On a Parfit-inspired account of culpability, as the psychological connections between a person's younger self and older self weaken, the older self's culpability for a wrong committed by the younger self diminishes. Suppose we accept this account and also accept a culpability-based upper limit on punishment severity. On this combination of views, we seem forced to conclude that perpetrators of distant past wrongs should either receive discounted punishments or be exempted from punishment entirely. This article develops a strategy for resisting this conclusion. I propose that, even if the perpetrators of distant past wrongs cannot permissibly be punished for the original wrongs, in typical cases they permissibly be punished for their ongoing and iterated failures to rectify earlier wrongs. Having set out this proposal, I defend it against three objections, before exploring punishment it can justify.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I defend and expand the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment (FTP). Second, I argue that this theory implies that non-consensual neurointerventions - interventions that act directly on one's brain - are permissible. According to the FTP, punishment is justified as a way of ensuring that citizens who infringe their duty to demonstrate the reliability of their moral powers will thereafter be able to comply with it. I claim that the FTP ought to be expanded to include citizens' interest in developing their moral powers. Thus, states must ensure that their citizens develop their moral reliability, not only because they must enforce their citizens' compliance with certain duties, but also because states have the duty to maintain the conditions for stability and satisfy their citizens' interest in developing their moral powers. According to this account of the FTP, if neurointerventions are the only or best way of ensuring that offenders can discharge their fortificational duties, states have strong reasons to provide these interventions.

If the resources used to wage wars could be spent elsewhere and save more lives, does this mean that wars are unjustified? This article considers this question, which has been largely overlooked by Just War Theorists and pacifists. It focuses on whether the opportunity costs of war lead to a form of pacifism, which it calls 'Opportunity Costs Pacifism'. The article argues that Opportunity Costs Pacifism is, at the more ideal level, compelling. It suggests that the only plausible response to Opportunity Costs Pacifism applies in highly nonideal circumstances. This has major implications for Just War Theory and pacifism since it is only at the highly nonideal level that war can be justified.

Lately it has become a commonplace to complain about the injustice of mass incarceration. I share the sentiment that this phenomenon has been an injustice. But it also has become orthodoxy to allege that the acceptance of a retributive penal philosophy has been one of the chief factors that has brought about mass incarceration in the first place. As a self-proclaimed retributivist, I find these allegations to be troubling and unwarranted. The point of this paper is to take steps to rebut them. I begin by making four conceptual points about retributivism. If I am correct, retributivism comes in countless flavors, and the particular variety to which I am most attracted can be applied to show why some punishments should be less severe than those presently imposed. Next I argue that many persons deserve less punishment than our legal system currently inflicts. Reflection about whether perpetrators should be afforded a complete or partial defense reveals retributivism to be less punitive than conventional wisdom would suggest.

Sometimes one can prevent harm only by contravening rights. If the harm one can prevent is great enough, compared to the stringency of the opposing rights, then one has a lesser-evil justification to contravene the rights. Non-consequentialist orthodoxy holds that, most of the time, lesser-evil justifications add to agents' permissible options without taking any away. Helen Frowe rejects this view. She claims that, almost always, agents must act on their lesser-evil justifications. Our primary task is to refute Frowe's flagship argument. Secondarily, it is to sketch a positive case for nonconsequentialist orthodoxy.