RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY

Explaining mobilization for revolts by private interests and kinship relations
Armandola NG, Doehne M and Rost K
Mobilization for revolts poses a significant challenge for rational choice theory because revolts are vulnerable to free-riding, which disincentivizes rational actors from mobilizing. Strong, informal relations such as kinship ties have been identified as factors that can shift the rational calculations of individuals and lead to mobilization for revolts. In social networks that are polarized by the presence of mobilized individuals, such as rebels, and actors opposing the mobilization effort such as the elite, kinship relations have not only a bridging effect but also a diverging one. Building on Tullock's private interest theory, we develop a framework in which kinship relations determine the extent of individual's payoffs and costs of mobilization for revolts against an elite. We posit that distant kin of the elite expect high payoffs of mobilization for revolts and face the lowest costs of mobilization for revolts by virtue of their position in the network of kinship relations. Using a unique, hand-collected dataset that reconstructs a revolt in Basel, Switzerland, in 1691, we test our framework and contribute to a better relational understanding of the mechanisms that lead rational actors to mobilize for revolts. Our analyses show that mobilization for revolts is mainly driven by distant kinship relations to the ruling elite rather than close kinship relations to the rebels.
Regulation and state capacity
Chowdhury A
While one might expect states with low capacity to regulate less than states with high capacity, this is not supported by evidence, leaving open the possibility of rent-seeking. I use the example of the regulation of witchcraft in parts of Africa to informally model the conditions under which states with low capacity still come to promulgate a range of regulations even in the absence of rent-seeking interests. The model suggests that regulation can be a substitute for basic state functions like policing. I identify one normatively troubling aspect of this; the conditions under which such regulation might still improve state capacity over time, which qualifies claims made about rent-seeking and neo-patrimonialism; the model's implications for contemporary state formation; and the parallels between the regulation of witchcraft and the regulation of offensive speech.