achieving the common good. Nevertheless, as participants agree that political actors are not responsive to them, but rather to market actors, there is no evident dilemma. Our analysis shows that political actors' capacity for agency and choice, frames participants' understandings of responsiveness and responsibility. This result becomes the basis for a reconceptualisation of the notion of responsiveness and representation from a citizen perspective.