The often-asserted relation of formal adequacy or elective affinity between capitalism and democracy is historically contingent on both sides of the relation. First, it holds for what Weber called "formally rational capitalism" - which is the form that Marx had previously investigated in - rather than others, such as traditional commercial capitalism or politically oriented capitalism. Second, it holds only to the extent that "the comprehensive contradiction" identified by Marx at the heart of the democratic constitution can be resolved: the contradiction between a universal franchise that potentially gives subaltern classes control over legislative and executive powers and a constitution that protects property rights favourable to capital. Building upon Poulantzas, it is then argued that these conditions are being undermined by the rise of new forms of political capitalism, especially finance-dominated accumulation, that are facilitated in turn by the consolidation of both neoliberalism and "authoritarian statism". This involves the intensification of "exceptional" elements in a formally democratic shell, and the emergence of a permanent state of austerity. The article concludes with comments on the limits of finance-dominated accumulation and the austerity state.

The contribution begins by attempting to specify the corona crisis' essence and form by means of acceleration theory. In so doing, the diagnosis of a politically induced, objectively measurable deceleration is pivotal. In a second step, the social theoretical conclusions from this diagnosis are drawn in contrast to system theory on the one hand, and neomarxist approaches on the other. The focus is on the argument that the political reaction to SARS-CoV‑2 can neither be explained by reference to the principles of functional differentiation nor through the logic of securing political power or through capital accumulation. Following this line of thought, the article maps out the possibilities created by the crisis for societal path and system change, and outlines the role that sociology as a scientific discipline can and should play in this historical situation.

The corona pandemic is a medical catastrophe that is intricately intertwined with an epochal economic-ecological double or "pincer-grip" crisis - thus goes the central thesis of this contribution. COVID-19 is defined as an "external shock" followed by a deep recession. Leaving aside the natural process of viral mutation, the pandemic, recession and pincer-grip crisis can be understood as distinct repulsions of an hyperglobalization that is gradually undermining its own conditions of existence. Meanwhile, the recent rupture cannot be adequately grasped without taking into account the financial crash of 2007 to 2009, the political interregnum of the post-crisis years and the tendency towards bonapartistic democracy. By itself, the corona crisis will not lead to a "build back better"; the emergency state is hardly capable of such a setting of the course. Instead, there is a rising danger that fierce conflicts over distribution, increasing inequality and desolidarization will make a turn to sustainability even harder.

The COVID-19 pandemic does not herald a new social era. Rather, the mechanisms of dealing with the pandemic, as far as they can be identified at this point, bear testimony to the structural socio-economic and socio-political crisis that must be regarded as the signature of democratic capitalism. Nor should the prevailing crisis management be misunderstood as a "politics of life" which (at least temporarily) suspends the capitalist logic of accumulation and of profit: as it is only certain lives that the governments of the democratic-capitalist industrialized countries are committed to saving and protecting. This means that any adoption of the life-coaching semantics of "crisis as an opportunity" should be treated with caution. However, for sociology itself the current circumstances could indeed offer an opportunity: that is, if it would finally stop denying that its own practice is inextricably enmeshed in (trans-)formative social processes and is never unideological, nor value-free, nor politically neutral.

The rise of China has led to a series of conflicts with the leading Western countries. The reasons for these disputes are that Chinese corporations have become serious competitors for US and European companies and that there are diverging approaches of governing the market between Western and Chinese power elites. In China, political and economic power are organized differently than in the US and the EU. The party-state is the (partial) owner of important companies and openly intervenes in the national economy by five-year plans. Furthermore, the Communist Party of China is engaged in companies as a regulatory authority. At the same time, the party-state organizes its rule through output legitimacy and functions in many respects as an indicator-driven, meritocratic system. The expansion of hybrid Chinese party-state capitalism is therefore leading to a new system conflict. Economically, emerging Chinese (state-owned) enterprises are becoming competitors. Politically, the control of sensitive data flows and infrastructure networks is resulting in contention. The article analyzes current conflict dynamics between the US resp. the EU and China in the areas of foreign trade, investment, high technology, and industrial policy. Comparative political economy and world-system analysis guide the analysis. In each case, there are differences in the policy responses: The US has relied on aggressive trade and sanctions policies, while the EU has reacted more defensively. It is shown how these conflicts could change China's state-driven globalization strategy and contribute to the restructuring of the world economy.

The term "globalization" doesn't refer to a current epoch of world history, but to an undulated process interrupted by harsh setbacks. Its phases of upswing are characterized by exponential growth. They end when tipping points arrive. For globalization inevitably has its winners and losers, these phases are paralleled by processes of fragmentation in other countries, macro-regions and societies. The article provides a sketch of both types of processes, illustrated by examples from world history. It thereby shows that they must not be considered mere byproducts of technological development in transport and communication, but also depend on institutions that guarantee "International Public Goods" (IPGs), above all safety, stability and connectivity. Only great powers can provide this type of goods, for only they have the resources to do so, then again for only they are confronted with a volunteer's dilemma. Moreover globalization depends on a grand narrative that marginalizes competing schools of thought. Crises emerge either when transactions driving the process reach a tipping point, or when great powers decline and are no longer ready or able to provide IPGs. Now critical discourses emerge and become hegemonic in the face of successive crises undermining the grand narrative. This results in social division between cosmopolitans and populists. Both "big players" currently face different dilemmas conditioned by their positions as hegemonic power (USA) and freerider (China), in each case causing them to act neo-isolationist. The result: IPGs are no longer guaranteed, globalization is in crisis. This development has been catalysed by the Corona-pandemic.

The rise of rightwing populism in the last decade, but more recently also the seemingly "authoritarian" measures taken by the state in protection against the COVID-19 pandemic, inspire ever more frequent comparisons with historical fascism. The paper discusses to what extent such a diachronic comparison is empirically and methodologically sound. The analysis is based in Max Weber's concept of "ideal type", which can be used as a . The concept of "fascist minimum", which systematizes the structural features of fascist movements and regimes, provides a standard of comparison that combines theoretical rigor and empirical substance. Applying the concept of "fascist minimum", the article examines if and to what extent current tendencies of and in German politics deserve to be called "fascist".

Does the corona pandemic allow for a departure from the capitalist time regime? Can the crisis induce a more sustainable order of time? This article looks at the COVID-19 pandemic and the state interventions in response to it from the perspective of sociology of time and economic sociology. It shows that the social and economic disruptions attributed to the pandemic can be understood as the result of a collision of opposing temporal logics. In order to fight the pandemic, the state initially enforced ways of dealing with time that contradict the capitalist time regime and its major principles-commodification and rational use of time, acceleration, as well as appropriation of the future. However, and contrary to what e.g. Hartmut Rosa hopes, this "return of the state" as a time-political ordering power does not yet imply a path change towards a "new order of time" that lasts beyond the current state of emergency. The article shows that especially those state interventions that go beyond mere pandemic control can often be understood as attempts to mediate between different temporal logics. While they cushion the collision of opposing temporal logics, they are essentially intended to facilitate a "return" to the capitalist time regime. In doing so, they perpetuate time-related inequalities.

This article explores the question of what systemic relevance means in times of the pandemic and to what extent "systemic relevance" could become a component of the socio-political semantics of the 21st century. To answer this question, empirical, theoretical, and thought-experimental considerations are being combined. The first part understands systemic relevance as an actor category and examines the term's career and shifting meanings in different discursive contexts. The second part understands systemic relevance as an analytical category and discusses three theoretical perspectives that accompany the establishment of quasi-sociological observational schemes in everyday life and politics. Finally, the third part is devoted to the conceptual challenges for sociology during and after the pandemic. Starting from a conceptual gap in the discourse of systemic relevance, it is argued that we cannot talk meaningfully about systemic relevance without at the same time considering the expected or planned duration with which certain institutions are being closed down or put into minimal operation in critical situations.

The article examines the importance of social class in shaping solidarity orientations in Austria, especially with regard to welfare state arrangements and solidarity with refugees. It builds on 48 interviews conducted between 2016 and 2019. Distinguishing multiple dimensions of solidarity, the paper builds a typology of seven solidarity configurations, which are then systematically related to the class position of interviewees articulating them. In that context, not only objective class positions, but also latent mechanisms of habitus formation are taken into account. In so doing, the paper indicates how solidarity configurations of both privileged and non-privileged interviewees are shaped, but not determined by class. This casts new light on meaningful differences in the scope, conditions and underlying normative principles of distinct solidarity configurations. Class is key to understanding how attitudes towards the community of welfare solidarity are tied to specific preferences as to who should be included in and excluded from that community.

The economic difficulties following the COVID-19 pandemic have seemingly reinforced the need for geographic restructuring and a reshoring of production, as they have demonstrated the vulnerability of globalized production. This article provides an assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on the geographies of production. Criticizing overly simplified perspectives on globalization, the article argues that global production networks are multiscalar and politically shaped phenomena. Based on these theoretical considerations and case studies on the automotive, electronics and clothing industries, the article concludes that the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be interpreted as a trigger for a general retreat from global manufacturing, but it reinforced longer-standing shifts toward more multipolar production and consumption structures. While the issue of global production network resilience has attracted greater attention in corporate strategies and industrial policies, the localization and regionalization of production networks is only one of several strategies, and it has hardly been implemented so far. Ongoing disruptions of supply chains, increased transport costs, and, above all, geopolitically and environmentally motivated policies could well lead to greater re- or nearshoring. Political efforts in this direction are, however, limited by pre-existing global economic development paths and the balance of power associated with them. In the conclusions, the article stresses the necessity of a politically motivated restructuring of global production networks in the context of an urgently needed social-ecological transformation.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is having profound repercussions for the international system and the global economy. In this conversation, Boris Kagarlitsky, professor at the Moscow School for Social and Economic Sciences and long-standing analyst of Russian society, politics, and the global political economy, discusses the implications of the war on the Russian economy, its financial sector, and the Russian elite. Furthermore, Kagarlitsky analyzes the ongoing crisis of globalization, in particular Western sanctions, rising commodity prices, and the current role of China.