In 2019, the employment rate among 25- to 64-year-olds in the UK reached 80 per cent - the highest on record, and considerably higher than the 76 per cent rate recorded shortly before the Great Recession. In this paper, we investigate the growth in employment between the eve of the Great Recession and the eve of COVID-19 across several dimensions. We analyse which sectors, demographic groups and regions accounted for the rise. We also investigate how job 'quality' - in both financial and non-financial terms - has changed. We find that almost all demographic groups and regions saw a rise in employment, especially those with low pre-existing employment rates and those near the bottom of the income distribution. Hourly pay growth was very weak over the period, with the median actually slightly falling. Other indicators of job quality show a more mixed picture: employees seem to have greater appreciation of their work and firm, but perceive less security and flexibility in their job.

In times of heightened uncertainty, consumers face incentives to build up precautionary stocks of essential supplies. We study consumer spending dynamics during one such time, the first infection wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, using household scanner data covering fast-moving consumer goods in the United Kingdom. We document large increases in demand for storable products, such as food staples and household supplies, in the days before lockdown. Households in all socio-economic groups exhibit unusually high demand pre-lockdown, but there is a clear gradient, with the largest demand spikes for wealthier households. Although stories of people purchasing extreme amounts received a lot of attention, higher aggregate demand was mainly driven by more households than usual choosing to buy storable products, with only small increases in average quantities bought on a given trip. Temporary limits on the number of units per transaction, introduced following the demand spike, are therefore unlikely to lead to the avoidance of stock-outs.

We provide empirical evidence on the labour market impacts of COVID-19 in the UK and assess the effectiveness of mitigation policies. We estimate the relationship between employment outcomes and occupational and industrial characteristics and assess the effects on consumption. Seventy per cent of households in the bottom fifth of the earnings distribution hold insufficient assets to maintain current spending for more than one week. We compare the effectiveness of the UK's Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme and of Economic Impact Payments in the US. The EIPs are more effective at mitigating consumption reductions as they have full coverage, depend on household structure and are higher for low-income workers.

We examine trends in employment, earnings and incomes over the last two decades in the United States, and how the safety net has responded to changing fortunes, including the shutdown of the economy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The US safety net is a patchwork of different programmes providing in-kind as well as cash benefits, and it had many holes prior to the pandemic. In addition, few of the programmes are designed explicitly as automatic stabilisers. We show that the safety net response to employment losses in the COVID-19 pandemic largely consists only of increased support from unemployment insurance and food assistance programmes, an inadequate response compared with the magnitude of the downturn. We discuss options to reform social assistance in the United States to provide more robust income floors in times of economic downturns.

This paper discusses the potential long-run effects of large-scale unemployment during the COVID-19 crisis in the labour market on vulnerable job losers and labour market entrants in the United States. The paper begins by contrasting measures of the scale of job loss during the crisis. These measures are paired with estimates from past recessions indicating that the costs of job loss and unemployment can reduce workers' earnings and raise their mortality for several decades. Focusing only on a subset of vulnerable job losers, the potential lifetime earnings losses from job loss related to the COVID-19 pandemic are predicted to be up to $2 trillion. Related losses in employment could imply a lasting reduction in the overall employment-population ratio. For these workers, losses in potential life years could be up to 24 million. Even at the low range, the resulting estimates are substantially larger than losses in potential life years from deaths directly due to COVID-19. New labour market entrants are at risk to suffer long-term losses in earnings and mortality as well. Based partly on experiences in other countries, the paper discusses potential reforms to short-time compensation programmes and unemployment insurance, which could help limit the short- and long-term harm from layoffs going forward.

Over nine million jobs were furloughed in the United Kingdom during the coronavirus pandemic. Using real-time survey evidence from the UK in April and May 2020, we document which workers were most likely to be furloughed and we analyse variation in the terms on which they furloughed. We find that women were significantly more likely to be furloughed. Inequality in care responsibilities seems to have played a key role: mothers were 10 percentage points more likely than fathers to initiate the decision to be furloughed (as opposed to it being fully or mostly the employer's decision) but we find no such gender gap amongst childless workers. The prohibition of working whilst furloughed was routinely ignored, especially by men who can do a large percentage of their work tasks from home. Women were less likely to have their salary topped up beyond the 80 per cent subsidy paid for by the government. Considering the future, furloughed workers without employer-provided sick pay have a lower willingness to pay to return to work, as do those in sales and food preparation occupations. Compared with non-furloughed employees, furloughed workers are more pessimistic about keeping their job in the short to medium run and are more likely to be actively searching for a new job, even when controlling for detailed job characteristics. These results have important implications for the design of short-time work schemes and the strategy for effectively reopening the economy.

We explore the effects of the COVID-19 crisis and the associated restrictions to economic activity on paid and unpaid work for men and women in the United Kingdom. Using data from the COVID-19 supplement of Understanding Society, we find evidence that labour market outcomes of men and women were roughly equally affected at the extensive margin, as measured by the incidence of job loss or furloughing. But, if anything, women suffered smaller losses at the intensive margin, experiencing slightly smaller changes in hours and earnings. Within the household, women provided on average a larger share of increased childcare needs, but in an important share of households fathers became the primary childcare providers. These distributional consequences of the pandemic may be important to understand its inequality legacy over the longer term.

This paper combines novel data on the time use, home-learning practices and economic circumstances of families with children during the COVID-19 lockdown with pre-lockdown data from the UK Time Use Survey to characterise the time use of children and how it changed during lockdown, and to gauge the extent to which changes in time use and learning practices during this period are likely to reinforce the already large gaps in educational attainment between children from poorer and better-off families. We find considerable heterogeneity in children's learning experiences - amount of time spent learning, activities undertaken during this time and availability of resources to support learning. Concerningly, but perhaps unsurprisingly, this heterogeneity is strongly associated with family income and in some instances more so than before lockdown. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that any impacts of inequalities in time spent learning between poorer and richer children are likely to be compounded by inequalities not only in learning resources available at home, but also in those provided by schools.

The COVID-19 pandemic has reduced well-being and economic security on a number of dimensions, likely worsening mental health. In this paper, we assess how mental health in the US population has changed during the pandemic. We use three large, nationally representative survey sources to provide a picture of mental health prior to and during the pandemic. We find dramatic but broad-based declines in the level of mental health from pre-pandemic baseline measures across both people and places. Rates of poor mental health have jumped roughly 25 percentage points, from a base of roughly one-third. We document substantial disparities in mental health but show that the pandemic has generally preserved, rather than widened, these. Significant worsening in relative mental health among Hispanics and respondents aged 30 and older are exceptions. Consistent with an important role for pandemic-specific shocks, We find that income loss, food insecurity, COVID-19 infection or death in one's close circle, and personal health symptoms are all associated with substantially worse mental health. If anything, the decline in mental health is worsening as the pandemic wears on and is becoming less related to local COVID-19 case rates.

We use real-time scanner data in Great Britain during the COVID-19 pandemic to investigate the drivers of the inflationary spike at the beginning of lockdown and to quantify the impact of high-frequency changes in shopping behaviours and promotions on inflation measurement. Although changes in product-level expenditure shares were unusually high during lockdown, we find that the induced bias in price indices that do not account for expenditure switching is not larger than in prior years. We also document substantial consumer switching towards online shopping and across retailers, but show this was not a key driver of the inflationary spike. In contrast, a reduction in price and quantity promotions was key to driving higher inflation, and lower use of promotions by low-income consumers explains why they experienced moderately lower inflation. Overall, changes in shopping behaviours played only a minor role in driving higher inflation during lockdown; higher prices were the main cause, in particular through a reduced frequency of promotions.

In this paper, we suggest an approach to analysing policies relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. We discuss the formulation of policy and sketch how the approach can be applied to different specific challenges as policymakers try to make difficult choices for managing the pandemic and protecting the economy and society.

The spread of COVID-19 has led to sweeping changes in the way households work, spend their time and shop, resulting in different shopping patterns and rapid price changes in some goods. How will changes such as these be reflected in headline inflation measures such as the Consumer Prices Index (CPI)? This paper discusses problems in interpreting the CPI as a measure of how the cost of living is changing during the lockdown.

The spread of COVID-19, and international measures to contain it, are having a major impact on economic activity in the UK. In this paper, we describe how this impact has varied across industries, using data on share prices of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, and how well targeted government support for workers and companies is in light of this.

The economic and public health crisis created by the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed existing inequalities between ethnic groups in England and Wales, as well as creating new ones. We draw on current mortality and case data, alongside pre-crisis labour force data, to investigate the relative vulnerability of different ethnic groups to adverse health and economic impacts. After accounting for differences in population structure and regional concentration, we show that most minority groups suffered excess mortality compared with the white British majority group. Differences in underlying health conditions such as diabetes may play a role; so too may occupational exposure to the virus, given the very different labour market profiles of ethnic groups. Distinctive patterns of occupational concentration also highlight the vulnerability of some groups to the economic consequences of social distancing measures, with Bangladeshi and Pakistani men particularly likely to be employed in occupations directly affected by the UK's 'lockdown'. We show that differences in household structures and inequalities in access to savings mean that a number of minority groups are also less able to weather short-term shocks to their income. Documenting these immediate consequences of the crisis reveals the potential for inequalities to become entrenched in the longer term.

The coronavirus pandemic has had huge impacts on the National Health Service (NHS). Patients suffering from the illness have placed unprecedented demands on acute care, particularly on intensive care units (ICUs). This has led to an effort to dramatically increase the resources available to NHS hospitals in treating these patients, involving reorganisation of hospital facilities, redeployment of existing staff and a drive to bring in recently retired and newly graduated staff to fight the pandemic. These increases in demand and changes to supply have had large knock-on effects on the care provided to the wider population. This paper discusses likely implications for healthcare delivery in the short and medium term of the responses to the coronavirus pandemic, focusing primarily on the implications for non-coronavirus patients. Patterns of past care suggest those most likely to be affected by these disruptions will be older individuals and those living in more deprived areas, potentially exacerbating pre-existing health inequalities. Effects are likely to persist into the longer run, with particular challenges around recruitment and ongoing staff shortages.

The lockdown measures that were implemented in the spring of 2020 to stop the spread of COVID-19 are having a huge impact on economies in the UK and around the world. In addition to the direct impact of COVID-19 on health, the following recession will have an impact on people's health outcomes. This paper reviews economic literature on the longer-run health impacts of business-cycle fluctuations and recessions. Previous studies show that an economic downturn, which affects people through increased unemployment, lower incomes and increased uncertainty, will have significant consequences on people's health outcomes both in the short and longer term. The health effects caused by these adverse macroeconomic conditions will be complex and will differ across generations, regions and socio-economic groups. Groups that are vulnerable to poor health are likely to be hit hardest even if the crisis hit all individuals equally, and we already see that some groups such as young workers and women are worse hit by the recession than others. Government policies during and after the pandemic will play an important role in determining the eventual health consequences.

The COVID-19 emergency has had a dramatic impact on market incomes and income-support policies. The lack of timely available data constrains the estimation of the scale and direction of recent changes in the income distribution, which in turn constrains policymakers seeking to monitor such developments. We overcome the lack of data by proposing a dynamic calibrated microsimulation approach to generate counterfactual income distributions as a function of more timely external data than are available in dated income surveys. We combine nowcasting methods using publicly available data and a household income generation model to perform the first calibrated simulation based upon actual data, aiming to assess the distributional implications of the COVID-19 crisis in Ireland. Overall, we find that the crisis had an equalizing real-time effect for both gross and disposable incomes, notwithstanding the significant hardship experienced by many households.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having a dramatic economic impact in most countries. In the UK, it has led to sharp falls in labour demand in many sectors of the economy and to initial acute labour shortages in other sectors. Much more than in a typical downturn, the current crisis is not simply a general slowdown in economic activity but also a radical short-term shift in the mix of economic activities - of which an unknown, but possibly significant, amount will be persistent. The initial policy response has focused on cushioning the blow to families' finances and allowing the majority of workers and firms to resume their original activities once the crisis subsides. These are crucial priorities. But there should also be a focus on reallocating some workers, either temporarily if working in shut-down sectors or permanently by facilitating transitions to sectors and jobs offering better prospects and facing labour shortages. The phasing-out of the furlough subsidies, which is projected to happen in Autumn 2020, brings this into even sharper focus since the alternative for many workers will be unemployment. Active labour market policy will need to be front and centre.

This paper brings together evidence from various data sources and the most recent studies to describe what we know so far about the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on inequalities across several key domains of life, including employment and ability to earn, family life and health. We show how these new fissures interact with existing inequalities along various key dimensions, including socio-economic status, education, age, gender, ethnicity and geography. We find that the deep underlying inequalities and policy challenges that we already had are crucial in understanding the complex impacts of the pandemic itself and our response to it, and that the crisis does in itself have the potential to exacerbate some of these pre-existing inequalities fairly directly. Moreover, it seems likely that the current crisis will leave legacies that will impact inequalities in the long term. These possibilities are not all disequalising, but many are.