How does the public react to information about the likely progression of COVID-19 cases in the United States? How do these reactions vary over the course of the pandemic and by partisanship, and with what consequences for policy attitudes and personal behavior? We argue that reading projections about the peak of COVID-19 cases in the United States is likely to lead to increased levels of anxiety and sadness. We expect that these effects will be more pronounced and less polarized along partisan lines earlier in the pandemic. Finally, we expect that elevated anxiety and sadness should in turn lead to greater support for protective policies to combat the pandemic and a greater inclination to engage in protective behaviors. To test these arguments, we fielded online survey experiments at three points in time (April, June, and August 2020), in which respondents were randomly assigned to a control group or one of two projections about the likely progression of COVID-19 cases in the United States. Across all three waves, we find that exposure to information about case peaks increases anxiety and sadness, though the effects get weaker over time, particularly among Republicans. We also find evidence that these elevated emotional responses increase support for protective policies and behavior.

We test the hypothesis that COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is attributable to -an interactive combination of low concern and low trust. Across two studies, 9,695 respondents from different parts of Britain reported their level of concern about COVID-19, trust in the UK government, and intention to accept or refuse the vaccine. Multilevel regression analysis, controlling for geographic area and relevant demographics, confirmed the predicted interactive effect of concern and trust. Across studies, respondents with low trust and low concern were 10%-22% more vaccine hesitant than respondents with high trust or high concern, and 26%-29% more hesitant than respondents with high trust and high concern. Results hold equally among White, Black, and Muslim respondents, consistent with the view that regardless of mean-level differences, a common process underlies vaccine hesitancy, underlining the importance of tackling distrustful complacency both generally and specifically among unvaccinated individuals and populations.

Existing research has focused extensively on the role of emotions such as anger, fear, and enthusiasm in explaining public opinion, but less is known about the importance of disgust, an innate disease-related emotion. To study the independent and joint effects of disgust and information, I draw on the case of the COVID-19 pandemic. I demonstrate that experimentally induced incidental disgust and exposure to information about how to flatten the curve of the COVID-19 cases have distinctive effects on political, racial, and health attitudes. Independently, exposure to information affects preferences only for restrictive policies to fight the spread of the virus. In contrast, the stand-alone effect of incidental disgust, as well as its joint effect with exposure to information, are responsible for attitude change toward both pandemic-relevant and irrelevant policies, Asian minorities, and prevention measures. Importantly, the study finds that citizens respond symmetrically to disgusting stimuli and information across degrees of political awareness, ideology, partisan affiliation, and trait authoritarianism. The results draw attention to the far-reaching implications of disgust on public opinion under threatening conditions.

Tolerance, the acceptance of disapproved conduct of others, is considered an indispensable feature of diverse societies. Yet tolerance can be expressed in one of two distinct ways, which is not reflected in the literature. In one way, tolerance is passive and involves suppressing the inclination to interfere with the disapproved conduct of others. In the other way, tolerance is active and involves endorsing the ability of others to engage in a disapproved practice. Using two nationally representative samples of Dutch majority members and eight scenarios involving real-world debates about the accommodation of Muslim minority practices, we find that while a significant minority of people engage in passive tolerance toward disapproved outgroup practices, very few people are willing to engage in active tolerance by proactively supporting disapproved practices. Furthermore, we also find that people who have stronger moral concerns about particular minority practices are less willing to engage in either active or passive tolerance. These results emerged both in contexts where Muslim minority practices had a direct impact on one's personal life as well as those that impacted on society as a whole. Collectively, these results illustrate two different forms of tolerance and the influence of moral concern in tolerance.

Reducing the spread of infectious viruses (e.g., COVID-19) can depend on societal compliance with effective mitigations. Identifying factors that influence adherence can inform public policy. In many cases, public health messaging has become highly moralized, focusing on the need to act for the greater good. In such contexts, a person's moral identity may influence behavior and serve to increase compliance through different mechanisms: if a person sees compliance as the right thing to do (internalization) and/or if a person perceives compliance as something others will notice as the right thing to do (symbolization). We argue that in societies that are more politically polarized, people's political ideology may interact with their moral identity to predict compliance. We hypothesized that where polarization is high (e.g., USA), moral identity should positively predict compliance for liberals to a greater extent than for conservatives. However, this effect would not occur where polarization is low (e.g., New Zealand). Moral identity, political ideology, and support for three different COVID-19 mitigation measures were assessed in both nations ( = 1,980). Results show that while moral identity can influence compliance, the political context of the nation must also be taken into account.

The emergence of the novel coronavirus has put societies under tremendous pressure to instigate massive and rapid behavior change. Throughout history, an effective strategy to facilitate novel behaviors has been to morally condemn those who do not behave in an appropriate way. Accordingly, here, we investigate if complying with the advice of health authorities-for example, to physically distance or vaccinate-has emerged as a moralized issue during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Study 1, we rely on data ( = 94K) from quota-sampled rolling cross-sectional online surveys from eight countries (Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, the United Kingdom, and the United States). We find that large majorities find it justified to condemn those who do not keep a distance to others in public and around half of respondents blame ordinary citizens for the severity of the pandemic. Furthermore, we identify the most important predictors of condemnation to be behavior change and personal concern, while institutional trust and social distrust also play large but less consistent roles. Study 2 offers a registered replication of our findings on a representative sample of Britons ( = 1.5K). It shows that both moralization and condemnation of both vaccination and general compliance are best predicted by self-interested considerations.

Research shows that emotions matter in politics, and they matter during a public health crisis. Yet, a comprehensive analysis of emotional political rhetoric during the COVID-19 crisis is still missing. Based on parties' position in the political arena (government versus populist radical parties), I expect differences in how specific emotions are employed and in how these messages actually influence the public. To test my hypotheses, I use word embeddings and neural network classifiers to measure fear and hope appeals in social media messages of political parties in four European countries. Furthermore, I rely on more than 1,400,000 public tweets of random citizens to estimate the impact of party messages. To do so, I employ vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to compare retweet volumes of political messages to emotional expressions in public tweets. Results indicate two main findings, (1) populist radical parties communicate less about the pandemic and decrease fear and increase hope appeals while COVID case numbers are rising whereas government parties exhibit the opposite pattern; (2) increased diffusion of party tweets consistently precedes change in partisans' emotional expressions the following day. The findings can carry important implications for (affective) polarization and the level of protective behavior among the population.

The objective prevalence of and subjective vulnerability to infectious diseases are associated with greater ingroup preference, conformity, and traditionalism. However, evidence directly testing the link between infectious diseases and political ideology and partisanship is lacking. Across four studies, including a large sample representative of the U.S. population ( > 12,000), we demonstrate that higher environmental levels of human transmissible diseases and avoidance of germs from human carriers predict conservative ideological and partisan preferences. During the COVID-19 pandemic ( = 848), we replicated this germ aversion finding and determined that these conservative preferences were primarily driven by avoidance of germs from outgroups (foreigners) rather than ingroups (locals). Moreover, socially conservative individuals expressed concerns of being susceptible to contracting infectious diseases during the pandemic and worried about COVID-19. These effects were robust to individual-level and state-level controls. We discuss these findings in light of theory on parasite stress and the behavioral immune system and with regard to the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the lives of all Americans, but the severity of the pandemic has been experienced unevenly across space and time. Some states saw sharp rises in COVID-19 cases in early March, whereas case counts rose much later in the rest of the country. In this article, we examine the relationship between exposure to COVID-19 and citizens' views on what type of measures are required to deal with the crises and how experience with and exposure to COVID-19 is associated with greater partisan polarization. We find consistent evidence of partisan divergence in pandemic-response policy preferences across the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic: Republicans support national control measures whereas Democrats support welfare policies, and interparty differences grow over time. We find only limited evidence that exposure or experience moderates these partisan differences. Our findings are consistent with the view that Americans interpret the COVID-19 pandemic in fundamentally partisan manner, and that objective pandemic conditions play at most a minor role in shaping mass preferences.

Fighting the COVID-19 pandemic requires large numbers of citizens to adopt disease-preventive practices. We contend that national identification can mobilize and motivate people to engage in preventive behaviors to protect the collective, which in return would heighten national identification further. To test these reciprocal links, we conducted studies in two countries with diverse national tactics toward curbing the pandemic: (1) a two-wave longitudinal survey in China (Study 1,  = 1200), where a national goal to fight COVID-19 was clearly set, and (2) a five-wave longitudinal survey in the United States (Study 2,  = 1001), where the national leader, President Trump, rejected the severity of COVID-19 in its early stage. Results revealed that national identification was associated with an increase in disease-preventive behaviors in both countries in general. However, higher national identification was associated with greater trust in Trump's administration among politically conservative American participants, which then was associated with slower adoption of preventive behaviors. The reciprocal effect of disease-preventive behaviors on national identification was observed only in China. Overall, our findings suggest that although national identification may serve as a protective factor in curbing the pandemic, this beneficial effect was reduced in some political contexts.

Most health models emphasize individual factors in predicting health behavior. However, in the context of COVID-19 where the immediate response to stopping the spread of the virus requires collective efforts and change, other sociopolitical factors need to be considered. Prior research points to health behaviors being impacted by neighborhood and national social relations, social identification, confidence in government and political orientation. This research, though, is generally piecemeal (or specific), tends to be cross-sectional, and is usually not oriented to pandemics. These issues are addressed in the current research. A two-wave study with a representative sample of Australians (  = 3028) gathered during COVID-19 examined sociopolitical factors at the local and national level as predictors of health behaviors one month later. Four models were tested. These encapsulated geographic levels (local or national) and two health behaviors (hand hygiene or physical distance). In the three of the four models, social identification was a significant predictor of health behavior, while controlling for sociodemographic and individual-level measures. There were more mixed results for social relations and confidence in government. There is evidence that to better promote health behaviors sociopolitical factors need to be more prominent in public policy and health behavior models.

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, personal protective measures (e.g., social distancing, handwashing, and mask wearing) have been adopted as a cornerstone to limit the spread of the disease. Yet, the effectiveness of these measures depends on people's levels of adherence. In this article, we apply social-psychological research to the study of compliance with personal protective measures during the COVID-19 pandemic in Chile. We consider three possible models underlying adherence: (1) sociodemographic and socioeconomic factors, (2) instrumental factors, and (3) normative factors. We draw on data from a longitudinal nonrepresentative panel study (Study 1,  = 32,304) and a cross-sectional representative survey (Study 2,  = 1,078) to explore the impact of these different factors on personal protective measures compliance. Findings show the strongest support for the role of instrumental and normative factors, in that people who comply with protective measures report to a greater extent that relatives and friends comply too and tend to perceive high risk of COVID-19. We finish by proposing policy recommendations to promote effective strategies to contain the spread of the virus.

The COVID-19 pandemic has generated unprecedented human loss and financial difficulties worldwide. In line with recent calls for social sciences to help collective efforts to address COVID-19, we investigated the link between peace and pandemic preparedness, advancing the literatures on negative (i.e., absence of direct violence) and positive peace (i.e., absence of structural violence and presence of equality) and governments' crisis preparedness as well as crisis relief efforts. Two studies tested whether both positive and negative peace predict pandemic preparedness, operationalized as COVID-19 tests, cases, and positivity rates, during the onset of the pandemic. Study 1 did so at the national level across 155 countries; Study 2 did so at a local level, across 3144 counties within the United States. Even after controlling for population size, population density, GDP, and amount of air travel, higher levels of both negative and positive peace predicted a greater number of COVID-19 tests per one million people, fewer overall COVID-19 cases, and a lower positivity rate. These findings point to the possibility that by promoting peace, governments and the international community could potentially become better prepared to handle future pandemics and other crises.

Drawing on social identity theory and research on digital media and polarization, this study uses a quasi-experimental design with a random sample ( = 3304) to provide causal evidence on perceptions of who is to blame for the initial spread of COVID-19 in India. According blame to three different social and political entities-Tablighi Jamaat (a Muslim group), the Modi government, and migrant workers (a heterogeneous group)-are the dependent variables in three OLS regression models testing the effect of the no-blame treatment, controlling for Facebook use, social identity (religion), vote in the 2019 national election, and other demographics. Results show respondents in the treatment group were more likely to allay blame, affective polarization (dislike for outgroup members) was social identity based, not partisan based, and Facebook/Instagram use was not significant. Congress and United Progressive Alliance voters in 2019 were less likely to blame the Modi government for the initial spread. Unlike extant research in western contexts, affective and political polarization appear to be distinct concepts in India where social identity complexity is important. This study of the first wave informs perceptions of blame in future waves, which are discussed in conclusion along with questions for future research.

The COVID-19 pandemic has given rise to unprecedented and extraordinary conditions. It represents a profound threat to health and political and economic stability globally. It is the pressing issue of the current historical moment and is likely to have far-reaching social and political implications over the next decade. Political psychology can inform our preparedness for the next phase of the pandemic as well as our planning for a post COVID-19 world. We hope that this special issue will play its part in helping us to think how we manage and live with COVID-19 over the coming decade. In this editorial, we review the key themes arising from the contributions to our special issue and, alongside existing knowledge highlight the relevance of political psychology to finding solutions during this time of crisis. The contributions to this special issue and the pandemic raise many classic topics of central interest to political psychology: leadership, solidarity and division, nationalism, equality, racism, and international and intergroup relations. In our editorial, we offer an analysis that highlights three key themes. First, the importance of sociopolitical factors in shaping behavior during this pandemic. Second, the relevance of political leadership and rhetoric to collective efforts to tackle SARS-COV-2. And third, how sociopolitical cohesion and division has become increasingly relevant during this time of threat and crisis.

The COVID-19 disease pandemic is one of the most pressing global health issues of our time. Nevertheless, responses to the pandemic exhibit a stark ideological divide, with political conservatives (versus liberals/progressives) expressing less concern about the virus and less behavioral compliance with efforts to combat it. Drawing from decades of research on the psychological underpinnings of ideology, in four studies (total  = 4441) we examine the factors that contribute to the ideological gap in pandemic response-across domains including personality (e.g., empathic concern), attitudes (e.g., trust in science), information (e.g., COVID-19 knowledge), vulnerability (e.g., preexisting medical conditions), demographics (e.g., education, income) and environment (e.g., local COVID-19 infection rates). This work provides insight into the most proximal drivers of this ideological divide and also helps fill a long-standing theoretical and empirical gap regarding how these various ideological differences shape responses to complex real-world sociopolitical events. Among our key findings are the central role of attitude- and belief-related factors (e.g., trust in science and trust in Trump)-and the relatively weaker influence of several domain-general personality factors (empathic concern, disgust sensitivity, conspiratorial ideation). We conclude by considering possible explanations for these findings and their broader implications for our understanding of political ideology.

This article maps political rhetoric by national leaders during the COVID-19 pandemic. We identify and characterize global variations in major rhetorical storylines invoked in publicly available speeches ( = 1201) across a sample of 26 countries. Employing a text analytics or corpus linguistics approach, we show that state heads rhetorically lead their nations by: enforcing systemic interventions, upholding global unity, encouraging communal cooperation, stoking national fervor, and assuring responsive governance. Principal component analysis further shows that country-level rhetoric is organized along emergent dimensions of cultural cognition: an agency-structure axis to define the loci of pandemic interventions and a hierarchy-egalitarianism axis which distinguishes top-down enforcement from bottom-up calls for cooperation. Furthermore, we detect a striking contrast between countries featuring populist versus cosmopolitan rhetoric, which diverged in terms of their collective meaning making around leading over versus leading with, as well as their experienced pandemic severity. We conclude with implications for understanding global pandemic leadership in an unequal world and the contributions of mixed-methods approaches to a generative political psychology in times of crisis.

Shared social identifications (family, community, nation, humanity) predict normative actions and psychological well-being and can be invoked discursively by leaders to mobilize their followers. We illustrate the potential for harnessing shared identities to mobilize resilient public responses against COVID-19. Study 1 explored which patterns of social identification predicted protective behaviors (personal hygiene, physical distancing), prosocial actions (helping proximal and distal others), and psychological well-being (mental well-being, depressive symptoms, anxiety) among 560 U.K. adults surveyed during lockdown. Study 2 contrasted Prime Minister Ardern's use of identity-based rhetoric to mobilize New Zealanders, with Prime Minister Johnson's use of individualistic appeals to the U.K. public. Our findings suggest how political leaders might beneficially use social identities in communications about extreme events.

On March 12, 2020, the Norwegian government put the country on lock-down to get the COVID-19 situation under control. Making people adhere to restrictive measures is difficult. Even so, the Norwegian government largely succeeded in getting the population to comply and became the first European country to announce control over the situation. In this study, we ask what narratives the government put forth in their communication of the measures and how these measures were handled and made sense of in personal narratives at the general population level. We base our discussion on near daily government press conferences in March-April, as well as qualitative interviews with 16 individuals. Using a cultural narrative perspective on the data, we tie these meta-narratives and personal narratives together. Persuading people to comply with prevention and control measures in a crisis is crucial, and our study shows the importance of the selection of meta-narratives. There will be cultural differences in governance and receptiveness of the population across different settings, and our study suggests that governments will have to balance where on different continua they place their COVID-19 narratives, balancing freedom up against restrictions, hope against fear, and individualism against solidarity.

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has always been controversial and highly politicized. Here, using a social identity approach, we review evidence that trauma and its aftermath are fundamentally linked to social position, sociopolitical capital, and power. We begin this contribution by demonstrating how a person's group memberships (and the social identities they derive from these memberships) are inherently linked to the experience of adversity. We then go on to consider how it is through group memberships that individuals are defined by their trauma risk and trauma histories-that is, a person's group memberships and their trauma are often inherently linked. Considering the importance of group memberships for understanding trauma, we argue that it is important to see these, and group processes more generally, as more than just "demographic" risk factors. Instead, we argue that when groups are defined by their trauma history or risk, their members will often derive some sense of self from this trauma. For this reason, attributes of group memberships are important in developing an understanding of adjustment and adaptation to trauma. In particular, groups' status, their recourse to justice, and the level of trust and solidarity within the group are all central to the impact of traumatic events on individual-level psychological resilience. We review evidence that supports this analysis by focusing on the exacerbating effects of stigma and social mistrust on post-traumatic stress, and the value of solidarity and strong identities for resilience. We conclude that because of these group-related processes, trauma interweaves the personal with the political and that post-traumatic stress is fundamentally about power, positionality, and politics.

Although it seems reasonable to assume that activating patriotism might motivate citizens to cooperate with the state in reaching societal goals, the empirical evidence supporting this contention is based mostly on correlational rather than experimental studies. In addition, little is known on whether patriotism can be manipulated without simultaneously triggering nationalism and on the psychological processes which determine the patriotism-cooperation relation. This current article reports results of one survey and three experiments that manipulate patriotism by displaying either a national flag or national landscapes or by priming national achievements. The outcomes indicate that reported and manipulated patriotism indirectly increase tax compliance, although the national flag also increases nationalism. National achievements, on the other hand, seemingly increases trust in national public institutions and the voluntary motivation to cooperate, whereas national landscapes only increase the voluntary motivation to cooperate. Hence, it is possible to increase social capital in the form of trust and cooperation through patriotism without fostering nationalism as well.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, a rally effect led to a precipitous rise in political trust. However, the increase in political trust concealed a simultaneous decline among a smaller portion of the population. This paper examines the psychological mechanisms underlying these heterogeneous attitudes towards government and shows that a biosocial model best explains the observed patterns of response. The interplay of genetic and environmental factors of political trust reveals the stable but dynamic nature of heritability: genetic influences of political trust increased immediately following 9/11 but quickly decayed to pre-9/11 levels.

We sought to document that the extent to which different ethnic groups are perceived as embodying the American identity is more strongly linked to anti-minority policy attitudes and acculturation ideologies among majority group members (European Americans) than among minority group members (Asian Americans or Latino/as). Participants rated 13 attributes of the American identity as they pertain to different ethnic groups, and reported their endorsement of policy attitudes and acculturation ideologies. We found a relative consensus across ethnic groups regarding defining components of the American identity. However, European Americans were perceived as more prototypical of this American identity than ethnic minorities, especially by European American raters. Moreover, for European Americans but not for ethnic minorities, relative ingroup prototypicality was related to anti-minority policy attitudes and acculturation ideologies. These findings suggest that for European Americans, perceptions of ethnic group prototypicality fulfill an instrumental function linked to preserving their group interests and limiting the rights afforded to ethnic minorities.

This paper studies the relationship between the "big five" personality traits and political ideology in a large US representative sample (N=14,672). In line with research in political psychology, "openness to experience" is found to predict liberal ideology and "conscientiousness" predicts conservative ideology. The availability of family clusters in the data is leveraged to show that these results are robust to a sibling fixed-effects specification. The way that personality might interact with environmental influences in the development of ideology is also explored. A variety of childhood experiences are studied that may have a differential effect on political ideology based on a respondent's personality profile. Childhood trauma is found to interact with "openness" in predicting ideology and this complex relationship is investigated using mediation analysis. These findings provide new evidence for the idea that differences in political ideology are deeply intertwined with variation in the nature and nurture of individual personalities.

The goal of the current study was to examine the moderating role of in-group social identity on relations between youth exposure to sectarian antisocial behavior in the community and aggressive behaviors. Participants included 770 mother-child dyads living in interfaced neighborhoods of Belfast. Youth answered questions about aggressive and delinquent behaviors as well as the extent to which they targeted their behaviors toward members of the other group. Structural equation modeling results show that youth exposure to sectarian antisocial behavior is linked with increases in both general and sectarian aggression and delinquency over one year. Reflecting the positive and negative effects of social identity, in-group social identity moderated this link, strengthening the relationship between exposure to sectarian antisocial behavior in the community and aggression and delinquency towards the out-group. However, social identity weakened the effect for exposure to sectarian antisocial behavior in the community on general aggressive behaviors. Gender differences also emerged; the relation between exposure to sectarian antisocial behavior and sectarian aggression was stronger for boys. The results have implications for understanding the complex role of social identity in inter-group relations for youth in post-accord societies.

Ideological preferences within the American electorate are contingent on both the environmental conditions that provide the content of the contemporary political debate and internal predispositions that motivate people to hold liberal or conservative policy preferences. In this article we apply Jost, Federico, and Napier's (2009) top-down/bottom-up theory of political attitude formation to a genetically informative population sample. In doing so, we further develop the theory by operationalizing the top-down pathway to be a function of the social environment and the bottom-up pathway as a latent set of genetic factors. By merging insights from psychology, behavioral genetics, and political science, we find strong support for the top-down/bottom-up framework that segregates the two independent pathways in the formation of political attitudes and identifies a different pattern of relationships between political attitudes at each level of analysis.

Evidence suggests that our foraging ancestors engaged in the small-scale equivalent of social insurance as an essential tool of survival and evolved a sophisticated psychology of social exchange (involving the social emotions of compassion and anger) to regulate mutual assistance. Here, we hypothesize that political support for modern welfare policies are shaped by these evolved mental programs. In particular, the compassionate motivation to share with needy nonfamily could not have evolved without defenses against opportunists inclined to take without contributing. Cognitively, such parasitic strategies can be identified by the intentional avoidance of productive effort. When detected, this pattern should trigger anger and down-regulate support for assistance. We tested predictions derived from these hypotheses in four studies in two cultures, showing that subjects' perceptions of recipients' effort to find work drive welfare opinions; that such perceptions (and not related perceptions) regulate compassion and anger (and not related emotions); that the effects of perceptions of recipients' effort on opinions about welfare are mediated by anger and compassion, independently of political ideology; and that these emotions not only influence the content of welfare opinions but also how easily they are formed.

Measures of symbolic racism (SR) have often been used to tap racial prejudice toward Blacks. However, given the wording of questions used for this purpose, some of the apparent effects on attitudes toward policies to help Blacks may instead be due to political conservatism, attitudes toward government, and/or attitudes toward redistributive government policies in general. Using data from national probability sample surveys and an experiment, we explored whether SR has effects even when controlling for these potential confounds and whether its effects are specific to policies involving Blacks. Holding constant conservatism and attitudes toward limited government, SR predicted Whites' opposition to policies designed to help Blacks and more weakly predicted attitudes toward social programs whose beneficiaries were racially ambiguous. An experimental manipulation of policy beneficiaries revealed that SR predicted policy attitudes when Blacks were the beneficiary but not when women were. These findings are consistent with the claim that SR's association with racial policy preferences is not due to these confounds.