Putative human chemosignals have been shown to influence mood states and emotional processing, but the connection between these effects and higher-order cognitive processing is not well established. This study utilized an economic game (Dictator Game) to test whether androstadienone (AND), an odorous compound derived from testosterone, impacts on altruistic behavior. We predicted that the female participants would act more generously in the AND condition, exhibiting a significant interaction effect between gender and AND on Dictator Game contributions. We also expected that the presence of AND should increase the positive mood of the female participants, compared to a control odor condition and also compared to the mood of the male participants. The results confirm our hypotheses: for women the subliminal perception of AND led to larger monetary donations, compared to a control odor, and also increased positive mood. These effects were absent or significantly weaker in men. Our findings highlight the capacity of human putative chemosignals to influence emotions and higher cognitive processes - in particular the processes used in the context of economic decisions - in a gender-specific way.

There are two regularities we have learned from experimental studies of choice under risk. The first is that the majority of people weigh objective probabilities non-linearly. The second regularity, although less commonly acknowledged, is that there is a large amount of heterogeneity in how people distort probabilities. Despite of this, little effort has been made to identify the source of heterogeneity. In this paper, we explore the possibility that personality type is linked to probability distortions. Using validated psychological questionnaires, we clustered participants into distinct personality types: motivated, impulsive, and affective. We found that the motivated viewed gambling more attractive, whereas the impulsive were the most capable of discriminating non-extreme probabilities. Our results suggest that the observed heterogeneity in probability distortions may be explained by personality profiles, which can be elicited though standard psychological questionnaires.

When asked to choose between immediate versus future gains, individuals tend to fast-track benefits and, congruently, they tend to delay costs. But, despite the ever-increasing importance of the topic, few studies have investigated this behavior among senior citizens. The handful of studies that have been conducted have led to conflicting results and focused on gains as opposed to losses. These conflicting results may in part be due to demographic confounds and the inherent variability that comes with aging. Here, demographic confounds and variability due to aging were minimized by studying three groups: middle-aged, unimpaired-older, and impaired-older adults. Participants were asked to choose between sooner-smaller and later-larger monetary rewards and losses. Results indicated that impaired-older adults discounted the future more than unimpaired-older adults. Interestingly, middle-aged adults discounted future gains at a similar rate to impaired-older adults, but discounted future losses less than impaired-older adults (and similarly to unimpaired-older adults). This may suggest that unimpaired-older adults have developed a compensatory mechanism that leads to more cautious, patient choices. We discuss these results in the context of the neurobiology and neuropsychology of aging and decision making.

We explore the influence of genetic variation on subjective well-being by employing a twin design and genetic association study. In a nationally-representative twin sample, we first show that about 33% of the variation in life satisfaction is explained by genetic variation. Although previous studies have shown that baseline happiness is significantly heritable, little research has considered molecular genetic associations with subjective well-being. We study the relationship between a functional polymorphism on the serotonin transporter gene () and life satisfaction. We initially find that individuals with the longer, transcriptionally more efficient variant of this genotype report greater life satisfaction (n=2,545, p=0.012). However, our replication attempts on independent samples produce mixed results indicating that more work needs to be done to better understand the relationship between this genotype and subjective well-being. This work has implications for how economists think about the determinants of utility, and the extent to which exogenous shocks might affect individual well-being.

A recent trend in decision neuroscience is the use of model-based fMRI using mathematical models of cognitive processes. However, most previous model-based fMRI studies have ignored individual differences due to the challenge of obtaining reliable parameter estimates for individual participants. Meanwhile, previous cognitive science studies have demonstrated that hierarchical Bayesian analysis is useful for obtaining reliable parameter estimates in cognitive models while allowing for individual differences. Here we demonstrate the application of hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation to model-based fMRI using the example of decision making in the Iowa Gambling Task. First we use a simulation study to demonstrate that hierarchical Bayesian analysis outperforms conventional (individual- or group-level) maximum likelihood estimation in recovering true parameters. Then we perform model-based fMRI analyses on experimental data to examine how the fMRI results depend upon the estimation method.

The dynamic inconsistency of preference is well documented in behavioral research, but its basis remains controversial. In this article, we summarize recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) work in the domain of intertemporal choice, specifically considering evidence bearing on the hypothesis that delay discounting in humans is determined by competition between an evolutionarily older system that discounts precipitously with delay (System 1), and a newer system that exhibits very little discounting (System 2). We argue that neuroimaging evidence does not support the hypothesized separate and competing value systems. While it is clear that the sophisticated cognitive capacities that lead to greater valuation of larger later alternatives (e.g., selective attention and self-signaling) depend critically on neocortical structures, these capacities affect intertemporal choice through mediation of (rather than competition with) older cortical and subcortical structures central to reward and motivation. Taken together, neuroimaging evidence supports the alternative hypothesis that intertemporal choice is guided by a single valuation system.

Neuroimaging studies on delay discounting tasks that use reward delays ranging from minutes to days have implicated the insula and striatum in the processing of inter-temporal decisions. This study aimed at assessing whether these brain regions would also be involved in decision-making when subjects have to wait through the delays within the range of seconds. Employing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in thirteen healthy volunteers, we repeatedly presented monetaryoptions with delays that differed within the range of multiple seconds. Using a region of interest approach, we found significant activation in the bilateral anterior insula and striatum when subjects chose either the immediate (smaller) or delayed (larger) option. In particular, insular activation was observed after the response and the delay, when the outcome of the immediate or the delayed choice was shown. Significantly greater activation was observed in the ventroanterior striatum while subjects chose the immediate, as opposed to the delayed, options, and also after receiving the outcome of waiting through the longer delay option. The evidence presented here indicates that both the ventral striatum and the insula are involved in the processing of choosing delay options as well as the consequences of choices with delays in the seconds' range.

Temporal discounting refers to the reduction in the present subjective value of an outcome as a function of the temporal distance to that outcome. Though a number of mathematical models have been proposed to describe this time/value relationship, this search has largely excluded insights from the literature on memory decay. This study examines the utility of memory decay models by comparing the fits of four of these models to fits from established temporal discounting models using past and future temporal discounting data. These results (1) suggest that a single model describes valuation of both future and past outcomes, (2) indicate the exponential-power model, from memory decay literature, is statistically superior in fitting discounting data from both past and future outcomes, and (3) support the advancing perspective of the psychological interconnectedness of the future and past.

This article provides the beginning neuroeconomist with an introductory overview to the different methods used in human neuroscience. It describes basic strengths and weaknesses of each technique, points to examples of how each technique has been used in neuroeconomic studies, and provides key tutorial references that contain more detailed information. In addition to this overview, the article presents a framework that organizes human neuroscience methods functionally, according to whether they provide tests of the association between brain activity and cognition or behavior, or whether they test the necessity or the sufficiency of brain activity for cognition and behavior. This framework demonstrates the utility of a multi-method research approach, since converging evidence from tests of association, necessity and sufficiency provides the strongest inference regarding brain-behavior relationships. Set against this goal of converging evidence, human neuroscience studies in neuroeconomics currently rely far too heavily on methods that test association, most notably functional MRI.

Neuroimaging techniques have recently been used to examine the neural mechanism of decision-making. Nevertheless, most of the neuroimaging studies overlook the importance of emotion and autonomic response in modulating the process of decision-making. In this paper, we discussed how to integrating fMRI with psychophysiological measurements in studying decision-making. We suggested that psychophysiological data would complement with fMRI findings in providing a more comprehensive understanding about the physiological and neural mechanisms of decision-making. Also, this technique would yield valuable information in examining the interplay among emotions, autonomic response and decision-making. The discussion is presented in a tutorial format with concrete technical recommendations for researchers who may consider to adopt the technique in their study of decision-making.

Many important decisions are taken not by the person who will ultimately gain or lose from the outcome, but on their behalf, by somebody else. We examined economic decision-making about risk and time in situations in which deciders chose for others who also chose for them. We propose that this unique setting, which has not been studied before, elicits perception of reciprocity that prompts a unique bias in preferences. We found that decision-makers are less patient (more discounting), and more risk averse for losses than gains, with other peoples' money, especially when their choices for others are more uncertain. Those results were derived by exploiting a computational modeling framework that has been shown to account for the underlying psychological and neural decision processes. We propose a novel theoretical mechanism-precautionary preferences under social uncertainty, which explains the findings. Implications for future research and alternative models are also discussed.