The conscientious refusal to dispense emergency contraception (EC) is legally protected in fourteen states. While the ethical dimensions of these objections have been explored within moral and feminist philosophy, conscientious refusal to the over-the-counter sale of EC has not been significantly studied through an egalitarian lens, especially with attention to the existing reproductive healthcare landscape in which these refusals occur. This article argues, through Amartya Sen's capability approach, that conscientious refusal to EC creates a burdensome inequality for people wishing to prevent pregnancy that manifests within a background of historical injustices, elevating its importance in our weighing of capabilities.

Though much progress has been made on inclusion of non-pregnant women in research, thoughtful discussion about including pregnant women has lagged behind. We outline resulting knowledge gaps and their costs and then highlight four reasons why ethically we are obliged to confront the challenges of including pregnant women in clinical research. These are: the need for effective treatment for women during pregnancy, fetal safety, harm from the reticence to prescribe potentially beneficial medication, and the broader issues of justice and access to benefits of research participation. Going forward requires shifting the burden of justification from inclusion to exclusion and developing an adequate ethical framework that specifies suitable justifications for excluding pregnant women from research.

This article proposes a new way of conceptualizing the ethical relationship between postpartum mothers and their newborn babies. I suggest that the intertwinement of mother and baby - and the tensions that this intertwinement produces - do not disappear with birth, but rather persist throughout the postpartum period in the form of . I draw upon three years of ethnographic fieldwork and training in the US and China to argue that the dependency associated with postpartum maternal tethering makes it extremely difficult for postpartum mothers to act autonomously, even in the relational sense. I then examine how breaches in the postpartum maternal tether can open up new possibilities for thinking about the bioethics of vulnerability, dependency and care, by denaturalizing and de-sanctifying the mother-baby relationship and diversifying newborn care.