This research responds to an increasing volume of scholarly literature unpacking the recent dynamics of EU foreign policy discourses and practices vis-à-vis China. Drawing on the theoretical approach of collective securitisation, this article shows that EU foreign policy towards China since the mid-2010s has witnessed increasing collective securitisation moves directed at multiple policy frames, including Asian regional security frame, economic security frame, political security frame and information and technology and cybersecurity frame. The EU's attempts to securitise China as an existential threat across multiple issue areas have been triggered by a combination of long-term trends and specific sets of precipitating events, which contributed to galvanising the EU's collective securitising discourses and subsequent policy initiatives. However, this research finds that the EU's securitising moves and relevant speech acts have not resulted in a coherent audience response among the EU member states. The divergent views held by the EU's internal audience on whether China should be perceived as an existential threat have hampered the implementation of the EU's collective policy outputs.

Climate change has been socially constructed crisscrossed by public and private interests, asymmetries and world-view conflicts. When it comes to the legitimacy of norms to address the complexities of social conditions of vulnerability and effective actions to fulfil distributive and climate justice principles, climate change still faces a discrepancy between political announcements and incongruous practices of international actors. While analysing the cases of China and the European Union, we point out contradictions stemming from their policy goals guided by strategic interests. From a global climate justice perspective, we analyze recent power dynamics that operate at two levels: first, economic relations and negotiations between Brazil and the two poles of power, considering the scenario of socio-environmental injustice and climate insecurity; second, policy practices of both global players in climate governance, bearing in mind the notions of climate justice and development as conceptual guides to understand when and where contradictions emerge. To do so, this article is structured around three sections: (i) a brief historical account of China's and the EU's roles in international climate policy; (ii) their legacies in climate governance and the inextricable relationship between their normative behaviour and their development objectives; (iii) an overview of the signing of the strategic memorandum of understanding for economic and trade agreement between Mercosur and the EU in 2019, as well as Sino-Brazilian relations facilitating investments and trade in multiple segments vis-à-vis the most recent multifaceted backlash in Brazil's socio-environmental and climate policies.

How did Britons view China in 2020, at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic? This paper presents new, detailed evidence of the negative and worsening perceptions of China in the UK across three domains: public opinion (based on survey data collected in autumn 2020), political elites in parliament, and the media. The worsening of perceptions of China emerged in the context of a changing and more contested China policy from the UK government and a greater level of public debate about China, partly a consequence of the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. The paper places analysis of these perceptions in the context of the development of relations between the UK and China. Together with deteriorating Chinese views of the UK's China policy and controversy over a number of developments in China, widespread negative views about China among the British public and in political circles will constrain UK-China relations from developing in a more positive direction.

Climate justice is a concept with many different and competing interpretations. It has salience at intra-country, inter-country and intergenerational levels of climate politics. While inter-country climate justice has long been on the agenda of United Nations climate negotiations, the intra-country and intergenerational aspects of climate justice have assumed new prominence in many countries in recent years, as the economic consequences of mitigation became felt and transnational activism highlighted youth concerns. The diverse elements of and approaches to climate justice have this in common: realising them requires massive financial interventions and reforms. This article examines the still emerging frameworks to finance climate justice in two of the jurisdictions most important to the global response to climate change: the European Union and the People's Republic of China. The EU and China have in common that they are both on the front line of financial innovation to respond to climate change. They are utilising similar tools of systemic financial intervention in order to transition financing to climate-friendly investment, in the first case domestically, but with clear implications for global financial markets. However, the EU and China are utilising climate financing mechanisms in the context of very different prevailing perspectives on climate justice. This article interrogates the relationship between these different perspectives on climate justice and the distribution, scale and pace of climate finance. The article also observes that while the EU incorporated climate justice considerations in its economic responses to the COVID-19 pandemic with a recovery package prioritising climate action, China did not take the opportunity to foster a 'green recovery'.

The Visegrad Group format - coordinated policy forum for Czechia, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary - has been dubbed as a significant policy tool that advocates the interests and builds synergies among the four partners. The "Visegrad Four + " format, which coordinates foreign relations of these four countries, has been narrated as the key foreign policy venue of the V4, and the V4 + Japan is often understood as the key partnership within this format. Due to the recently growing Chinese influence in Central and Eastern Europe, and the impacts of the war in Ukraine in 2022, many have come to expect the coordination to strengthen and ramify. This article argues, however, that the V4 + Japan platform represents only a marginal policy forum and is unlikely to gain any significant political momentum in the foreseeable future. Basing the analysis on a set of interviews with the V4 and Japanese policymakers, the paper posits three reasons that have prevented the deepening of the V4 + Japan coordination: (i) there are significant limits to socialization in the group, (ii) there are diverse threat perceptions among V4 members, and (iii) there is little interest in deepening economic coordination vis-a-vis third parties. These findings question the viability of foreign policy coordination among the Visegrad Group members, and highlight the impediments for the expansion of V4 + Japan cooperation.

Since 2011, the European Union's (EU) free trade agreements (FTAs) include a Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapter which provides for environmental and labour commitments. Nevertheless, the ratification and implementation of these commitments remain insufficient. It is therefore essential to analyse whether the EU has become more ambitious in enforcing the TSD chapter. To analyse the chapter's enforceability, the EU's FTAs with South Korea, Canada and Japan have been compared. The comparative analysis was based on three elements: the labour and environmental commitments, institutional mechanisms and the enforcement procedure. Concerning the latter, the ongoing EU-Korea dispute settlement case over workers' rights in South Korea is the leading example. Until the Commission reveals more assertive enforcement plans, it can be said that the EU has not become more ambitious in enforcing its TSD chapter. Since no major changes were detected in the comparative analysis, several interviewees proposed enforcement mechanisms.

China launched an ambitious strategy known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 with an objective to promote regional economic growth and integration. The initiative was implemented primarily through massive investment in transportation infrastructure development among the Belt and Road countries to improve transportation connectivity and reduce trade costs. While such a strategy has been implemented for more than seven years, it remains unclear to what extent the investment of transportation infrastructure has affected the regional economic performance in various countries. To clarify this question, this study provides an in-depth assessment of BRI investment in transportation infrastructure using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Different from previous studies, the regional economic impact was evaluated through CGE simulations based on the actual investment data obtained from various sources. In addition, both the change of intraregional and interregional trade costs as a result of BRI transportation infrastructure investment was estimated. The results show that the transportation infrastructure investment in BRI has generated different impacts among regions. In particular, China, Central and West Asian countries have gained significant growth in GDP, employment, and economic welfare, whereas the economic impact of transportation infrastructure investment in the Central and West Europe is relatively minor. Overall, the research findings provide important policy implications for future transportation infrastructure investment in BRI countries and beyond.

Over the past decade, the series of crises in the EU, the rise of China, and the outbreak of the global pandemic have complicated contemporary EU-China relations. In this context, studies on the bilateral relationship have thrived. However, little is known how the complex relationship is reflected in the self-construction of one side through the understanding of the other. This special issue aims to contribute to this area. It consists of five articles, revealing the communication gap as seen from three perspectives, namely, official policy statements, mass media representations, and public opinion polls. Together, these sources provide empirical evidence on the different interpretations of "the other" in the reflection of "self" between the EU and China and the consequences they have caused. The special issue of this journal will shed light on the logical growth point and current soil of EU-China relations and help to promote mutual understanding and the establishment of mutual trust.

Amid rising uncertainty in the global economy and unprecedented economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the concept of supply chain resilience has gained increasing popularity in ASEAN and the EU. However, by comparing their paths to resilient supply chains, this article argues that while both organizations regard resilience as a departure from past doctrines of pure economic efficiency, each has a different understanding of and approach to supply chain resilience. While for ASEAN, supply chain resilience is meant to reconcile inward- and outward-looking dimensions to support ASEAN competitiveness, within the EU, resilience is associated with the search for strategic autonomy with an internal focus. Despite these differences, both groups regard sustainability and digital transformation as crucial components of supply chain resilience, which they see as a way to enhance their economic cooperation and strategic partnership.

This paper provides a historical overview regarding the emergence, development and deepening of divergences between the European Union (EU) and the People's Republic of China (China) in reducing global aviation emissions. It focuses on their divergences on three specific issues, i.e. under which framework to tackle global aviation emissions, whether and how to reflect the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) principle in the design and implementation of the global market-based measures (MBMs) for international aviation and which role the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) should play in offsetting these emissions. Besides, this paper explains the driving forces behind these divergences by examining both normative and economic-related factors, which have formed different stances of both sides. From a Chinese perspective, considerations about the issues of state sovereignty, fairness regarding burden sharing in tackling climate change, the development of China's aviation and aircraft manufacturing and its limited capability in promoting the large-scale SAF deployment help explain its hardline stance on reducing global aviation emissions. As for the EU, perceptions of its leading role in the global climate governance and the CBDR-RC principle, the targets of strengthening the EU ETS role in the global carbon market, and the competitiveness of the European airlines are underlying reasons behind its attempt to include the international aviation under its ETS. Moreover, the EU member states' support to the ICAO can be explained through the conformity between the emissions offsetting objectives under this organisation and the EU's current climate policies.

The twenty-first century has brought in its wake a flurry of competing foreign investment players on the African investment sphere. This situation may be called the globalization of foreign investment (Bodomo 2017). Foreign investment features as a salient issue for intellectual discussions of topics such as agency, soft power, and symmetry. In this paper, we outline the important role that China and the European Union (EU), the biggest investment polities in Africa, have played in the globalization of investment in Africa and argue that China has, indeed, created a paradigm shift with respect to its investment engagement with the African continent. This paradigm shift may be calibrated in terms of the volume of engagement; in terms of the speed and efficiency with which investment projects are completed, and, in terms of the very discourse of trade and investment. The argument is advanced further by discussing some of the main features of Chinese investment that distinguish it from that of other global players on the African continent, such as Europe. We further extend arguments from our previous work (Bodomo 2017; Bodomo and Che 2020) to say that if Africa does not sharpen its agency, the end result may be that China and the EU may gain at the expense of Africa but that should Africa play a more proactive and controlling role such as enforcing its investment laws, the mid-twenty-first century may yet see a trilateral win-win-win outcome for Africa, China, and the EU.

To address environmental problems, efforts to green financial systems are proliferating across the globe. However, green finance policy approaches differ substantially and in ways left unexplained in current literature. Focusing on the EU and China as the most active and influential in green finance, the paper provides a comparative analysis and conceptualization of their approaches. The analysis is based on the dissection of policy documents, a review of stakeholder statements and articles, and insights from semi-structured interviews and participant observation. The paper finds that in terms of similar characteristics, both parties seek inclusive expertise input, establish thematic committees, and initiate green finance efforts through financial system-wide guidelines. In terms of different characteristics, the paper finds that through a consultation-based, transparent, and limited mandate approach, the EU is characterized by longer time horizons and organic growth. This can be contrasted with the Chinese technocratic, closed-door, and non-limited mandate approach, characterized by rapid rollout and command-and-control growth. These findings can be conceptualized as a approach in the EU and a approach in China. The different approaches help explain current difficulties in coordination between the EU and China and imply that cooperation is only possible through compatibility rather than harmonization. The findings show that different governance models can actively use the state to pursue sustainable development, and second that such an active state can function in very different ways towards the same goals.

The China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) is a balanced, high-level, and mutually beneficial investment agreement. It not only sets up a new legal framework for China-EU economic and trade relations, but also provides stability for China-EU bilateral relations in an uncertain world experiencing major changes.

The formal conclusion of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investments (CAI) has drawn much criticism. Criticisms for member states did not always recognise the same critical points. The case of Italy presents an instance in which the issue rather than laying in the content of the agreement was identified in the process. Not only had Italy been marginalised in the process of negotiation that led to the conclusion of the CAI, but also exponents from the government claim that leading negotiators, amongst which France and Germany, ignored Italy's doubts about the deal when these were raised. Beyond politics, the paper shows that the Italian business community displays a response to the agreement in line with that of the rest of the EU in its positive assessment of the outcome.

This article offers a novel understanding of China's changing engagement in global climate governance over the past decade. This article argues that China has embedded the construction of its international identity, which has been transforming towards what this article conceptualizes to be a 'Yinling leading power', in promoting and leading global climate governance. China's transforming identity construction has contributed to changing its construction of climate justice and led China to proactively undertake more responsibilities, provide international public goods and promote international climate cooperation. Global climate governance has become one of China's prototypical discursive frames in constructing its new international identity, an important platform where China seeks to share leadership with other major powers and the climate leadership in turn constitutes China's new identity. However, China's inadequate response to international expectations and lack of self-reflection in its climate policy have influenced international recognition on its climate leadership and new identity. In general, China's transforming identity construction and its reconstruction of climate justice have far-reaching implications for China and Europe to cooperate and coordinate in strengthening global climate justice and promoting global climate governance.

The significance of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for Europe is increasing. The diplomatic initiative "16 + 1," comprising China and 16 Central, East and Southeast European economies (CESEE), expanded to a "17 + 1" format in April 2019, when Greece officially joined the cooperation forum. This expansion revived interest in Chinese activities aimed at better physical and digital connectivity in Europe and their effects. The article descriptively shows a geographical division of Chinese infrastructure development activities in Europe: the "17 + 1" region is targeted more intensively by Chinese construction projects. Moreover, roughly 90% of all construction contracts with the "17 + 1" region are attributable to connectivity sectors, while Chinese activities in other European regions are more diversified. In Europe, the Western Balkans are expected to economically benefit the most from the BRI, as they show particularly high deficiencies in infrastructure, and so far, have limited access to EU grants. Economic effects of infrastructure projects, however, trickle through European production and supply chains, affecting a larger number of countries than information on projects would suggest. EU initiatives presented since 2018 may help to increase complementarity between Chinese and European infrastructure development plans and reduce associated risks, such as unsustainable debt or new trade barriers arising from increased competition for Chinese investments. The BRI is about to change physical and digital connectivity within Europe, while the EU has yet to become an active player engaging in the initiative, in order to enable improved connectivity in Europe to drive economic convergence and not political divergence.

The major objective of the China-EU CAI was to facilitate a rebalancing of the bilateral relationship by improving access for European companies to the Chinese market and leveling the playing field for them in China. While progress on the former is hard to deny, the situation is less rosy on the latter, and whether China will expeditiously implement its commitments remains an open question. France-one of the driving forces behind the deal-shares the European Commission's optimism and considers that the agreement represents a step forward and a sign of China's willingness to open up further.

This paper explores the impact of infrastructure on trade connectivity among ASEAN and three Asian countries-India, China, and Japan. Our study is mainly motivated by the increased infrastructure investment and trade among these countries in recent years. The main results of trade network analysis include high trade density and interconnectedness among ASEAN, India, China, and Japan. There are specific "trade intensive paths" among the few countries in the group. It highlights the "export hubs" or main "suppliers of intermediate goods" in the region. Further, the paper analyzed the nexus between trade connectivity and infrastructure by applying the panel fixed effects method and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. Moreover, the robustness of the results is tested by estimating two-stage least square. Hard infrastructure, foreign direct investment plays a crucial role in bringing the nexus to trade connectivity. Reducing trade barriers and improving infrastructure quality are essential for deepening regional trade integration.

In the period between 2015 and 2020, we have witnessed an increase in 'system friction' in the trade and investment relations between the EU and the People's Republic of China (PRC). This paper focuses on the meaning of this notion of 'system friction', originally coined by Sylvia Ostry and on how the EU and especially the European Commission reacted to this friction. This notion might present an alternative to the notion of 'system rivalry'. The result of system friction in the relation between the EU and the PRC had been a convergence towards more trade defensive moves. A form of managed trade with help of a ratified Investment treaty between the two sides might be a potential outcome.