Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to attitude formation or change toward an object due to that object's mere co-occurrence with another valenced object or objects. This chapter focuses on the "how" question, that is, the question of what cognitive processes intervene between mere co-occurrence and attitude formation or change. Though EC has typically been thought of as occurring through a single, albeit contentious, mechanism, we begin by pointing out that both the heterogeneity of EC methodologies and the abundance of inconsistent results suggest that multiple processes with different characteristics can produce EC. We describe how the earliest posited process of EC, Pavlovian conditioning or signal learning, is a valid mechanism of EC that appears to have operated in some experiments but is unlikely to have operated in others and also cannot account for various EC findings. We describe other mechanisms of EC, when they can be expected to occur, and what characteristics they have. We particularly focus our attention on a process model of EC we have recently introduced, the implicit misattribution model. Finally, we describe the implications of a multi-process view of EC, which we argue can help resolve theoretical controversies and further the application of EC as a practical intervention for influencing attitudes in various domains.

In this article, we discuss the hypothesis that affect is a fundamental, psychologically irreducible property of the human mind. We begin by presenting historical perspectives on the nature of affect. Next, we proceed with a more contemporary discussion of core affect as a basic property of the mind that is realized within a broadly distributed neuronal workspace. We then present the affective circumplex, a mathematical formalization for representing core affective states, and show that this model can be used to represent individual differences in core affective feelings that are linked to meaningful variation in emotional experience. Finally, we conclude by suggesting that core affect has psychological consequences that reach beyond the boundaries of emotion, to influence learning and consciousness.

The perception of social categories, emotions, and personality traits from others' faces each have been studied extensively but in relative isolation. We synthesize emerging findings suggesting that, in each of these domains of social perception, both a variety of bottom-up facial features and top-down social cognitive processes play a part in driving initial perceptions. Among such top-down processes, social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in how we perceive others' faces. Extending the Dynamic Interactive framework (Freeman & Ambady, 2011), we outline a perspective whereby the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as emerging from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. Such an account of social perception would envision perceptions to be a rapid, but gradual, process of negotiation between the variety of visual cues inherent to a person and the social cognitive knowledge an individual perceiver brings to the perceptual process. We describe growing evidence in support of this perspective as well as its theoretical implications for social psychology.