The paper analyzes current discussions concerning the so called "replicability crisis" - a notion describing difficulties in attempts to confirm existing research findings by their additional scrutiny or by new empirical studies. We propose interpretation that this "crisis" may be seen as a manifestation of the increasing inconsistency between, on the one hand, the outdated views on a human being and social structures dominating in the academic mainstream across various disciplines, including psychology and sociology, and, on the other hand, the reality of the emerging new stage of societal evolution, neo-structuration, which brings to the forefront individual agency. Our analysis suggests the possibilities for the future inter-disciplinary paradigmatic shift, which implies putting in the center of research not the idea of a constant or predictably developing individual in the context of solid external structures operating in line with a presumably sustainable "progress". Instead, under increasing neo-structuration, individual agency becomes, simultaneously, a manifestation of the essence of human nature (as cultural psychology argues) and the driving force for societal transformations, including solving most acute social problems, in the concrete historical period. It means a fundamentally new task for social sciences and humanities: to elaborate methodological solutions and theoretical frameworks to systematically comprehend the contextually conditioned human ability to create and transform - and not only to reproduce. Addressing more attention to agency manifestations in digital environment and, in particular, to those congruent to social activism or volunteering, seems especially fruitful for comprehending human activity in the neo-structurated world.

This article explores the embodied dimension of authoring life trajectories for individuals who have undergone heart transplantation. Confronting the radical otherness of existential finitude can create a rich context for examining the relationships between authorship, corporeality, and creative processes. By integrating Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body with Susanne Langer's theory of affective semiosis and presentational signs, this work aims to foster a productive dialogue between these perspectives, grounded in Semiotic Cultural Psychology, which meta-theoretically synthesizes a diverse range of knowledge on the transformative interaction between individuals and culture. The article presents three participants' cases, selected for their ideographic expressiveness, as empirical evidence that both enlivens and enriches this study's theoretical and epistemological foundations. The fragments of participants' elaborations were derived from individual interviews conducted at the IMIP heart transplant clinic between 2022 and 2023. IMIP is a university hospital located in Recife. The interviewees were adults who had undergone transplantation at least one year prior. The discussion of the reports highlights three interpretative axes: (a) embodied ambiguities and tensions experienced; (b) living metaphors and potential presentational signs regarding life trajectories; (c) ways of referencing the future and temporality of experiences felt intensely in the present and their methods of reconstructing the past. The interpretative analysis of participants' metaphors aims to shed light on the role of corporeality in the construction of meaning and, consequently, in the creative perspective of life and the sense of authorship when facing the alterity, in this case, specifically of illness and consecutive heart transplantation. This article seeks to contribute to studying affective semiosis and corporeality in Cultural Psychology by highlighting its hermeneutic relevance as a critical feature of the human cultural construction of the self, others, and the world.

While widely considered Alexander Luria's (1902-1977) autobiography, The Making of Mind. A Personal Account of Soviet Psychology, published posthumously in 1979, is not a true autobiography but rather an autobiography with heterobiographic elements. However, the largely overlooked Spanish book, Mirando hacia atrás. La vida de un psicólogo soviético en retrospección, published in the same year, may be regarded as an authentic autobiography written by Luria. Based on the close reading of previously unknown archival sources, including Luria's autobiographic typescripts, the central argument of the article shows that it is likely that the history of this key figure in modern Soviet neuropsychology is embodied in various instances of his life-writing. Our reconstruction of Luria's life-writing is transnational in scope and multi-language based. It aims at drawing an overall account, which may later be followed by a series of contributions dealing with details of the history of Luria's life-writing.

This volume makes a notable contribution with a deep and extensive analysis to achieve the movement from Yoga Philosophy to Yoga Psychology for the promotion of integration with Modern Psychology, a task hitherto unrealized despite the burgeoning attention to Yoga. This commentary is constrained by my own limited knowledge of traditional Indian philosophy in making a thorough examination of Paranjpe's contribution beyond attention to selected concepts and sporadic illustrations from the original volume. Yoga practice is, Paranjpe informs us, just the tip of an immense consolidation of knowledge, deep intellectual thought and theoretical consideration about the embodied sense of self, health and well-being. Spirituality is foundational to the theory and practice of yoga. This volume has immense potential relevance for contemporary psychological theory and practice in an attempt to highlight embodied and spiritual considerations of human existence. With some notable exceptions, modern psychology has adopted the positivistic paradigm that systematically rejects traditional knowledge systems. Through intercultural translation (a concept I borrow from Santos, 2018), Paranjpe successfully transcends this divide and provides detailed possibilities about why and how this knowledge can relate to, inform and expand the science of human being and becoming that is inclusive, built for mutuality rather than domination; travelling on the path of dialogue between diverse knowledge systems.

This article aims to reconceptualize the replication crisis as not merely a problem of flawed methods, lack of scientific rigor, or questionable researcher conduct, but as a fundamentally epistemological and philosophical issue. While improved methodologies and scientific practices are necessary, they must be considered through the lens of the underlying epistemologies. Toward this end, a new paradigm for psychological research and practice, grounded in second-order cybernetics and transactional causality, is proposed as instrumental. Second-order cybernetics, as introduced by Heinz von Foerster, challenges traditional scientific methodologies that assume a strict separation between the observer and the observed. The core idea is that the observer, through the very act of observing, inevitably becomes part of the system they study, leading to a shift from linear to transactional causality. This epistemological shift has profound implications for the research practice and the responsibility of the psychology practitioner. Foerster's ethical imperative -act always so as to increase the number of choices- combined with the aesthetic imperative -If you desire to see, learn how to act- illuminates an alternative methodological landscape for the clinical practice. The replication crisis in psychology is examined in light of these theoretical shifts, allowing for a new constructive vision which integrates basic research with applied psychological practice. Second-order cybernetics encourages a participatory approach to research, emphasizing the catalyzing role of the observing practitioner. The article concludes by advocating for an epistemological superposition, where psychologists navigate multiple perspectives to enhance the integrity and applicability of their findings in the real world.

In today's debate about a user oriented humanistic turn in the field of mental health care, the early Foucault is once again relevant. In his works from 1954 Foucault shows that the root of understanding mental phenomena is not to be found in universal medical concepts and methods, but in the reflection on lived experiences and in the human being itself. In accordance with contemporary social, community, and cultural psychologists, such as Brinkmann, Kinderman and Prilleltensky, Foucault is critical to the psychology's medical foundations. Instead of focusing on medical and physiological matters he suggests that psychology, as a discipline, should be more user oriented, and focus more on the human being itself, and on social and cultural contexts.

Over the past century, numerous studies have examined Jean Piaget's relationship with psychoanalysis. Until the 1970s, they often emphasized the value of a rapprochement between Piaget and Freud and highlighted the use of Piaget's ideas in therapeutic practice. Then from the 1980s onwards, several studies focused on the relationship between his work-seen as purely cognitive, to the exclusion of the social and the affective-and his conflicted relationship with his mother. Based on similar sources, particularly his autobiography, these studies led to a reductionist account of his work according to which intellectual content was determined as much by the conflictual relationship as by his alleged autism. The article begins by deconstructing these ideas, showing that in the 1920s Piaget gave an important place to affectivity and the role of the mother in development. It then analyses the Piaget's family dynamics of the 1919-1920 period, focusing on the family system-Jean's parents, sisters and brother-in-law-in its relationship to pathology, a dynamic reconstructed with the help of correspondences. The article presents a series of totally unknown episodes in Piaget's life. It shows that this was an enmeshed family system Minuchin (Families and family therapy, 1974) in which members were both highly involved and dependent on the mother. Within it, Piaget was designated as a therapist, for both the mother and the system, thus reversing standard roles and the classic figure of the designated patient. This research strengthened the few works that have identified either Piaget's position as a therapist or the importance of his ideas for psychotherapy.

The study's goal was to examine the tension between democratic school governance, requiring its participants to obey school rules, even though they might disagree with those rules, and personal responsibility, requiring the participants to act morally, in accordance with their conscience and their sense of what is right and makes sense for them, regardless of the democratic nature of the imposed school rules. This examination was based on three sources: 1) three Open Symposia with American and Russian democratic educationalists, 2) my review of the existing literature on civil disobedience and democratic education, and 3) my empirical study based on the interviews of participants of an American private democratic school, known as The Circle School, regarding their instances of civil disobedience. The three Open Symposia allowed me to develop a working definition of civil disobedience as a particular principled disobedience. One important finding arising from these Open Symposia was that neither democratic educator could come up with an example of civil disobedience in democratic schools. My literature analysis revealed four types of civil disobedience: instrumental, existential, safeguarding, and expedient. The participants of my interviews in a democratic school - current teenage students, staff, and alumni - reported many instances of diverse types of civil disobedience, but primarily existential. Despite a lack of discussions of civil disobedience in the school, I discovered that the democratic school apparently promotes civil disobedience as its unintended curriculum by promoting and supporting students' authorial agency, aiming at the students deciding what is good for them, and opposing educational paternalism.

Our present and evolved understanding has challenged the previously synonymous use of the terms 'sex' and 'gender'. We have moved beyond the binary categorization towards proliferation of gender identities. Thus, raising questions whether certain identities are traits or gender identities. This complexity of the issue is exacerbated by the cultural relativity of gender identity and by lack of a standardized list. Adopting a balanced approach, the article touches upon the prejudices against the gender minorities. Additionally, it touches upon the controversies surrounding gender identities and their development to ensure that the individuals can make more informed choices and engage in more meaningful discourse. It addresses issues of politicised debates, linguistic diversity, and the role of pharma industry in the sex-change procedures. The paradigm of gender has transcended the binary constructs in the contemporary discourse. However, it has ventured into unchartered territories revealing several unexplored facets that await scholarly investigation. The present paper critiques the concept of gender identities and the sociopolitical landscape surrounding it through the lens of Critical Theory. In conclusion, our understanding of gender is still limited and evolving. There is a need for adopting a more nuanced and informed approach to challenge the issues posed by this era of evolving gender expression and identities. The article concludes with policy recommendations based on insights gained from the article and suggestions for future research.

Time dilation is an important issue in the field of physics. Introduced by the special relativity theory, it means that the time duration spent by an entity to reach a certain destination depends on the movement and speed of the entity. Time dilation has been widely addressed in other disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and motivation. However, it has produced practical and theoretical controversies in the literature. The new version of relativity theory resolves these issues by extending time dilation to conceptual and mental factors and taking a process-based approach to the development of universe. The purpose of this paper is to discuss time dilation in different scientific arenas and explicate it in motivation from the perspective of motivational congruence theory (MCT). The theory provides a new explanation for the underlying mechanisms of time dilation as a mental phenomenon in motivation. According to MCT, a congruence between the context and extrinsic and intrinsic motivations escalates overall motivation. This, in turn, results in high levels of effort and engagement towards the task and leads to mental time dilation. That is, the individual becomes so engaged with the task that their subjective estimation of time duration becomes shorter, compared to an objective measurement of the elapsed time. The study provides hypotheses for further empirical research. MCT's view to time dilation aligns with advances in the fields of physics and philosophy. It contributes to the literature by presenting a new explanation for mental time dilation and elaborating the motivational mechanisms that underlie this phenomenon.

This theoretical paper offers an in-depth examination of the intersection between Theory of Mind (ToM) and artificial intelligence (AI), drawing on developmental psychology and philosophical analysis. By investigating the key developmental stages at which children begin to understand that others have distinct mental states, the paper provides a framework for assessing the cognitive boundaries of AI systems. It critically interrogates the pervasive human inclination to anthropomorphize machines, particularly through the attribution of complex mental states like "knowing," "thinking," or "believing" to AI entities that lack subjective experience. The paper argues that AI, while capable of simulating cognitive processes, operates without the conscious awareness that defines human cognition, raising profound epistemological and ethical questions. It explores the broader implications of this projection for society, considering how our conceptualization of AI affects both technological development and social structures. Ultimately, this interdisciplinary inquiry calls for a more nuanced understanding of the distinctions between human and machine cognition, advocating for responsible approaches to AI as its capabilities evolve.

This interview article explores how British anthropologist Tim Ingold's work can inspire innovation in mental health and the psy disciplines. Ingold critiques dominant biomedical and individualistic approaches, arguing for the importance of caring attentiveness and abolishing dichotomies like those between surface and depth, when engaging with people to understand and assist them. Instead, he suggests viewing human existence as correspondences with environmental, social, and relational others. The interview highlights the concept of "doing-undergoing," proposing that care is a reciprocal, relational process. Ingold's ideas suggest a shift towards practices that engage directly with the world and promote attentiveness to human and more-than-human relations. The article encourages practitioners, educators and students of mental health disciplines to rethink traditional models and adopt more humane approaches.

The concept of human goals is central to the study of psychology (i.e., motivation, behavior, and well-being), sociology (i.e., social structure, culture, and dynamics), education (i.e., setting objectives, student motivation, and growth strategies), management (i.e., leadership, employee motivation, productivity, organizational behavior), and economics (i.e., consumer and market behavior, decision making, labor relations), among others. Because it represents the ultimate desired destination that orients decisions and actions, it plays a central role in the theory and practice in these fields. Despite its centrality, the concept lacks theoretical consensus regarding its definition and distinctiveness from related concepts such as needs, motives, and values. Like these concepts, the goals literature suffers from the proliferation of both concepts and taxonomies, suggesting a need for a return to theoretical foundations. In this article, we advocate for a fundamental reconsideration of the concept of goals, anchoring it within a new psychological theory of human motivation based on first principles. The paper's primary contribution lies in demonstrating that the operational definitions utilized by academics and practitioners alike can be thought of as attempts to approach concepts of human motivation, specifically, emotional needs, without fully getting there. We review the leading definitions of human goals in the literature, concluding that they can be distilled to a fundamental set of human emotional needs, each associated with extensive literatures of their own. A comprehensive framework of 12 human emotional needs is introduced; it is argued that a comprehensive motivational framework offers significant advantages over current theoretical approaches, which tend to spin off an ever-expanding list of concepts. We consider the impact of embedding goals concepts within existing motivational constructs with clear benefits for: (a) theory development, (b) method development, and (c) practical applications, emphasizing the advantages of clear operational definitions.

This commentary outlines a novel agenda for future mindfulness research, building on various authors' insights, particularly Indius (Indius, S. (2024). Meditation and Self-transcendence: A Human need? Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 58(3), 878-883), who integrates Maslow's hierarchy of needs into the discussion of mindfulness. Indius argues for a revision of humanistic psychology to reflect contemporary needs, emphasizing the dynamic nature of meditation as a transformative process that leads to self-actualization and self-transcendence. This exploration highlights the metaphor of a volcanic eruption to illustrate how meditation can lead to the destruction and subsequent rebirth of psychological needs, fostering a deeper connection to oneself and the environment. Additionally, it examines the interplay of social, material, and cultural contexts in shaping mindfulness practices, suggesting a need for personalization and ecological interconnectedness. The commentary aligns with multiple perspectives presented in the Special Issue, underscoring the necessity of adapting traditional frameworks like Maslow's to meet evolving cultural and psychological landscapes. Future research pathways include preserving mindfulness breakthroughs, exploring religious worldviews, and integrating social environments into mindfulness studies, ultimately advocating for a holistic understanding of mindfulness as both a process and outcome in the context of human experience.

This article delves into the psychological framework of Busemann, focusing on the core principles of balance, character, autonomy and dialogue. It emphasizes how these concepts contribute to the development of personality, the dynamic process of becoming a fully realized individual. According to Busemann, personality evolves through the interaction of personal dispositions, talents, and character, with dialogue playing a crucial role in fostering growth. The paper also examines the phenomenon of Geborgenheit, understood as a sense of security and inner stability, within this theoretical context. Geborgenheit is framed as an advanced psychological need that emerges once basic needs are satisfied and is deeply tied to both external and internal balance. By analyzing the character of Holden Caulfield in J.D. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye, the article illustrates the challenges of achieving Geborgenheit and suggests practical implications for applying Busemann's theory to create supportive environments in educational settings.

What does the brain mean in a legal domain, and how does integrating neuroscience and law go beyond the practical difficulties highlighted by social scientists and legal theorists? The debate about the confluence of neuroscience and law is both promising and uncertain. Legal theorists took it as a conceptual error, and neuroscience advocates find it a promising emerging field. The social psychological approach towards law is for critical integration of both. Scholars took an alternative route, considering it a fascinating element of scientific discourse. The present article aims to show that the coming of "brain language" in the everyday legal discourse will not become a reality, as truth is inferred through everyday experiences and the interpretations of scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge through mapping active brain areas by the available brain visualizing techniques shows the correlation between the brain and behavior, not the causation. So, its use in the legal domain seems less institutionalized, showing the determinism of the brain as less authentic in itself when compared with the intuitive path embedded in culture and history. Implication for sociolegal psychology working for dignity and social justice is discussed.

To produce a theoretical approach about the relations between neuroscience and psychopathology that expands beyond the biomedical model to include a non-reductionist, enactive, and biocultural perspective. An integrative review, drawing from the biocultural approach from Anthropology, is used to produce examples from epigenetics, neuroplasticity, and functional neuroanatomy. A biocultural approach points to a brain that is highly plastic, reinforcing a much more complex model in which biological vulnerabilities and the historical-cultural environment co-construct each other. The examples given seem to point to the pressing need for a critical expansion of reductionist models of psychopathology. Importantly, the cultural-historical environment to which we refer is not a set of neutral social relations to which individuals are homogeneously exposed, such that aspects that are usually studied under the social determinants of health and disease (poverty, discrimination, violence, and other factors that represent sources of control, production, and distribution of material resources, ideology, and power) need to be incorporated in adequate biopsychosocial models of mental distress.

Exploring the nuanced and often elusive realm of pre-reflective consciousness presents a methodological challenge, as it involves capturing experiences that arise prior to reflective thought and language. This article introduces Phenomenological Mapping, an innovative research method designed to systematically study the pre-reflective dimensions of human experience. Grounded in the foundational theories of Edmund Husserl (2012), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2013), and Martin Heidegger (1992, 2008), the approach also integrates contemporary perspectives from Dan Zahavi (1999, Contemporary Phenomenology and Qualitative Research 5(1), 1-17, 2021), Shaun Gallagher (2006, 2017), and Evan Thompson (2010, 2017). Drawing upon advancements in neurophenomenology, embodied cognition, and intersubjectivity, Phenomenological Mapping provides a structured framework for accessing and analyzing pre-reflective consciousness. This methodology guides researchers through a sequence of eleven phases, from initial preparation and contextualization to data collection, analysis, and integration. It employs Husserl's phenomenological reduction, Merleau-Ponty's concept of embodied perception, and Heidegger's exploration of being-in-the-world. The approach is further enriched by Zahavi's intersubjectivity, Gallagher's work on embodiment, and Thompson's continuum of consciousness. By utilizing multisensory data collection techniques-such as visual diaries, audio recordings, and experiential practices-Phenomenological Mapping offers a multi-dimensional approach to analyzing subjective experience. This research contributes a novel methodological tool to phenomenology, facilitating an empirical investigation that remains faithful to the philosophical foundations of pre-reflective consciousness while bridging empirical and theoretical domains.

The paper critically analyses cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) in two most important aspects - the basic unit of analysis (i.e., in essence, the subject of the theory) and the main epistemological and methodological principles. It is shown with several examples that the concepts and principles that CHAT took from Vygotsky's theory are absent in Vygotsky's theory and are ascribed to him by misunderstanding and misinterpretation. One may agree or disagree that cultural-historical theory and activity theory are different theories, despite their historical connections, but Leontiev's theory has no activity (and the concept of activity! ) as a unit of analysis, because the principle of the unity of consciousness and activity theory represents a completely different logic of analysis, which does not need units of analysis at all.

The present paper treats the issue of methodological assumptions in mainstream neuropsychology and, as counter-concepts, in Vygotsky's approach and Holzkamp's critical psychology. The analysis identifies four main assumptions concerning the methodology of mainstream neuropsychology, which are contrasted with the positions of other approaches. The methodologies of the mainstream neuropsychology vs. Holzkamp's and Vygotsky's approach assume: (1) mechanistic vs. dialectical materialism; (2) formal vs. dialectical logic; (3) decomposition into elements vs. units; (4) reductionism of psychic processes to the brain vs. activity as a unity of environmental and organism-pole. Despite the vast coincidence in their main assumptions, we also discuss nuances of difference between Holzkamp's and Vygotsky's approaches. The former, possibly due to its reference to cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) and its theoretical neglection of the organism-pole of psychic functions, falls short of structural considerations in its accounts on phylogenetic emergence. On the other hand, Vygotsky's neuropsychology does not fully explore the phylogenetic emergence of basic units of functional psychic organisation. This might be due to certain implications of Vygotsky's initial accounts, which seem to highlight cultural development to the detriment of phylogenetic one.

In this article, the authors aim to offer a perspective on self-compassion capable of becoming part of a unified psychology; however not "from scratch", but based on what Neff (2003a, b) proposed. This is through the analysis and refinement of her theory in two stages. First, they check whether the supposed six factors exist in the constitution of self-compassion using the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) technique in a collected sample for this study (249 participants, 69.8% women ranging in age from 18 to 65, median = 22). In the second stage, they analyze and refine Neff's theory based on the results of the EFA, and in light of an evolutionary perspective and Aristotle's philosophy, following, respectively, the suggestions proposed by Zagaria et al. (2020); Osmo and Borri (2024a) that aim to unify psychological science.