There are an increasing number of ways to enhance human abilities, characteristics, and performance. In recent years, the ethical debate on enhancement has focused mainly on the ethical evaluation of new enhancement technologies. Yet, the search for an adequate and shared understanding of enhancement has always remained an important part of the debate. It was initially undertaken with the intention of defining the ethical boundaries of enhancement, often by attempting to distinguish enhancements from medical treatments. One of the more recent approaches comes from Julian Savulescu, Anders Sandberg, and Guy Kahane. With their welfarist account, they define enhancement in terms of its contribution to individual well-being: as any state of a person that increases the chances of living a good life in the given set of circumstances. The account aims to contribute both to a shared and clear understanding of enhancement and to answering the question of whether we should enhance in certain ways or not. I will argue that it cannot live up to either claim, in particular because of its inherent normativity and its failure to adequately define well-being. Nevertheless, it can make a valuable contribution to an ethics of enhancement. As I will show, the welfarist account refocuses the debate on a central value in health care: well-being, which can be a relevant aspect in assessing the permissibility of biomedical interventions - especially against the background of new bioethical challenges. To fulfil this function, however, a more differentiated understanding of well-being is needed.

Forensic mental health services (FMHS) involve restricting certain individual rights to uphold or promote other ethical values - the restriction of liberty in various forms is justified with reference to health and safety of the individual and the community. The tension that arises from this has been construed as a hallmark of the practice and an ever-present quandary for practitioners. Stating this ethical dilemma upfront is a common point of departure for many texts discussing FMHS. But do we run the risk of missing something important if setting the ethical scene rather than exploring it? This paper draws on interviews with three types of interested parties in mental health law proceedings - patients, psychiatrists and public defenders, and seeks to tease out what values are enacted when they describe and discuss experiences of FMHS and court proceedings. In doing so, we find emphasized values such as acceptance, telling it like it is, atonement, normality, and ensuring the future. We find that well-delineated and separate values are not necessarily the basis for decisions. We also find potential for explanation and guidance in bringing ethical discourse closer to everyday practice.

Multi-professional teams have become increasingly common in healthcare. Collaboration within such teams aims to enable knowledge amalgamation across specializations and to thereby improve standards of care for patients with complex health issues. However, multi-professional teamwork comes with certain challenges, as it requires successful communication across disciplinary and professional frameworks. In addition, work in multi-professional teams is often characterized by medical dominance, i.e., the perspective of physicians is prioritized over those of nurses, social workers, or other professionals. We argue that medical dominance in multi-professional teams can lead to institutional epistemic injustice, which affects both providers and patients negatively. Firstly, it codifies and promotes a systematic and unfair credibility deflation of the perspectives of professionals other than physicians. Secondly, it indirectly promotes epistemic injustice towards patients via leading to institutional opacity; i.e., via creating an intransparent system of credibility norms that is difficult to navigate. To overcome these problems, multi-professional teamwork requires institutional settings that promote epistemic equity of team members.

Healthcare systems produce significant greenhouse gas emissions, raising an important question: should healthcare be treated like any other polluter when it comes to reducing its emissions, or is healthcare special because of its essential societal role? On one hand, reducing emissions is critical to combat climate change. On the other, healthcare depends on emissions to deliver vital services. The resulting tension surrounds an idea of healthcare exceptionalism and leads to the question I consider in this paper: to what extent (if any) should the valuable goals of healthcare form an exception to the burdens of reducing greenhouse gas emissions? The goals of this paper are twofold. One is to think about how to address the issue of healthcare exceptionalism. Second is to discuss the extent of healthcare's climatic responsibilities. I examine two perspectives on healthcare exceptionalism. The first treats a responsibility to reduce emissions and the delivery of healthcare as separate issues, each governed by its own principle. I reject this view, proposing instead that we consider healthcare's environmental responsibilities in conjunction with its essential functions. I defend an "inability to pay" principle, suggesting that while healthcare should indeed contribute to mitigating climate change, its obligations should be constrained by the necessity of maintaining its core goals like protecting health and preventing disease. Healthcare should be treated differently from other sectors, but not to the extent that it is entirely exempt from efforts to reduce emissions.

Compassion is an essential phenomenon in the therapeutic relationship, and some use it to justify physician-assisted dying practices. The value of compassion in the relationship between healthcare professionals and patients is undeniable. However, different approaches to its definition and scope can lead to distinct conclusions about the role of compassion in end-of-life interventions. In this context, the paper aims to compare Mahatma Gandhi's and Aristotle's views on compassion to explore whether it can be utilized to justify physician-assisted dying. Gandhi's thoughts on compassion and Aristotle's standpoint on virtues and vices demonstrate that Gandhi evaluates this concept as a moral duty to relieve intractable suffering, whereas Aristotle relies on balancing all virtues through relevant deficiencies and excesses. Therefore, even though Gandhi's opinion on compassion can for allow assisted dying interventions, Aristotle's idea of virtues and vices restricts compassion to a scope that alleviates suffering through available means without causing death.

This paper seeks to determine the extent to which individuals with borderline personality disorders can be held morally responsible for a particular subset of their actions: disproportionate anger, aggressions and displays of temper. The rationale for focusing on these aspects lies in their widespread acknowledgment in the literature and their plausible primary association with blame directed at BPD patients. BPD individuals are indeed typically perceived as "difficult patients" (Sulzer 2015:82; Bodner et al. 2011), significantly more so than schizophrenic or depressive patients (Markam 2003). The "responsibility question" for patients with BPD has already been raised (Martin 2010; Zachar and Potter 2009; Bray 2003), but this paper tackles it from a novel perspective. First, I narrow down the category of things for which the responsibility question is specific to individual with BPD. After that, I argue that some of the diagnosis criteria of BPD such as emotional instability or impulsivity might serve as excusing factors targeting the "control condition" on moral responsibility. Second, this paper also considers another widely accepted condition on moral responsibility: the epistemic condition. The view defended in the paper is that the answer to the responsibility question for individuals with BPD, concerning both the control condition and the epistemic condition, hinges on an understanding of their epistemic profile.

Silence is a byword for socially imposed harm in the burgeoning literature on epistemic injustice in psychiatry. While some silence is harmful and should be broken, this understanding of silence is untenably simplistic. Crucially, it neglects the possibility that silence can also play a constructive epistemic role in the lives of people with mental illness. This paper redresses that neglect. Engaging with first-person accounts of mania, it contends that silence constitutes a crucial form of epistemic agency to people who experience mania and that the prevailing failure to recognise this may harm them. The paper proceeds as follows. After briefly examining the negative understanding of silence in the epistemic injustice literature, it outlines three epistemically agential silences: communicative silence, listening silence, and withholding silence. It then deploys these concepts to explore how the ability to perform epistemically agential silence is impaired in mania and why such silences are vital to people. The penultimate section highlights two ways that the failure to recognise the epistemic value of silence can harm people with mania. The paper concludes by drawing out implications for future research on epistemic injustice in psychiatry.

Artificial intelligence-based clinical decision support systems have a potential to improve clinical practice, but they may have a negative impact on the physician-patient dialogue, because of the control problem. Physician-patient dialogue depends on human qualities such as compassion, trust, and empathy, which are shared by both parties. These qualities are necessary for the parties to reach a shared understanding -the merging of horizons- about clinical decisions. The patient attends the clinical encounter not only with a malfunctioning body, but also with an 'unhomelike' experience of illness that is related to a world of values and meanings, a life-world. Making wise individual decisions in accordance with the patient's life-world requires not only scientific analysis of causal relationships, but also listening with empathy to the patient's concerns. For a decision to be made, clinical information should be interpreted considering the patient's life-world. This side of clinical practice is not a job for computers, and they cannot be final decision-makers. On the other hand, in the control problem users blindly accept system output because of over-reliance, rather than evaluating it with their own judgement. This means over-reliant parties leave their place in the dialogue to the system. In this case, the dialogue may be disrupted and mutual trust may be lost. Therefore, it is necessary to design decision support systems to avoid the control problem and to limit their use when this is not possible, in order to protect the physician-patient dialogue.

Endometriosis, a chronic inflammatory condition affecting 10% of biological women, is widely understudied and particularly overlooked in later life. Discussions surrounding endometriosis predominantly centre on medical gender bias during reproductive years, with limited attention to intersecting factors of discrimination and the impact of ageism on affected individuals. As endometriosis is framed as a disease of reproductive age, research is lacking when it comes to the effects of the illness on the older population. Symptoms in (post)menopausal individuals are frequently misattributed to other ailments due to ageist and sexist preconceptions, leading to prolonged diagnoses and mistreatment. This is a social justice issue in which age and sex contribute to the discrimination of a certain population - namely older biological women living with endometriosis. In this paper, we approach this issue from the perspective of epistemic justice. The experiences of the affected persons are shaped by a lack of knowledge about endometriosis among both the healthcare personal and the affected person, as well as a lack of acknowledgement and consideration of the persons experiences. Using the lens of epistemic justice, we develop an analytical model to understand the intersection of age and gender in the experiences of endometriosis patients. This article contributes to ongoing debates on epistemic injustice and intersectionality within medicine and healthcare, offering an analytical model that connects the critical approaches of epistemic injustice and intersectionality to address health injustice. Ultimately, this work advocates for a comprehensive, lifespan approach to endometriosis that acknowledges and addresses intersecting forms of discrimination.

This article demonstrates the value of French philosophy of science for medical practice through an exposition of Michel Serres's philosophy of the body. It explores how Serres's examination of the similarity between scientific models and works of art can provide insight into different conceptions of the human body. What makes Serres's method of unique is that it does not see art and literature as subordinate to the natural sciences: they are both involved in mapping the communication lines of the body. Since early modernity, we can roughly speak of three successive communication models of the body: mechanical, thermodynamic and informational. This article finally discusses the relationship between those different conceptions and explains how they help to articulate different aspects of the body, health, and medical ethics.

False hope is costly for individuals, their loved ones, and society. Scholars have defined false hope as one that involves an epistemically unjustified belief. In this paper, I argue that this account of false hope is incomplete and that false hope should be conceptualized in terms of the way in which the agent attends to or focuses on a highly desired but unlikely outcome. I explain how this account better captures the distinctiveness of false hope.

Saving as many lives as possible while ensuring equity for vulnerable groups through access to triage resources has been the dominant position since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. However, the exact relationship between the principles of social justice and efficiency remains a controversial and unresolved issue. In this paper, we aim to systematically distinguish between different models of this relationship and show that conceptualizing social justice as a 'moral side-constraint' or adopting a 'balancing approach' that attempt to reconcile social justice with efficiency inevitably lead to significant moral costs that require further justification. Based on this discussion, we propose a novel "threshold model" for trading-off moral costs. According to this model, the structural impact of triage must be considered in order to determine whether one opts for triage with the primary aim of efficiency or social justice. This contextualization further explains why, in some societies and circumstances, social justice can rightly be seen as the primary concern, while in other societies and circumstances, efficiency can be defended as the primary concern.

Some philosophical and metaethical theories have tried to provide a fundamental background for bioethics but miss the fundamental question about what medicine is, its nature and its end. We argue that the philosophy of medicine, through the development that Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma gave to this field of study, allied with Aristotle's practical and teleological ethics, can provide an ontological background for bioethics beyond the tradition of principles and deontology, with particular emphasis on the uniqueness of the doctor-patient encounter. Some difficulties and criticisms of this ontological model are also examined.

The present paper highlights the urgency for a revitalization of the field of bioethics. The authors have identified the "malaise" present in contemporary bioethics, and they claim that it has become a boring way to approach medicine and life sciences instead of challenging them. Starting from a brief explanation of the origin of bioethics, this paper analyzes the main issues at the core of its malaise, i.e., its depersonalization and extreme specialization which exclude of a holistic view of the patient. Clinical ethics, an applied branch of bioethics, provides a prime example of a bioethical discipline that operates in real-world contexts, and it contrasts with the more theoretical nature of traditional bioethical frameworks. Thus, the inherent multidisciplinary nature of clinical ethics offers an opportunity to a way of connecting the hard and soft sciences, and, ultimately, of transcending this distinction in the medical humanities. The cure of the malaise of bioethics proposed in this article comes from the medical humanities, specifically from the applied humanities perspective, which offers a comprehensive approach to current world issues, including the fast evolution of technologies with applications to the health field.

Recent publications on digital health technologies highlight the importance of 'responsible' use. References to the concept of responsibility are, however, frequently made without providing clear definitions of responsibility, thus leaving room for ambiguities. Addressing these uncertainties is critical since they might lead to misunderstandings, impacting the quality and safety of healthcare delivery. Therefore, this study investigates how responsibility is interpreted in the context of using digital health technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), telemonitoring, wearables and mobile apps. We conducted a scoping review with a systematic search in PubMed, Web of Science, Embase, CINAHL and Philosopher's Index. A total of 34 articles were included and categorized using a theoretical framework of responsibility aspects, and revealed two main findings. First, we found that digital health technologies can expand and shift existing 'role responsibilities' among caregivers, patients and technology. Second, moral responsibility is often equated with liability or accountability, without clear justification. Articles describe new ways in which physicians can be held accountable, particularly in the context of AI, and discuss the emergence of a 'responsibility gap' where no-one can be fully responsible for AI-generated outcomes. The literature also shows that m-Health technologies can increase patients' accountability for their own health. However, there was limited discussion in the reviewed literature on whether these attributions of accountability are appropriate. We conclude with implications for practice and suggestions for expanding the theoretical framework of moral responsibility, recommending further study on responsibility of collectives and artificial entities, and on the role of virtue in digital health.

Empirical research on moral injury (MI) has rapidly evolved since 2009. Originally developed to address the moral dimensions of traumatic experiences among US veterans, MI has also found application in the context of traumatized refugees. This paper delves into the ethical and epistemological questions that arise when applying a concept originally rooted in a qualitatively distinct experience and a demographically different population to refugees. It is argued that the prevailing clinical and psychological conceptualization of MI may not adequately accommodate the unique needs and experiences of refugee populations. This examination underscores the imperative of conceptualizing to better serve the ethical and epistemic demands of refugee communities.